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Résumé
La discipline de l’éthologie cognitive étudie la nature et l’évolution des capacités
cognitives chez les animaux. Selon deux éthologues éminents, C. Allen et M. Bekoff. le
statut scientifique de cette discipline fait l’objet de vives contestations et se heurte à
plusieurs objections. Cette thèse a deux objectifs. Dans la première partie,j’examine les
quatre objections les plus importantes qui ont été avancées contre le projet de l’éthologie
cognitive. Il s’agit d’objections qui visent à montrer, en particulier, qu’il n’est pas
légitime d’attribuer des états mentaux intentionnels aux animaux. Les objections sont: j)
que les animaux «ont pas de langage, et donc pas de pensées, ii) que l’attribution d’état
mentaux aux animaux n’est qu’une forme d’anthropomorphisme, iii) que, même si les
animaux possédaient des état mentaux, on ne pourrait pas les connaître, car les esprits des
animaux sont inacccessibles. et iv) que sur le plan expérimental, il est pratiquement
impossible d’élaborer des expériences qui démontreraient que les animaux ont des états
mentaux J’ essaierai de montrer que ces objections n’ont qu’une force ‘prima facie’ et
qu’elles ne réussissent pas à faire avorter le projet. Après cette discussion, il restera un
problème méthodologique qui ne sera résolu que dans la deuxième partie de la thèse, à
savoir le fait que les théories de type behavioriste expliquent aussi bien les
comportements observés chez les animaux que les théories de type mentaliste. Par
conséquent. il n’y aurait aucune raisons valable de postuler des états mentaux.
Dans la deuxieme partie, j’examine différentes théories de l’intentionnalité et de
l’attribution de concepts qui ont été avancées par des éthologues cognitifs, dans le but de
dégager les hypothèses les plus fructueuses en ce qui concerne le potentiel intentionnel et
conceptuel des animaux. Les théories de I’intentionnalité que je présente visent toutes à
identifier ou à attribuer des états mentaux intentionnels aux animaux. J’éxamine des
théories de quatre types: une théorie behavioriste, une théorie normative, la théorie de la
stratégie intentiommelle de D. Dennett, et la théorie téléologique de J. Bennett. Il s’avère
que la théorie de Bennett permet de résoudre le problème méthodologique laissé en
suspens à la fin de la première partie. Dans le dernier chapitre j’examine le projet de N.
Chater et C. Heyes de trouver une théorie des concepts qui s’appliquent aux animaux. Ils
prétendent que ce projet est voué à l’échec, puisqu’ils sont incapables de concevoir que
les concepts puissent être indépendants du langage. Je ne suis pas d’accord avec eux, etje
montre qcme ce sont plutôt leurs critères qui sont suspects. Je finis par esquisser une
théorie de l’attribution de concepts qui est indépendante du langage et applicable aux
animaux.
Ivlots clé: éthologie cognitive concepts: anthropomorphisme: contenu propositionel:
expérience subjective.
CAbstract
The discipline of cognitive ethoiogy is concerned prirnarily with an investigation
into the nature and evolution of cognitive capacities in non-hurnan animais (hereafier
animais). According to two erninent cognitive ethoiogists, the discipline of cognitive
ethoiogy faces challenges to its scientffic status. My aim in this thesis is two-foid. In
Part One, I wiil examine the four most important ofthe objections made to the discipline
of cognitive ethoiogy, in particular as they relate to the search for mental states in
animais, and show these objections as providing no reai obstacles to the search for mental
states in animais. The objections are that animais have no language therefore they cannot
have mental states and other types ofthought; that ail mental state attribution to animais
is anthropomorphism; that even if animais have mental states, we wiii flot be abie to gain
access to them because animais are ‘other minds’, and that the search for mental states in
animais is rendered nearly impossibie from an experimental point ofview, since ail
explanafions ofthe animals’ behavior are aiso accounted for by behaviorist expianations.
This methodological probiem wiii not be compieteiy solved in the first haif of the thesis.
Once T have demonstrated that there is no clear prima facie reason not to examine
the potentiai for mental states in animais, I examine in Part Two various theories of
intentionality and concept attribution that have been advanced by cognitive ethoiogists,
with the aim of pointing to the most fruitfui advances made by the discipline with regard
to exploring the potentiai for intentionai mental states and concepts in animais. The types
of intentional theories that I examine are ail concerned with the identification or
attribution of intentional (purposeful) mental states in animais. I examine four different
types, one that is behaviorist in nature. one that is normative in nature, Daniel Deirnett’s
Intentionai Stance theory, and Jonathan Beimett’s teleological theory. As it turns out,
Bennett’s theory ends up solving the methodologicai probiem left over from chapter four.
In the last chapter, I examine Nick Chater and Celia Heyes’ atternpt to search for a theory
of concepts that applies to animais. They daim that their search is unsuccessfui because
they carmot find a sense ofthe term ‘concept’ that is independent of language. I do flot
agree with their view and instead argue that it is their set of criteria that is at fault. I end
up finding a theory of concept attribution that is both independent of language and
applicable to animais.
Keywords: cognitive ethology; concepts; propositionai content; anthropomorphisrn;
subjective experience.
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Introduction
This thesis is concerned with an examination of the field of cognitive ethology
particularly as it bears on the search for mental states in animais. The field of cognitive
ethoiogy’s main aim is the study ofthe cognitive processes of animais.
Donald Griffin is credited with starting the discipline of cognitive ethology. He
had been working on the echolocation capacities of bats since the early 1970’s and was
giving a talk on his findings at Rockefeller University. Tomas Nagel was in the
audience, and witnessed Griffin’s post-colioquium treat ofreleasing bats in the
auditorium to dernonstrate the process of echolocation. Nagel was inspired to write an
essay in 1974 entitled “What is it Like to be a Bat?” (1974) which was about the elusive
phenomenon ofthe subjective point of view and the apparent failure of objective
scientific theories in capturing it. This essay in turn inspired Griffin to write a book
published in 1976 entitled “The Question of Animal Awareness” (1976), thus introducing
the question of the possibility of conscious awareness and other cognitive capacities in
animais. Hence was born the discipline of cognitive ethology.
Characteristic to the discipline of cognitive ethology is its interdisciplinary nature.
Input to the field includes philosophy, biology, and psychology as well as evolutionary
psychology. This interdiscipiinary nature makes for rich and varied discussion amongst
its participants. However, one drawback stemming from the lack of a common
background in the various participants in discussions is the absence of any standardized
agreement over what should be the proper objects of study and what methods should be
used to study them. Central to the study of cognitive ethology is a new ernphasis on
discovering the mental processes of animais. This new emphasis was inspired in part by
Donald Griffin’s hypothesis that some animais might have conscious awareness. These
two issues, particularly that of whether or flot and to what degree animais might be the
locus of cognitive processes, have sparked off much discussion.
Many thinkers have voiced their doubts about the viability of studying animal
cognition, offering up seerningly powerful arguments as to why animais carmot share the
capacity for possessing intentional mental states, concepts, thoughts and other qualities
Vthat we humans possess. As the eminent ethologists Colin Allen and Marc Bekoff note,
C the discipline of cognitive ethology has recently faced a challenge to its scientffic status
(1997:314). These arguments or objections to the project of cognitive ethology are
pervasive in the literature, and presented as obstacles to the project by those who question
its viability.
The inspiration for this thesis comes from an article titled “$layers, Skeptics and
Proponents” (1997) written by Allen and Bekoff. In this article they categorize the views
of comnientators on reviews of the work of Donald Griffin into tbree possible points of
view: that of a detractor (Slayer), a hopeftil fence-sitter ($keptic) and an advocate
(Proponent). From there, they were able to distill the objections against and arguments
for and against the discipline of cognitive ethology based on book review articles
commenting on the work of Donald Griffin. The objections treated by Allen and Bekoff
include that anthropomorphism is unscientific; that anecdotes are illegitimate forms of
data; that attribution mental states to animals is impossible and that cognitive ethology is
a soft science (1996:3 15).
Finding Allen and Bekoff s treatment ofthe main objections to be adequate but
somewhat too superficial and limited to the work of a single author, I chose to limit my
focus to the most damaging point of view vis-à-vis the status of cognitive ethology, that
ofthe detractor, and also to distill and compile a set of objections that were most
recurrent in my reading of the literature. I have devoted the first part of this dissertation
to an examination of some of the main objections from the detractor point of view made
to the project of investigating mental states in animals. My aim is to demonstrate that
although these objections might have primafacie force to them, upon further scrutiny
they end up being baseless. For each ofthe four objections, I have chosen to discuss an
author whom I believe is most representative ofthe objection. This allows me to discuss
the objection in some depth without compromising details.
The first objection has to do with language. It is argued that language is
necessary to thought, animals do flot possess a reasonably humanlike form of language,
and so animals caimot be said to have thoughts. Since intentional mental states fali into
the category of thoughts, it is argued that language is necessary for the possession of
C intentional mental states. Donald Davidson is the most thorough and well-articulated
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proponent ofthis view. This objection hinges on the definition of language, and there are
two argument strategies one could take with regard to this daim. If language is more
nanowly defined, in other words construed as reasonably humanlike in nature, then it is
true that animais do flot possess language, construed as such. The strategy in this case is
to then argue that language is not necessary for the having of thought. If language is
taken in its broadest sense to mean a system of communication, the strategy is to argue
that some animais do indeed possess a ianguage, and the option is then open to
investigate whether animais possess mental states or not. In chapter one I examine both
ofthese strategies.
The second objection has to do with anthropomorphism. The term refers to the
tendency to attribute humaniike quaiities to non-humans. The objection is that it is
anthropomorphic, and thus a category mistake, to attribute humaniike quaiities to
animais. Anthropomorphism is considered a category error according to this objection
because of an underiying assumption that humans and animais belong to two separate
categories, and the attribution of traits across categories is an error ofmisattribution.
Mental states faii into the set of traits that are presumed to be restricted to humans, and so
it is anthropomorphic and thus an error to attribute mental states to animais. The daim
that animais and humans are two separate categories has not yet been borne out, and 50
this objection turns out to be a case ofbegging the question. However, there is aiso the
more generai objection regarding the issue of anthropomorphism, based on the daim by
detractors that it occurs rampantiy, reguiariy and in an unchecked manner in research in
cognitive ethoiogy. This pervasive phenomenon supposediy stems from the fact that it is
an innate naturai human tendency to anthropomorphize. It is argued that researchers
shouid not use the same terminoiogy that they use for humans in their descriptions of
animai behavior. Chapter two is thus concerned with an examination ofthe daim that the
charge ofantbropomorphism is based on an error of categories as weii as the rejoinder
daim made by ethoiogists that it is useful when empioyed as a heuristic tool in research,
in the context ofhypothesis-testing.
The third objection is not an objection in and of itseif, but rather underlies many
ofthe others discussed. It is the probiem of ‘other minds’, aiso known as the probiem of
‘other species ofmind’ in Cognitive Ethoiogy. The fact of the matter that is ofien
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refened to is that we can neyer have direct access to the contents of the mmd of another
human. We have even less direct access to the rninds of animais, since they caimot
verbalize their mental states in a manner understood by us. Since we have twice removed
access to the mental states of animais, it is futiie to search for them.
The problem of other minds stems in part from the mutuai influence of the
philosopher Thomas Nagei and the ethologist Donaid Griffin mentioned above. As
mentioned, the discipline of cognitive ethoiogy was in part born as a resuit ofGriffin’s
suggestion that animais may have subjective awareness. This daim led Nagel to ask of
the nature ofthe phenomenon of subjective experience and whether we couid have access
to it. If anything is flot knowabie, it is certainiy the subjective point of view of another
human being, and even more so that of an animai. Nonetheïess the attempt is being made
by cognitive ethologists to research the subjective experience of an animai, due in part to
the reaiization that much ofthe research done to date is from an anthropocentric (human
centered) perspective and potentially masks whatever cognitive capacities the animai
might truly have. Chapter three is thus concerned with an analysis of some of the various
reactions to the tension created by Nagei’s consideration ofthe subjective point ofview,
as weii as an evaiuation ofthis new research strategy. Notwithstanding questions of
tractability, research into the animai’s subjective worid is certainly a step in the right
direction sirnply because it draws us further away from the hurnan centered or
anthropocentric perspective that is characteristic of much of cognitive ethology, and more
toward the area in which subjective awareness might be found, if it exists.
The finai objection has to do with methodoiogy. It is argued that the study of
animais is empiricaily intractabie, in part because they lack language. In rnost
experiments involving human subjects, ianguage is the medium by which subjects are
briefed and de-briefed as to the aim of the experiment. Animais cannot be briefed nor
can they be asked or answer questions.
Experimental design must become a lot more intricate and sophisticated to get
around the Yack of a common information-sharing medium between humans and animais.
This new level of sophistication, along with a consideration of the type of phenomenon
being studied (mental states), invites the question of interpretation, most ofien whether
the experimental resuits support the hypothesis advanced. Chapter four looks at a
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snapshot of this problem occuning in a subset discussion area within the discipline of
cognitive ethology, where the existence of a theory of mmd is being investigated in
primates. Theory of mmd theories are concerned to explain the possible rnechanism
underlying the human ability to explain and predict each other’s behavior. It is
hypothesized that humans interpret each other’s behavior by attributing mental states to
themselves and others. The view of Celia Heyes, ardent opponent of the theory of mmd
theory, will be examined in this chapter. Her argument is that since current experirnents
cannot demonstrate univocally that primates use a theory of mmd, we should halt
research into this branch of cognitive ethology until a decisive method can be found. An
important methodological problem rernains from the discussion regarding the apparent
ambiguity in interpretation in current experiments, the idea that theory of mmd theory
cannot elirninate other alternative explanations. This problem will be resolved in the
second haif of the thesis.
It should be clear to the reader of the first four chapters that philosophy informs a
large portion of the theoretical underpirmings of cognitive ethology. The second haif of
the thesis is thus devoted to evaluating two of the most important and fruitful outcomes
of the marnage between philosophical theory and empirical research in cognitive
ethology: the attribution of intentional mental states and the attribution of concepts.
One ofthe aims ofresearch in cognitive ethology and the topic ofthis thesis is the
investigation of mental states in animais. Theories of intentionality, on my interpretation
and in the context ofthis thesis, are the theoretical ‘spelling out’ ofboth the constraints
necessary for the attribution of mental states as well as the content ofthese mental states.
Chapters five and six will thus be concemed with an evaluation of four theories of
intentionality. These theories will be subject to four conditions that I have retained from
the discussion on objections entertained in the first haif ofthe dissertation. Stealing a
trick ftom Dennett in his 1969 book “Content and Consciousness”, my aim is to elucidate
the constraints from within which any satisfactory theory of intentionality must evolve, in
order to be applicable to animals. The four conditions are the degree of empirical
applicability of the theory, the ability of the theory to account for error, whether or flot
the theory can specify content of mental states to a reasonable degree and most
importantly, whether or flot the theory can vindicate the attribution of mental states in the
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animal. This last condition, if fulfihled by the theory, will give us a solution to the
methodological dilemma encountered in chapter four in the discussion on eliminating
other explanations.
A second philosophical evaluatory tool that enters into the search for intentional
mental states of animais is the notion of a concept. On a philosophical construal,
concepts are the constituents out of which thoughts are built. The contentious daim with
regard to the link between mental states and concepts is the following. If a creature is to
be attributed propositional attitude mental states such as hopes, desires and fears, then
that creature must also possess the concepts ofthese propositional attitudes. I will not
concern myseif with this dense daim in the last chapter, preferring instead to tackie the
preliminary task of divorcing concepts from language and offering one example of a
theory of concept attribution that does not depend on language and that is empirically
tractable.
In the last chapter I will thus evaluate Cecelia Heyes and Nick Chater’ s self
fulfiuling prophecy of a failed search for a theory of concepts that applies to animais. The
reason that no theory of concepts is applicable to animais is due, in their opinion, to the
tight link between concepts and language. The search wiil be doomed from the start
because there is good reason to think that a theory of concepts that applies to humans will
not apply to animais precisely because human theories are often linked to human
language. I will argue that there is no reason to accept this conclusion by pointing to one
of the most fruitful theories of concepts in my opinion, employing behavioral criteria,
that applies to animais and that does not depend on language, developed by Colin Allen.
Chapter One
No Thought Without Language
1. Introduction: Two Strategies
The idea that animais Yack a reasonably discernable human-like language is oflen
cited as a reason flot to attribute thoughts to them. In schematic form, the argument is as
follows: Language is necessary for having thought, animais lack language, thus animais
cannot have thoughts. The language argument is one of four major objections raised
against the idea that animais might have intentional mental states.
Donald Davidson has written three articles on the topic of thought, language and
their relation to animais. Three separate but related arguments can be discerned from
these three articles. The first article “Thought and Talk” (1975) discusses the issue ofthe
interdependence of thought and language, in it Davidson argues that thought depends on
speech. The second article ‘Rational Animais” (1982) makes the case that the having of
propositional attitudes requires rationality, thereby linking rationality with thought. The
third article “The Emergence of Thought” (1999) is an argument for the holisrn of
thought, or the interdependence of various aspects of mentality, which makes difficuit the
tracking of the exact ernergence of each of these aspects. These three articles taken
together constitute Davidson’s overail view that there is no thought without language and
lacking language, animais cannot thereby reasonably be clairned to have thought.
There are three aspects ofmentaiity that Davidson wilI try to link together in the
three articles: language, thought, and rationality. Due to the holistic nature of lis
arguments and the interdependence between the various aspects he wants to evidence, his
arguments seem to hinge on one another, i.e., one cannot discuss one without discussing
ail ofthem. $ome points are revisited in different articles, but each time with a different
aspect that is amplified. It is very difficult to convey his arguments in a sympathetic
manner without first exposing them in their entirety, which is what must be done in order
to get a comprehensive view ofthem.
We will see in the next chapter that Davidson bas been iabeled a “hard ‘centrist”
by John Fisher. Hard anthropocentrists, generalÏy speaking, are committed to a sharp
divide between humans and animais. The position ofthe hard anthropocentrist is that any
attribution of any mental predicate to any non-human animal is a form of categorical
anthropomorphism (fislier, 1996:7). Although Davidson does not actually daim that
language is an exclusively hurnan trait aside from in a footnote in the “Rational Animais”
article (1982:319, note 1), the fact that he explicitly daims that only creatures with
language can think may be taken as an anthropocentric view. At any rate Davidson
himself raises this issue in this second article.
As mentioned, one ofthe issues that Davidson discusses in the first article is the
relation between thought and language. Does language depend on thought, does thought
depend on language. or does neither have conceptual priority? There are two possible
ways to interpret the daim that neither thought nor language lias conceptuai priority.
One is that they are interdependent, which is Davidson’s view, and the other is that they
are independent of each other. Davidson doesn’t believe that an adequate argument has
been given for the view that thought depends on speech, and so this is one of his aims in
the article. It should be noted here that his focus is on the interpretation of speech rather
than speech per se. That is, lie is interested in highlighting the role ofthe interpreter of
speech rather than the speaker. He will flot try to demonstrate that an interpreter must be
a speaker, although there are good reasons, on his view, to think this. He is ultimately
interested in demonstrating that thouglit depends on the ability for the interpretation of
speech, the ability to understand the utterances of another. The revised daim is thus that
thought depends on the interpretation of speech. The ultimate conclusion lie wishes to
draw from this argument is that a creature caimot have thoughts unless it is an interpreter
of the speech of another.
There are two possible strategies to take for those who are not in agreement with
Davidson’s daim that language and particularly the interpretation of speech is necessary
for thought. The first is to disagree that language is necessary for thought. In taking this
strategy, one must examine Davidson’s entire justification for the daim and try to find
flaws in it. This second strategy one can take with regard to Davidson’s daim is to agree
that indeed, language is necessary for thought and then argue that animais have language,
therefore they have thought. I believe that this second strategy is the one pursued by
C most cognitive ethologists. In taking this strategy the onerous task is that of convincing
the audience that the system of communication in animais does constitute a language. At
issue here is the definition of language, among other things. It is obvious that, if animais
had human language, the objection wouid neyer have been raised in the first place and
cognitive ethology wouid not have to defend itself against this objection. The issue is
thus how much the system of communication in animais must resembie human language
in order for it to be construed as a language, i.e., the kind of language that is supposed to
be necessary for thought. Davidson has a few conditions regarding this issue. A second
issue concerns whether we should accept Davidson’s elements that are necessary for
ianguage and conditions for thought as appiying to language in generai or just applying to
human language.
Both ofthe above strategies wiii be examined in this chapter. I choose to examine
both because both are viable strategies to take. In particular I want to examine the
strategy of claiming that animais have language because I don’t think that Davidson has
considered the evidence. b say this brings an immediate objection that this is flot an
empirical question, decidabie exclusiveiy by citing evidence or naming names of
particular species. However, I think it is, to a certain extent, necessary to look at
empirical dernonstrations of animai language, or at ieast considerations on the matter,
since the issue hinges on whether a language can be found in species of animais, and
whether this so-called language can be demonstrated to resembie the type of language
that humans have.
2. Thouglit and Talk
Davidson’s point in this first article (1975) is to outiine the relation between
thought and speech. He daims he wiIl demonstrate, tbrough a series of interrelated
arguments, that thought depends on speech. He believes that the relation has neyer been
entertained for its own sake, that the assumption is usualiy made that one is more
complex a concept than the other, and that the more complex term can be explained in
terms of the simpler term (1975:156). Neither of the two concepts can be fully explained
in terms ofthe other, in his view.
The term ‘thought’ must be defined since it bas such a central role in Davidson’s
views. Davidson’s use ofthe term should not be conflated with the ordinary-use sense of
4the term. In ordinary usage, thoughts encompass ail mental states that have content. On
Davidson’s construal, thoughts are the contents ofpropositional attitudes such as belief
and desire. Propositional attitude reports, such as ‘John hopes that it will ram today’, are
characterized by the fact that they exhibit semantic intensionality. That is, substitutions
of co-extensive terms in the sentences can alter the truth-value of the sentence
(1975:156).
The first thing to notice about Davidson’s argument is that he is interested in
demonstrating the relation between thought and speech as opposed to merely thought and
language, for he will daim that without the ability to interpret the speech of another,
thoughts and beliefs and desires cannot be attributed. The relation of dependence he
wants to emphasize is that thought depends on the ability to interpret speech. This might
appear to really obstruct the cognitive ethologist’s project, even more so than if Davidson
were able to prove that thought depends on language, since there is the impiicit additional
assumption of verbal utterances or speech. To prove that animals need language in order
to think is one thing, and could perhaps be circurnscribed by enlarging the definition of
language to include the connotation of a system of communication. It couid then be
argued that it is possible to attribute concepts to an animal, since animals pass the
criterion of having a language, if language is construed as a system of communication.
To make the case that thought depends on the interpretation of speech presents a
seemingly insurmountabic challenge to the cognitive ethologist. First, it must be shown
that some species of animals speak. It could be objected that this requirement is
unnecessary, for as stated above, Davidson insists that the focus is flot on speaking as
such. However, the idea of an animal that carmot speak but cari nonetheless interpret the
speech of others, in other words a mute interpreter, makes no sense unless we identify
whose speech the mute is interpreting. Demonstrating that some animals speak might be
impossible since animais lack the developed vocal cords that humans have. Second, one
must show that animais must be able to interpret each other’s utterings in a meaningful
way in order to be said to have thought. Since the second challenge requires the first in
order to be fulfilled, and the first has so far been found physically impossible to fuffihi,
there does flot appear to be much hope for the cognitive ethologist to demonstrate that
C animais satisfy Davidson’s condition for having thoughts.
The argument in the article can be divided into three sub-arguments. The first
sub-argument makes the case for the endless interlocking of be1ief or holism with regard
to belief. One ofthe daims is that the propositional attitudes cannot be reduced to each
other. For instance, desires cannot be reduced to hopes, and there are no basic
propositionaÏ attitudes. Belief, however, is central to ail types of thought, and often
underlies other attitudes. A desire for an object, for instance, is often accompanied by a
beliefthat the obj cet exists. The next daim is that having a thought requires that there be
a background ofbeliefs, but a thought does flot depend on a particular belief So
although a list of potential beliefs can be attributed to an individual in a particular
scenano, the thought of the individual cannot be ftxed to particular beliefs. The last
daim makes the case for holism of belief. Here follows the first set of daims in point
form.
1. The various sorts of thought cannot be reduced to one another.
2. Beliefis central to ail kinds ofthought.
3. Having a thought requires that there be a background ofbeÏiefs.
4. It is necessary that there be endless interlocked beliefs (1975:156-7).
Davidson then suggests looking at the relation between thought and language from
another angle, namely by inspecting the theory implicit in the explanation of behavior,
the teleological explanation of action. He gives a mundane example of an action, that of
a man raising his arm, that is explained by a series ofbeliefs and desires. For instance,
the person raises lis arm because he desires to attract the attention ofhis friend. This
person must also have the belief that raising his arm will indeed attract the attention ofhis
friend. The fact that behavior can be explained by patterns of beliefs and desires Ïeads
Davidson to daim that attributions of belief and desire are supervenient on behavior.
Supervenience in this context means that there is a relation of dependence between
beliefs and desires and of behavior ofthe following type. There cannot be a difference in
beliefs and desires without their being a difference in behavior, but there can be a
difference in behavior without an ensuing difference in the beliefs and desires
(Honderich, 1995:860). There is a further implicit assumption made by Davidson here,
that teleological explanation is a form ofrational explanation. Davidson appeals to two
factors to make the case for the cogency ofteleological explanation. The flrst is that the
6action to be explained must be reasonable in the light ofthe assigned beÏiefs and desires,
and the second is that beliefs and desires must fit with one another. Here follows the
second group of daims in point form.
5. Attributions ofbeliefs and desires are supervenient on behavior.
6. The cogency ofbeÏief-desire (telelogical) explanation rests on the ability to
discover a coherent pattern (1975:158-9).
This assumption of rationality, according to Davidson, constrains the range of beliefs that
are potentially attributable to an individual in a particular scenario in the sense that it is
stiil possible to attribute inational beliefs to sorneone, but the possibility is less likely
given the rationality constraint. The fact remains, however, that it is possible to attribute
to a thinker an explanation of behavior that is made up of irrational beliefs as well as
numerous different sets ofrational beliefs and this creates a problem ofunder
determination. That is, that many equivalent sets of beliefs and desires can be attributed
to any given behavior, and there is no way to choose which set is the one. The problem is
further exacerbated by the fact that behavior, which is the main evidential basis for
attributions of belief and desire, is observable, while beliefs and desires are not. In order
to narrow down the possible set of beliefs and desires that can be attributed to a thinker in
order to then begin to identify a particular belief or desire, Davidson daims that the
attributer must be an interpreter of speech.
The next halfofDavidson’s article is thus concerned with making the case for the
main thesis, the daim that a creature cannot have thoughts unless it is an interpreter of
the speech ofanother. Central to this daim is the idea of an interpreter, one who can
understand the utterances of another. Davidson insists that the idea of a language is not
necessary for making his point. Two speakers could interpret each others utterances
without there being, in any ordinary sense, a common language (1975:157). While this
daim might be true, I wonder if two interpreters couÏd understand each others utterances
without there being a common language? I shah corne back to this question.
$o far, Davidson has shown that the attribution of belief and desire must go hand
in hand with the interpretation of speech, but has said nothing about why the attribution
ofthought depends on the interpretation of speech. 11e first offers an uninformative
reason: that without speech we cannot make the fine distinctions between thoughts
7essential to explanations ofbehavior (1975:163). He gives the example ofa dog that
believes that bis master is home. He asks, does the dog also believe that Mr. Srnith is
home, or that the manager ofthe local bank is home? Ail three beliefs are equivalentiy
attributable, and there seems no way to decide between them, especially in the absence of
speech (1975: 164). The above does not constitute an informative reason however,
according to Davidson, ail he has shown is that unless there is behavior that can be
interpreted as speech, the evidence will not be adequate to justify the fine distinctions we
make in attributions of thought.
An argument is needed that wiÏl show that only creatures with speech have
thoughts. To develop the argument, Davidson appeals to the notion of interpretation. A
centrai aspect of interpretation is to give knowledge to the interpreter of the
circumstances under which someone holds sentences true (1975:162). To make this
point, Davidson draws an analogy with belief. Just as it is the pattern of beliefs that
allows us to identify a particular thought, it is the pattem of sentences held true that gives
sentences their meaning. In drawing this analogy, nothing has been said about how
interpretation is able to serve this function of giving to the interpreter knowledge of
sentences held true thus giving meaning to sentences. The difficulty in saying how
interpretation is able to carry out this function is due to the fact that two factors enter into
the situation: what the thinker takes the sentence to mean, and what the thinker believes.
A method is needed to hold one ofthese factors steady while the other is studied
(1975:167).
The assumption that most beliefs held by the thinker are true enables one to hold
steady the factor of what the thinker believes. This assumption is too strong, however,
for it assumes that the thinker bas no faise beliefs at ail and can therefore neyer err.
Davidson thus daims that the intelligibility of the identification of false beliefs must
depend on a background of largely unmentioned and unquestioned true beliefs
(1 975:168). What makes interpretation possible is that we can dismiss the chance of
massive error. A good interpretation counts a sentence true just when a speaker holds it
to be true, and given that both the speaker and the interpreter may be wrong in some
cases, Davidson modifies the original daim to the idea that a good theory of
interpretation maximizes agreement between the interpreter and the speaker (1975: 169).
$Given the account of interpretation above, Davidson daims that the concepts of
objective truth and of error are central in the context of interpretation. The distinction
between a sentence held true and being in fact true is essential to the existence of an
interpersonal system of communication. When there is a gap between that which is
objectively truc and that which is held true by the speaker, this gap must be called error.
Since the attitude of holding true by the speaker is the same whether the sentence is truc
or not, it corresponds directly to the concept of belief The concept of belief is what takes
up the slack between objective truth and that which is held truc by the individual
(1975:170).
Davidson then makes a rather bold set ofclaims. The first is that we have the idea
of belief only through its role in the interpretation of language. As a private attitude it is
unintelligible except as an adjustment to the public norm provided by language. Thus, he
daims, a creature must be a member of a speech community if it is to have the concept of
belief. Given the dependence ofthe other attitudes on belief, only a creature that can
interpret speech can have the concept of a thought. Below is the last part of the argument
in point form.
7. We have the idea of belief only tbrough the interpretation of language.
8. To have the concept of a belief one must be a member of a speech cornmunity.
9. Given the dependence ofthe other attitudes on belief, only a creature that can
interpret speech can have the concept ofa thought (1975:170).
Davidson then asks, at the very end of the article, if a creature can have a belief if
it does not have the concept of belief. Fie thinks not, because in order to have a belief, a
creature must understand the possibility ofbeing mistaken, this requires grasping the
contrast between truth and error- true belief and false belief. (1975:170). This contrast.
he argues, only arises in the context of interpretation, which alone forces us to the idea of
an objective public truth. The stipulation here is that in order to be able to entertain
beliefs, a creature must understand the contrast between truc belief and false belief,
which necessarily implicates the concept ofbelief
There are nurnerous points of disagreement to be found with Davidson’s view
even with an examination ofjust this first article, since it represents a schematic for his
C general viewpoint. The other two articles deal with amplifying two other aspects of
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thought: its relation to rationality and the holistic character ofthought. It should be noted
that I am only interested in disagreements with Davidson’s views in these three articles as
they directly bear upon the possibility of attributing thought to animais. The first obvious
point of disagreement concerns his definition and construal of ‘thought’.
Hans-Johann Glock takes issue with Davidson’s use of the term ‘thoughf, in
particular his inclusion of ‘concept’ and ‘propositional attitude’ within the set of
‘thoughts’ (Glock, 2000:42). To take issue is legitimate, since Davidson explicitly
mentions his intention to interchange certain terms at various points in the articles.
Concerning the inclusion ofpropositional attitudes into the realm ofthoughts, Davidson
states in the “Rational AnimaIs” article “Let me speak of ail the propositional attitudes as
thoughts.” (Davidson, 1982:321). Conceming his inclusion of concepts as well as
propositional attitudes within the reaim ofthoughts, he states in an article called “Seeing
Through Language”: “Thus there is in fact no distinction between having a concept and
having thoughts with propositional content.” (Davidson, 1997:25). Glock notes that
Davidson has included concepts within the reaim of thoughts and that this causes a
problem. Glock writes: “He (Davidson) insists, firstly, that concept possession and the
ability to have thoughts amount to one and the same thing, and, secondly, that both are
confined to language users.” (Glock, 2000:42). The first daim, according to Glock,
provides the rationale for the second, in that to attribute thoughts to animais on the basis
of non-linguistic behavior is rnisguided, since these thoughts involve concepts which
cannot be attributed on such a basis. Glock has a point here, the first daim does provide
a rationale for the second daim. This is merely a symptom, however, what does the
source of this problem stem from? I believe it stems from the inclusion of both concepts
and propositional attitudes under the heading ofthoughts. Putting ail three elements into
one set works well for ease of discussion, and it is truc that concepts and propositional
attitudes are thoughts. The problem with conflating ail three is that distinctions that do in
fact exist between the three terms are masked. One can therefore flot ask questions that
draw on the distinctions between the three elements. For instance, can one have thoughts
without possessing concepts? Can one have propositional attitudes without having the
concept of one, such as belief? It would be interesting to ask if it is possible to have
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propositional attitudes without having the concept ofthem, particularly in relation to
animais.
This conflation aiso raises the question of whether or flot concept possession
really precludes animais from having thoughts or beliefs. As Glock notes, flot making the
distinction between thoughts and concepts does flot even permit the question to be asked.
This issue wiii be taken up again later, because as will be seen, Davidson will add two
more items, membership in a speech community and language, to what is necessary in
order to be said to have a belief.
Another point of disagreement to be found is with Davidson’s holistic
characterization of belief outlined in the first four premises. One can disagree with his
premise 4, that it is necessary that there be endless interlocked beliefs. One can also
disagree in the same vein with premise 3, that having a thought requires that there be a
background ofbeliefs, but a thought does not depend on a particular belief. There exists
a contrasting point of view to this holistic view of belief and thought, that of atornisrn.
Atomism about concepts holds that instead of concepts being individuated by their
relations to one another as a holistic view would dictate, concepts are instead
individuated bytheir relations to the world (Margolis, 1999:551). Applied to beliefs,
atomism entails that beliefs are individuated by their relation to the world. In the case of
anirnals, this view would allow anirnals to be attributed single beliefs without having to
assume a whole background of other beliefs that the animal may or may flot have. It
would also allow for the identification of a particular belief, for it does flot assume that a
thought does flot depend on a particular belief, i.e., the indeterminacy of belief in the case
ofMalcolm’s dog. On Davidson’s view, a thought does flot depend on a particular belief,
i.e., there is no one-to-one correlation between beliefs and thoughts.
It is also possible to counter-argue Davidson’s daim that the under-determination
problem is solved only by language. As will be recalled, the problem ofunder
determination is caused by the rationality constraint, and exacerbated by the holistic
nature ofbelief. It is the insistence that many ofthe creature’s beliefs must be rational
along with the insistence that there be endtess interlocked beliefs that gets Davidson into
the under-determjnatjon situation where individual beliefs cannot be identified. As will
be seen in the second half of the thesis, the issue of identification of beliefs also arises in
relation to theories of intentionality as applied to animais, in the search for mental states.
The problem must be solved in various ways other than by recourse to language, since
animais do flot possess a language that is strictly humanlike in nature.
The case could be made that there is an inconsistency with regard to the issue of
language in Davidson’s arguments. At the beginning ofthe article, he insists that the idea
of a shared language is not necessary for making lis point. He daims that two speakers
could interpret each others’ utterances without there being a common language. We may
agree that interpretation is stili possible between two individuais whose mother tongue is
different, for instance. He then insists that a speaker must be a member of a language
community in order to have the concept of a beÏief. It is flot clear whether speakers of
this community speak the same language. Is the notion of a shared language necessary or
not to Davidson’s arguments? I don’t think his argument can get off the ground without
the preiiminary assumption of a shared language. On the other hand, if we take his view
at face value, and accept that a shared language is not necessary, then just as humans who
do not have a shared language may nonetheless be able to interpret each other’s foreign
language, the door is open to argue that humans may also eventuaily be abie to decipher
the ‘language’ of animais. Humans and animais then may eventuaiiy be able to interpret
each other’s ‘language’ even though it is not a shared language.
3. Rationality
Davidson’s second article (1982) on the question ofthought and ianguage is
interesting, among other reasons because he notes at the beginning ofthe article that le is
flot interested in the empirical question ofwhether animais have propositional attitudes,
contrary to most ofthe other commentaries on the issue. The question he is interested in
is rather what sort of empirical evidence is relevant to the question of whether an animal
has propositional attitudes (1982:318). What subtie difference is he trying to emphasize
here by his turn of phrase? Perhaps the distinction can be stated as follows: ‘What
animais are rationai?’ constitutes the empirical question, as opposed to the question
Davidson is interested in, which is ‘what makes an animal rationai?’ With regard to the
first empiricai question, one presumes he means that whether or not animais have
concepts is a question that gets a yes or no answer and is decided purely on empirical
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evidence for or against, and flot on theoretical considerations. Davidson is interested in
theoretical considerations. I have to wonder about Davidson’s underlying motive, in not
looking at the question empirically and flot engagrng in, as he cails it “nammg narnes or
names ofspecies” (1982:318), is he trying to eliminate the possibility that looking at
empirical work would constitute evidence for or against the issue?
The answer to the question of what constitutes rationality in an animal largely
hinges on the sarne arguments already discussed in the first article. Davidson cites the
first criterion, that ofhaving propositional attitudes. The having ofpropositional attitudes
is thus a criterion for rationality. His argument for holism follows closely behind. Talk
about propositional attitudes naturally leads him to daim that “to have one is to have a
full complement.” (Davidson,1982:31$). He goes on to list a second criterion, that of
language, although he gives no justification for it yet. He just states that, according to
holism, one belief needs other beliefs, and other propositional attitudes such as desire,
intention, and perhaps even the gifi oftongues.
These two criteria, that one either has none or many propositional attitudes, and
that one must have language in order to be rational might lead one to, as he anticipates,
accuse him ofbeing anthropocentric. Anthropocentrism construed generally is the view
of regarding man as the center of existence. An anthropocentric view is a human
centered view. With regard to language it is the view that only hurnans have the
cognitive capacity for it (Mitcheli et al 1997:11). Language is an exclusive property of
the human species (Kiriazis & Slobodchikoff, 1997:365). Davidson believes that the
charge is fair but ought not be levied against him since, by his lights, he is only
describing a feature of certain concepts. In other words, it is a feature of propositional
attitudes that 1) to have one is to have many and 2) to have propositional attitudes is to
also have language. Ris reason why he should flot 5e charged with anthropocentrism is
that he is merely poinfing out two special features of language. He then gives two
examples of fine distinctions that exist in language. Ihe first is the fact that our language
is rich enough to describe the differences between humans and other creatures. The
second is the fact that the Inuit language is rich enough to contain 16 different words for
snow. These two aspects of language go to show that we strive to make our language and
us seem special (1982:3 19). Nowhere, he insists, is he claiming that language is unique
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to humans. I am of the opinion he doesn’t have to explicitly daim that language is
unique to humans, that it follows from what he says.
Using Norman Malcolm’s story in ‘Thoughtless Brutes’ (1972) as a point of
departure. Davidson announces that he has an argument that will throw doubt on
Malcolm’s conclusion that the dog lias a particular belief: tliat the cat went up the tree. A
dog is chasing a catin a backyard. The cat is heading toward an oak tree but at the last
second, unbeknownst to the dog, veers off and climbs a maple tree instead. The dog,
thinking that the cat went up the oak, stands under it and barks up at the branches.
Someone observing the scene would say ‘ the dog thinks the cat went up that oak tree.’
Malcolm daims that die observer would be justified in attributing this belief to the dog
under the circurnstances. Davidson’s challenge is that we cannot attribute a definite
belief or set of beliefs to the dog, and there arc many to choose from: the fact that the tree
is oak, the fact that it is the oldest tree in the park, the fact that it is the same tree as the
last one the cat went up, etc. In order to be able to attribute to the dog tlie beliefthat the
cat went up the tree, we would have to assume that the dog had rnany other beliefs as
well. As he puts it” There is no fixed list ofthings someone with the concept ofa tree
must believe, but without many general beliefs, there would be no reason to identify a
belief as a belief about a tree, mucli less an oak tree.” (1982:320). So rnany or at least
more than one belief is necessary in order for a single belief to be attributable to a
creature. He daims that one runs into trouble quite quickly as soon as one wonders how
one would decide if the animal had the peripheral set of beliefs necessary to make the
initial one make sense. One cannot distinguish between the various beliefs that the dog
might have, one is not able to teli if the dog has them or not. Each belief requires a world
of beliefs in order to give it content and identity, and every other propositional attitude
depends for its particularity on a similar world ofbeliefs (1982:321). In brief terms. the
holistic nature of belief is such that it brings about the situation of underdetermination of
content with the consequence that we cannot attribute a single belief to the dog without
auributing rnany, and it is impossible to identify any single belief in the dog.
Davidson then gives a reason why to have propositional attitudes is to be a
rational creature. He starts with the propositional attitude ofbelief, saying that although
C there need not be a fixed set ofbeliefs attributable to the dog, many true beliefs are
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necessary. Within this set ofbeliefs, some may be particular, general or logical. 11e then
daims that since belief is so central to the propositional attitudes, that he is going to
hereafier refer to ail the propositionai attitudes as thoughts. This aÏlows him to daim that
thoughts have logical relations. The identity of a thought caimot be displaced from its
place in the logical network of other thoughts, it also cannot be relocated in the network
without becoming a different thought. Radical incoherence in belief is therefore
impossible. 11e is thus able to conclude that to have a single propositional attitude is to
have a largely correct logic, in the sense ofhaving a pattern ofbeliefs that logically
cohere (1982:321). This is one reason why to have propositional attitudes is to be a
rational creature.
Davidson then goes on to argue for language as a necessary condition for thought.
11e starts with the daim that it is justifiable to attribute attitudes to a creature given the
observance of a reasonably compiex pattern of behavior, because there is enough of a
conceptual tie between behavior and the attitudes. Then there is a stipulation that the
pattem of behavior being observcd must be quite complex to warrant the attribution of a
single thought. There is such a complex pattern ofbehavior only if the agent has
language. The implication here is that Malcolrn is onlyjustified in attributing the belief
‘that the catis up the oak tree’ to the dog if the dog has language. In order to be a
thinking rational creature the dog must be able to express rnany thoughts, and above ail,
be able to interpret the speech and thoughts ofothers (1982:323).
Against this it has been argued that given the success of explaining and
sometimes predicting behavior by attributing thought to languageless creatures, why
postulate the additional stipulation of language? Davidson admits that although we do
predict and explain the behavior of animals by attributing beliefs, desires and intentions
to them. there is a sense in which it is wrong to daim that non-verbal animais have
propositional attitudes. 11e compares animais to missiles, whose behavior can also be
expiained by attributing propositionai attitudes to them, although it is clearly
unwarranted. In the case ofthe missile, it is the designer of the missile who must have
propositional attitudes attributed to he or she, such as believing and desiring that the
missile shouÏd destroy an enemy airplane, rather than the missile itself Describing the
missile as having propositional attitudes is a manner of speaking, it is not the case that the
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missile really has propositional attitudes. Animais are different from missiles in two
ways. One, they are far more like humans in the range oftheir behavior than missiles and
two, we do not know of any better way to explain their behavior than to ascribe
propositional attitudes. If we had a solid condition for the necessity of language for
thought, we could continue to attribute propositional attitudes to dogs, even though we
know that they do not really have them (1982:324).
So far Davidson has flot really provided what he had set out to do, which is a
necessary condition for thought. As he sees it, ail he has reaiiy thus far shown is that
there can’t be much thought without language. The condition for thought that only
language can supply cornes in two premises:
1. In order to have a belief, one must have the concept of a belief.
2. In order to have the concept ofbelief, one must have language (Ï 982:324).
Davidson begins by contrasting his construal of ‘belief with Malcolm’s construai.
Malcoim, unlike Davidson, restricts the term ‘thought’ to cover only the higher level of
thinking, i.e., reflexive thinking. Thus he makes a distinction between simply having a
belief or believing something, and knowing that one believes something, or being aware
that one has a belief Malcolm considers only the second type of higher order belief as
thought and only it requires language. The dog can thus believe that the cat went up the
tree but it cannot have the thought that the cat went up the tree. Davidson makes no
distinction between beliefs and thoughts, and so both types require the concept of belief.
Even the lower form requires it: to have a belief, one must have the concept of belief,
which requires language (1982:324).
One ofthe criteria for having the concept of belief is the phenomenon of surprise.
Surprise is an indication ofthe contrast between what the agent did beiieve and what the
agent now cornes to believe. Such awareness arnounts to a belief about a belief. The
phenomena of surprise points to the difference between the subjective way things are
according to the thinker, and the objective way things reaïly are, according to the world.
Another way of saying this is to say that surprise involves a belief that a prior belief was
wrong. This distinction irnplies the idea of an objective reality that is independent ofmy
prior belief A creature may react to the world, be able to discriminate colours, learn new
reactions, and generalize its behavior to new categories of stimuli without entertaining
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propositions. None ofthese things, according to Davidson show that the creature
commands the subjective-objective contrast, as required by belief The only thing that
does demonstrate command of the subjective-objective contrast is linguistic
communication. Communication depends on each communicant having and correctly
thinking that the other has die concept of shared world, an inter-subjective world. The
concept of an inter-subjective world is the concept of an objective world (1982:325-6).
To complete the argument, Davidson needs to show that the only way one could
corne to have the subjective-objective contrast is through having the concept of inter-
subjective truth. In place of an argument, he offers an analogy where he introduces the
notion of triangulation. He asks us to imagine what it would be like to be bolted to the
earth. One implication would be not knowing where objects were located relative to
oneself. The reality of our situation here on earth at the present time is that in flot being
bolted to earth, we are free to triangulate with objects. He asks us to imagine a sense of
triangulation, involving two creatures, one that brings about the consequence of
objectivity. The fact that the two creatures share language and therefore the concept of
truth means that rationality is a social trait and only communicators have it (1982:327).
This notion of triangulation is elaborated on further in the last article.
Davidson is concerned with the question of what constitutes rationality in this
article. He specificalÏy asks what makes an animal rational. He gives criteria for the
attribution of rationality to an animal, one is the having of propositional attitudes, and
above all, as he argued for in the first article, the ability to interpret the speech and
thoughts ofothers, for these two things occur as a result of triangulation. He is able to
conclude from this that rationality is a social trait and that only communicators have it.
One point ofpotential disagreement occurring in Davidson’s second article is his
argument concerning the criteria for the concept of belief. With regard to belief it will
be remembered from the first article that he does not think that a creature can have a
belief if it does flot have the concept of a belief. In that same article, he claimed that to
have the concept of belief one must be a member of a speech community. In this article,
he additionally daims that in order to have a belief one must have the concept of a belief
and in order to have the concept of belief one must have language.
C
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Conceming the two premise argument that links belief with language, Johaim
Glock lias found an inconsistency within it. Davidson’s argument is as follows.
1. b have a belief, one must have the concept of belief.
2. b have the concept ofbelief, one must have language (1982:324).
Glock believes that premise one is mistaken and that prernise two, while true, cannot be
argued for in the way that Davidson does (Glock, 2000:54-6). As a starting point, Glock
takes Davidson’s answer to the question treated at the end ofhis article: can a creature
have a belief if it does not have the concept of belief? It will be recalled that Davidson
thinks flot, because a creature must understand the possibility of being mistaken, and this
requires grasping the contrast between tnith and error, true belief and false belief.
Glock’s answer to this is to advance the daim that it is possible to switch from belief A to
belief B without realizing that one’s prior belief was mistaken. Realizing that one’s prior
belief was mistaken is akin to having a belief about a belief, and Glock daims that this
middle step is flot necessary in the switch from a mistaken belief to a new belief
(2000:46). Moreover, Davidson cannot rule out this possibility.
I think that Malcolm’s distinction between beliefs and higher order beliefs that T
made reference to above is a sound one. I believe that Glock agrees with this construal
and it is the one that Glock is trying to point out in the argument of the previous
paragraph. This construal allows for attributing the thouglit to Malcolm’s dog that the cat
went up the tree, and saves the higher order reflexive thoughts, beliefs about beliefs, for
reflexive creatures like humans.
Against Davidson’s criteria for attribution for a concept, Glock offers an alternate
construal of concept that is based on a behavioral criterion, and constitutes the type of
construal that Davidson bas already discussed and argued is not sufficient for concept
attribution: “Concepts are principles of discrimination, and to possess a concept is to have
the ability to recognize or discriminate different types ofthings.” (Glock, 2000:45).
Davidson insists that mere discriminatory capacities are not enough, that the ability to
discriminate an object from others does flot mean that a creature lias the concept ofthat
object (Davidson, 1999:8).
Davidson has two arguments against this construal of concepts and concept
possession, found in another ofhis articles titled ‘Seeing through Language’ (1997). The
1$
first is reductio ad absurdum, and overstates the case a bit, in rny opinion. The quote
from Davidson is: “Unless we want to attribute concepts to butterfiies and olive trees, we
sbould flot count mere ability to discriminate between red and green or moist and dry as
having a concept, flot even if such selective behavior is learned.”(Davidson, 1997:25).
Davidson overstates the case here, no-one wants to attribute concepts to an olive tree
based on the fact that it withers in dry sou and flourishes in rnoist soi!, even if it were to
turn itself toward the sun like a plant does.
One might be tempted to make sentience the distinguishing factor between plants
and animais and humans, and follow Glock’s suggestion which is to attribute concepts
only to creatures that are sentient (2000:45). Sentience, on his view, is the dividing une
between differential reactions to causal inputs, in the case ofthe tree, and real
discrimination, which is tied to creatures with perceptual capacities. In my opinion,
making the distinction hinge on sentience is a wrong way to go, for it is an ad-hoc
distinction. As it turns out, a more appropriate distinguishing feature is contained within
the daim itself; it is the ability to learn. Learned selective behavior should be considered
as real discrimination, contrary to Davidson’ s dismissal of it, since the ability to learn is
an ability, not a mere disposition, and furthermore it is the ability to modify one’s
behavior in the face of changed circumstances or circumstances that do not lead to the
desired goal. It might even involve recognizing a mistake, it at least involves some kind
of recognition that causes the behavior of the creature to be modified. As will be seen in
chapter 7, learning from one’s mistakes is one criterion for the attribution ofa concept
according to the eminent cognitive ethologist, Colin Allen.
The other argument of Davidson’ s is that there is a difference between
discrimination and classification. Discrimination is a mere disposition and bas no
normative force, on Davidson’s view. Classification is required on Davidson’s construal
of concept possession. Classification requires the ability to recognize a mistake, and is
not among the abilities of non-iinguistic creatures, according to Davidson (1997:25). As
mentioned above, the case can be made that the ability of learned discrimination also
requires the recognition that a mistake has been made, proof of this is that the behavior is
modified on the basis ofthe mistake. Thus learned discrimination passes the criterion
and should be accepted as an indicator of concept possession. As to why language is
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required for the recognition of a mistake, this hearkens back to arguments visited eariier
in the chapter. As Glock sees the issue, animais display non-linguistic or behavioral
indicators that a mistake made has been recognized, and so the tinguistic criteria should
be dropped. This phenomenon ofmistake recognition has flot yet been explicitiy studied
in animais, but there is one case that has been cited by Colin Allen (1 999:38). In the
experiment, pigs were rewarded for making same/different choices with regard to
pictures of faces and other body parts. The pigs performed at about 90% accuracy, and
when the mistakes were analyzed, it was found that pigs physically backed away from 22
out 23 oftheir wrong choices made. Obviously language is a convenient indicator for
communicating that a mistake has been made, but is flot the only indicator. Moreover,
humans often don’t indicate by language but rather tbrough body language that a mistake
has been made. The same reasoning coutd be applied to animais.
4. Emergence of Thought
The third article by Davidson is titled ‘The Emergence of Thought’ (1999). It is
in this article that Davidson’s views on the holistic character ofthought are detailed.
Davidson daims that emergence is relative to a set of concepts, since when a
phenomenon emerges for the first time a concept is instantiated. He cites hoÏism of the
mental as a reason for the difficulty in saying anything about the emergence of various
aspects of mentality. We have seen him appeal to the holism argument with regard to the
phenomenon of belief earlier. Holism of the mental is the interdependence of various
aspects of mentality (1999:7). The fact that various aspects of mentality are
interdependent means that it will be difficult to plot the emergence of any single one.
Holisrn about belief entails that one cannot have just one belief About this he states”
Beliefs do not corne one at a tirne; what identifies a beliefand makes it the beliefit is is
the relationship (among other factors) to other beliefs” (1999:8).
The argument against the idea that a dog can have a single beliefhas already been
seen in the second article. In this version Davidson looks at the issue from a slightiy
different angle. The argument from this angle contains two sub-claims. The first is that a
belief is identffied by its propositional content. The second is that one must have rnastery
ofthe concepts involved in the propositional content (1999:2). The ability to
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discriminate an object from other objects, for instance, which is a capacity that animais
are often clairned as having, is not the same as possessing a concept. Animais
presumably can discrirninate sorne objects from others and this is what leads people to
attribute concepts to them. This is a mistaken une of reasoning for Davidson, for to have
a belief or a concept is to be able to make sense of the idea of misapplying a concept.
Cats and dogs cannot, on his account, make sense ofthe idea of misapplying a concept,
that is, ofbelieving orjudging that something is a cat which is flot in fact a cat.
Furthermore, concepts, due to their holistic nature, also have Iogical relations to each
other. One cannot identify the content of one’s belief unless beliefs are mostly consistent
with each another. Here Davidson equates consistency with rationality and concludes
that a degree ofrationality is also a condition for having beliefs (1999:8).
After much preamble about how difficuit it is to say something about the
ernergence of thought, Davidson describes a pre-linguistic pre-cognitive situation which
constitutes a necessary condition for thought and language, called triangulation. This
notion of triangulation was introduced at the end of the rationality article, as the only way
that a thinker could corne to have the concept ofthe subjective-objective contrast.
Triangulation is defined similarly in this article as a relationship between two agents,
each who also have a relation to the world. Each agent tracks changes in the other agent
based on the other agent’s interaction with the world. Triangulation is so narned because
it is a threefold interaction, oftwo creatures and the world, but an interaction which is
twofold from the point of each of the interacting agents. Davidson admits that
triangulation can be observed to obtain in the preverbal child and the animal, because it
can exist independently of thought and therefore preclude itt 1999:12).
Davidson gives two examples of triangulation occurring in its simplest forrn
(1999:12). He first gives an example of what he thinks is a triangulation situation that is
at its source a wired-in reaction. This would 5e a fish reacting to the slightest movement
ofother fish in its school, tailoring its movernents SO that the formation ofthe school is
not changed. Another example would be the Canadian geese who migrate to warmer
climates every faïl. They fly in a V-shaped formation, and ofien change position within
the formation according to the movements of each other without disturbing the V-shape
to a great degree. Davidson then gives two examples of a learned triangulation reaction.
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The first is that ofvervet monkeys in Kenya that have been found to give three
significantly different vocalizations depending on whether they see an eagle, a lion or a
snake approaching. The other members ofthe group, regardless ofwhether they have
themselves seen the predator, flee to safety in some maimer. The second example is that
of a honey-seeking bird found in Africa. This bird knows how and where to locate honey
but cannot open the source. The bird thus directs human hunters to the honey source to
open it and the hunters then share the honey with the bird. He says about this that we
cannot nonetheless conclude that the bird’s behavior or the rnonkey’s vocalization,
however complex and purposeful it is, is due to propositional beliefs, desires or
intentions. The bird’s ffight and the monkey’s cali, however instructive they may be. do
flot constitute a language. In order to constitute a language, the bird’s behavior would
have to be due to propositional beliefs, desires and intentions (1999:12).
Triangulation is essential to the existence and hence to the emergence ofthought.
The triangle can account for two aspects ofthought that cannot otherwise be accounted
for: the objectivity ofthought, and the empirical content ofthoughts about the extemal
world (1999:12-13). The first aspect, the obj ectivity of thought, refers to the fact that
propositional content is true or false independent ofwhat it is to the thinker. The thinker
must be aware ofthis situation. Wittgenstein bas suggested that we could flot have the
concept of getting things right or wrong if it were flot for our interaction with other
people. The triangle stands for the simplest interpersonal situation. Two or more
creatures each conelate their own reactions to external phenomena with the reactions of
the other interacting agent. Language as well as thought is necessarily social.
As for the second aspect, the empirical content of thoughts about the world,
Davidson believes that social interaction is the only account ofhow experience gives
content to our thoughts. Without the situation of triangulation, there is no other medium
that could teil us what it is in the world we are responding to. This is due to the
ambiguous nature of the concept of cause. It is in our interest to resolve the ambiguity
because the phenomenon of cause contributes to giving beliefs their content. There are
two sources of cause, both of which are provided by social interaction, that of width and
distance. The question ofwidth is to determine how much of the content ofbeliefis
relevant to cause, and it is the similarity of reactions among participants that brings about
the answer. It is the social sharing of reactions that makes the obj ectivity of content
available. The question ofthe distance ofthe relevant stimulus from the participant is
again socially determined, it is distal as opposed to proximal because it is
intersubjectively shared. The distal stimulus is thus triangulated, it is where causes
converge in the world (1999:13).
Davidson is careful to note that triangulation is a necessary condition to thought.
It cannot be a sufficient condition, because it exists in animals that he would not credit
withjudgement. He thus concludes that although triangulation must be present if thought
is present, it can also exist independently and should be viewed as preceding thought in
the order ofthings.
As things stand with Davidson’s arguments, it is possible to credit anirnals with
triangulation, and since triangulation exists where thought exists, it is flot a far greater
leap to credit them with thought, a leap that Davidson does not want to make. In order to
stop this from occurring Davidson must add something further to prevent animals from
being credited with thoughts. That ftirther thing is language. Language is the instrument
that enables a creature to communicate propositional contents out into the world, and it is
that missing element that enables creatures in the triangle to form judgments about the
world (1999:13).
In this article Davidson has claimed holism ofthe mental as a reason why flot
much can be said about the emergence of various aspects of mentality. He has also
identified triangulation as a necessary condition for thought, and because it can occur in
pre-verbal infants and non-verbal animals, he has been forced to daim a sufficient
condition for thought, that of language.
A potential point of disagreement to be found in this article concerns this issue of
Holism. Holism is central to Davidson’s arguments against animals having concepts,
thought and propositional attitudes. It can be seen from the way he argues his point for
holism of the mental, that it makes difficult the tracking of the exact emergence of
various aspects of mentality, that he is going to have trouble accounting for anything to
do with the phenomenon of acquisition, be it of language, concepts or propositional
attitudes. Because he lias this ‘all or nothing’ attitude toward concept acquisition
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Ianuage and the propositional attitudes, he is at pains to account for recent findings in
chiid development. for instance.
Simon Evnine also takes issue with the use ofthe argument for holism by
Davidson. His tactic is to find incompatibilities with Davidson’s espousal ofthe general
principles ofholism and the strange implications that resuit from their application to the
pre-’erbai child (1995). The situation as Evnine secs it is that Davidson’s denial of
thought and language to animais is counter-intuitive to most people. This is not a very
strong argument since it is well known that science has a history of overturning intuition
and even common sense. However, if one appiies this holistic view of concepts and
language to infants, as Davidson does, the child cannot have Ianguagc and SO any
utterings the child might make have no meaning, at least not to any aduit. The
intransiatable chiid somehow grows into the translatable adult, and somewhere during the
course of that change from child to aduit. incoherence in the chuld seemingly magically
hecomes coherence. Two explanations are possible for the result. One is that the child
had some but not ail ofthe conceptual and linguistic resources ofthe aduit. This means
uiving up holism with regard to language. The other possibility is that the childjurnped
from not having language to having one ail at once, and this conclusion is implausible, on
Evnine’s view. The point is that a holistic view with regard to even the acquisition of
language is untenable. This throws doubt on Davidson’s view that ail aspects of
mentaiity emerge simuitaneously. thus opening the door to the possibility that one can
have oiie or some ofthese aspects without having ah. One could then have behiefs, for
instance. without having the concept ofbehief.
The question that Achim Stephan is interested in is whether a creature that lacks
the concept ofbeliefcan be said to have any beliefs at ail. Stephan’s tactic is the
foilowing (1999: 80-83). He takes one ofDavidson’s examples of what it means to have
the concept ofsomething. in this case the concept ofa cat. In order to have the concept
ofa cat. Davidson stipulates, one must have a lot ofbeliefs about what a cat is, as well as
a lot ofother concepts, such as the concept of an animai, the concept ofa continuing
physical object etc (Davidson 1999:8). Stephan then transfers this stipulation, complete
with criteria, to the case of belief, and out ofthis cornes the Munchhausen, as he cails it,
conclusion, that without having the concept ofa behiefone can have neither beliefs nor
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concepts. It is Munchhausen because as Munchhausen pulled himseif out of the swarnp
by his forelock, ail concepts and beliefs get pulled out ofthe reaim ofthe pre-mentai by
the higher-order concept of belief, according to Davidson’ s holistic account of belief.
The problem, according to Stephan, is that this holistic view of concepts has the
implication that neither animais nor infants nor demented aduits can be said to have
beliefs or concepts, because they probably don’t have the concept of belief.
Stephan is looking for a category of creatures, that would inciude infants, animais
and demented aduits, that falis in between the set of creatures who can only perforrn
rudimentary acts of discrimination and those truly concept-possessing individuals. He
thinks that Davidson believes that the set is empty, especially given the quote from
Davidson, reproduced below because it seems to precisely sum up the difficulty.
We have many vocabularies for describing nature when we regard it as
mindless, and we have a mentalistic vocabulary for describing thought and
intentional action; what we lack is a way of describing what is in between.
This is particularly evident when we speak ofthe ‘intentions’ and ‘desires’
of simple animais; we have no better way to expiain what they do.
(Davidson, 1999:11)
Achim Stephan thinks that there is a set of creatures that have beliefs without
having the concept of belief. He thus suggests another construal of concept possession,
conceived of by a notorious ethologist, Colin Allen. Creatures do not need to possess the
concept of belief in order to have any concepts or beliefs at ail. AlÏen’s construal is
rather based on a more enriched discriminatory capacity than Davidson’s, one that
includes recognition and correction ofmistakes. It has three criteria:
1. The creature must be able to systematicaiiy discriminate between Xs and non
Xs,
2. The creature must be able to recognize its own discrimination errors, and
3. hereby be able to iearn to better discriminate between Xs and non-Xs. (Ailen,
1999:37).
It should be noted here that Colin Aiien’s second criterion replies to Davidson’s
objection on why discrimination is flot proper concept possessing behavior, that a
creature must be able to recognize when it has made a mistake in order to truly possess a
C concept. The phenomenon of mistake recognition can be observed behavioraliy by the
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fact that the animal changes its subsequent behavior. Allen’s account also makes
reference to learning, in that the creature learns to better discriminate by modifying or
conecting its behavioral reaction the next time the situation arises. This set ofthree
criteria for concept attribution will be examined in greater detail in the last chapter on
concept attribution. In this context, Allen’s criteria are offered as an alternative construal
of concept attribution that does flot assume language nor possession of the concept of
belief, and would be ideally applicable to animals.
As I mentioned in the introduction to my comments on Davidson’s views on the
issue ofthe necessity oflanguage for thought, I am only interested in critiquing lis views
as they bear directly on animals. As it turns out, the holisrn issue does not appear at first
glance to bear on the animal issue. The fact that Davidson’s holistic view ofmentality is
incompatible with aspects of human development of language and mentality in general in
the chuld may flot seem to have anything to do with the issue of animais. Appearances to
the contrary, however, it does. If we create a set ofhumans that has as a common factor
the lack of Ïanguage, that would contain pre-verbal infants, humans who are hearing
impaired and speech impaired and others, the case could be made that Davidson’s views,
although they could be said to be advanced to support the thesis that human language is
necessary to hurnan thought, that they do flot even succeed at this level, since they leave
out a portion of the population ftom the explanation. The door is then open to daim that
animais may be included in this set of creatures, in need of a theory of thought that does
flot have language as its main condition. T thus would like to agree with Davidson on the
one hand, that human language might be necessary to human thought. I do not, on the
other hand, think that he succeeds even in making the case for this daim. In any case, his
conclusion has nothing to do with the animal issue. That is, one cannot move from the
daim that ‘animais do not have human language’ to the daim that ‘animais do not have
thought’. Ail that can be said as a resuit of Davidson’s views is, following Searle,
‘Humans have language in a sense that animais do not’ (Searle, 1994:209).
5. Conclusion: Taking the Second Strategy
Remembering the two strategies that could be taken regarding Davidson’s daims
C that I outlined at the beginning of the chapter, one could also take the second tactic, and
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agree that language is indeed necessary to thought. This tactic would entail argujng that
the term ‘language’ should be defined in a wider sense as a system of communication. In
fact, one could follow Bennett’s construal cited in the preface of”Linguistic Behavior”
and interpret language as systematic communicative behavior (Bennett, 1976:ix). Taken
this way, it could be argued that alarm cails and barks constitute the language of an
animal and are interpreted by other animais ofthe same species. This constitutes the only
point of comparison between Davidson’s theory and animal theories that I can see, and it
requires flot oniy widening the definition of language, a move that Davidson might flot
agree with, but also looking at empirical evidence. Let us nonetheless look at this second
strategy, for it has given up some surprising results and has added some interesting
considerations to the issue.
The second strategy also offers two possible routes that can be taken. One is to
sec if certain species of animais can be taught to use some form of human language. The
other entails examining the communication system of animais and comparing it with
human language for common elements. Both of these routes are compatible with
acknowiedging that language is necessary to thought. Instead of taking the second route
which entails trying to demonstrate that animais have a language oftheir own that shouid
be construed as a language, sorne researchers have taken the first route and decided to
instead teach chimps to communicate using human language. The work of Sue Savage
Rumbaugh (1998) is the most thorough example ofthis attempt. Generally speaking,
success at the task of teaching human language to primates would indicate that human
language is flot a characteristic or capacity that is restricted to humans. The sharp divide
between animais and humans that has been thus far claimed could then bc thrown into
question, since the original differentiating characteristic of human ianguage would be a
capacity also possible in animais.
The reason why this strategy bas been criticized even by ethologists is because it
entails appiying an anthropocentric view of language, i.e., human language, and
attempting to show h to be present in non-humans. Why should animais be shown to
have human language rather than their own species-specific language? 0f course, it
makes perfect sense to take this strategy if one is intent upon answering Davidson’ s
arguments directly. In this case, the strategy is to daim a victory on Davidson’s own
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territory by showing non-human animais to be capable of human speech. I think that the
work of Savage-Rumbaugh and others, while it constitutes ‘feeding into the hand ofthe
enerny’, can also be taken in a more foundational way to question the idea that humans
and animais are different and the view that language is the defining trait that reinforces
this divide, which is basicaiiy the view of Davidson. Whiie I think that this is a good
thing, this work aiso takes ethologists one step back because it exciudes the path of
determining whether species-specific systems of communication exist and then debate
whether these systems should also be constituted as languages. Moreover, Davidson’s
view is stiil vindicated because he daims that thought uitimately depends on many other
things, arnong them the successfui interpretation of another’s utterances. Savage
Rumbaugli lias only so far shown that primates can communicate using ESL, a set of
symbols that are communicated through hand movements, and lexical pictures. She
cannot show that primates speak human language because the vocal cords of primates are
flot bent at the same angle that those of humans are. I am thus led to wonder whether
Davidson would even accept that ESL constitutes a legitimate form of language.
One issue that lias become centrai to primates being taught human language is
exactly this question. whether communication using lexicon images or sign language
constitutes a legitimate form of human language use. Skeptics (and I include Davidson in
this camp) argue that such practices do flot constitute legitimate forms of language use.
They argue that in order to qualify as language, sign language and lexical pictures must
contain ail the syntacticai structure that human language contains, including logical
connectives. Some even go so far as to daim that the primates must 5e able to produce
spontaneous novel sentence fragments, as chiidren are observed to do in the language
acquisition phase. Arguments ofthis type always take on the same forrn, deemed the
strategy of ‘upping the ante’ by Talbot Taylor (1998). Skeptics argue that only if it can
be shown that it is justffied to attribute more or less ail the communicationai abilities that
this or that theory of language attributes to an aduit human can the primate be said to
possess human language. We will see in later chapters that this type of argument is also
used with regard to mathematicai ability and concept attribution.
On the other side ofthis issue, there is also the question ofwhat exactly is taught
C to the primate. The leap is not easily made from teaching ESL or lexical images to the
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primate to the conclusion that human language has now been acquired by the primate. In
looking at what exactly is taught via ESL or lexicon images, Bennett argues that it is a
much impoverished version of human language, lacking in particular in the areas of
sentence structure and vocabulary. Claiming that E$L and lexicon images are flot
representative of what is characteristic of human language, Beirnett concludes that if one
teaches an impoverished version of language to the primates, one can only expect such an
impoverished version to be demonstrated by the primates (1988:203-4). This would
explain why no primate has been observed to produce spontaneous novel sentences. It is
because the primate has not been taught sentence structures to begin with. It can be
concluded here that the primate certainly demonstrates what it has been taught, and leads
one to wonder what would happen if ail aspects of language use were taught to the
primate.
Rather than try to teach human language to species of animais, some authors have
instead chosen to take the second route and attempted to study and characterize the
communicational systems of animais. One possible starting point is to devise a set of
essential characteristics to human language and see if any of these elements occur in the
communication systems of animais. It could be immediately objected that this is a non-
starter since the elements of comparison are from a human language, and if animais
possess a language, it is going to be an animal language and flot a human language.
Perhaps this animal language will not look anything like the human language.
Nonetheless some authors have argued that it has been assumed in an almost a priori
maimer, without evidence, that the communication systems of animais share none of the
elements of a human language.
Other authors argue that it’s the methods of study that are iimited, and not the
system of animal communication under scrutiny. If we proceed to investigate the
communication systems of animais with a human benchmark or antbropocentrically
defined notion of language in mmd, we wiil not find human language in animais. We
wiii aiso forgo the possibility of finding something like language occurring in the animai,
if it exists. It is entirely possible that the syntax/semantics of animai language is entireiy
unrecognizable to us, since it may have evoived aiong different pathways from an
C evoiutionary point ofview (Kiriazis & $iobodchikoff, 1997:367). Testing for language
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in animais is thus rendered more difficuit because researchers have this impiicit
anthropocentric bias for lexicons and syntax/semantics which, whiie these might be
characteristic to human language, need flot be present in the languages of other species.
Given the anthropocentric objection above, i.e., that animais wiii definitely flot
possess a human language if they possess any language at ail, a more promising strategy
has been to devise a set of what are known as ‘equivaience relations’ for the essential
characteristics found in human ianguages that can then be iooked for in animai languages
(Schusterman & Gisiner, 1997). Devising equivalence relations is a forrn of bottom up
processing, a way to circumvent the anthropocentric objection while stiii having a basis
for comparison. The situation is as foiiows. hi devising a set of essentiai characteristics
for human language, the fact remains that these characteristics are of a human language.
Assuming that the essentiai characteristics of an animai language will be animai in nature
is a safe assumption to make, but the problem then arises that we might flot recognize
these characteristics as anything, because the basis for comparison is lost. Setting about
the question from a human perspective is a form of top down processing in that it starts
out with a set of human characteristics, but quickiy runs into an anthropomorphic
objection, that the characteristics of an animai ianguage wiii probabiy not be human-like.
$0, in order to circumvent the charge of anthropocentrism, one starts from a set of
equivalence relations.
h is in the context of a neutrai setting, teaching an artificiai language to doiphins,
that $chusterman and Gisiner have been abie to deveiop a set of descriptions that
represent what an animai does when it iearns a language in order to then compare this set
with language acquisition by humans. From here, paralleis between animais and humans
wili be matched up and a set of equivaient relations developed. For instance, it is found
that doiphins have the abiiity to ciassify or categorize signs. This abiiity couid parallei
the human abiiity to recognize items as beionging in a category or even empioy concepts.
These two species-specific abilities wouid then comprise an equivaience relation. The
abiiities implicit in language learning could then be compared between humans and
animais.
It appears that in taking the second strategy around Davidson’ s arguments and
arguing that ianguage is necessary to thought, rnost of the crux of the issue then lies in the
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parameters ofthe definition oflanguage. In defining the term, it is found that the issue of
anthropocentrism arises, since the issue often bous down to what a human language
would consist in. There is a high likeiihood that animais wiii flot possess something that
is strictly human-like in nature. The notion of equivalence relations, in my opinion, pulls
the issue out ofthe anthropomorphic-anthropocentric stand-off and has the benefit of
aliowing for comparisons to be made between humans and animais as well as allowing
for the deveioprnent of something along the unes of a theory of ianguage acquisition in
animais.
In light ofa consideration ofthis second strategy which entails taking a iook at
recent advances made in animal language research (ALR), I think that two charges can be
levied at Davidson, both aibeit of an ad-hoc nature. One is that his views on ianguage are
antbropocentric in nature, and the other is that he can be viewed as failing back on the
rhetoricai strategy of ‘upping the ante’, given his anthropocentric view oflanguage. Both
these charges stem from the fact that Davidson has attempted to outiine the case for
human thought and its dependence on human language. Concerning the first charge, why
should we think his system would apply to other species of creatures? Concerning the
second, if it was found though equivaience relations that animais have a ianguage that
they use to communicate information to each other, why would these animais also have
ail these other human-like capacities such as the concept of a concept and explicit
knowledge of truth and faisity?
I have entertained two different strategies with regard to rebutting the ciaim made
by detractors of cognitive ethoiogy and most thoroughly articulated by Davidson. The
ciaim us that thought depends on ianguage and particulariy the successful interpretation of
speech. Davidson’s beiief in the holistic nature of ail ofthe various aspects ofrnentaiity
leads to an implausibie view concerning the acquisition in humans of ail aspects of
mentaiity, especiaiiy language. If lie didn’t hoid such a hoiistic view of mentaÏity, the
door wouid be open for ethoiogists to justify their search for mental states in animais by
comparing them with preverbal chuidren or mute aduits, ciaiming that these three groups
have some but not au or a primitive version of fuiiy-fledged aduit human mentaiity. In
flot agreeing with the holistic nature ofmentaiity, one can then disagree with Davidson’s
daim that thought depends on ianguage.
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The second strategy entails agreeing with Davidson’s view that thought depcnds
on language, but arguing that animais do have language construed in the wider sense of
the term. In entertaining this strategy one gains a wider perspective on the whole issue
and the possibility arises that perhaps Davidson’s arguments hinge on language uniquely
humanly construed. Animais perhaps have a language in the sense that they
communicate information to each other, but it does not have ail the elements or the same
eiements that human ianguage has. Attempts at forging a comparison between the two
systems could be successful to the extent that the elements are based on relations of
equivalence. The notion of anthropocentrism as a hindrance to the study of animais will
treated in detail again in chapter three on other minds. It turns out to have a major roie to
play in objections to the study of mental states in animais. At this point, I would
conclude that the “no thought without ianguage” argument, upon further examination,
does not constitute a viable objection to the study ofmentai states in animais.
Chapter Two
Anthropomorphism
1. Introduction: Assumptions
Many critics ofthe proj cet of cognitive ethology cite anthi-opomorphism as one of
the main reasons why it is a mistake to attribute mental predicates to animais. In its
general form, anthropomorphism is a tendency to attribute specffically human
characteristics to non-humans. It is thus anthropomorphic, according to these crities, to
attribute mental states to non-human animals. Historically, the term was used to
characterize the attribution of human characteristics to gods. Anthropornorphism is an
interesting phenomenon, partly because of its nature and the way it occurs.
Anthropomorphizing is flot in itself an enor; it is merely a tendency or a practice. In
order for anthropomorphism to count as an error a person must attempt to attribute hurnan
characteristics to non-humans, rnost ofien animais, that are in fact flot applicable to that
species. The phrase “are in fact not applicable to the species” is of utmost importance:
much of the dispute hinges on this phrase. Two things must be noted here. One is that
the charge of anthropomorphisrn must be levied in order to distinguisli it from the mere
practice or tendency. The attributer is then ‘guiity’ ofthe error of anthropomorphism.
The second thing is that there must be a question as to whether or not these characteristics
can in fact be attributed to the non-human. The charge of anthropomorphism is thus
based on an assumption, the assumption that to attribute mental traits to animais is
erroncous.
In this chapter I intend to examine the phenomenon of anthropomorphism in order
to ultimately show that as a charge it holds no weight mainly because it begs the
question, and that the practice of ‘criticai’ anthropomorphism, as it is construed by
Gordon Burghardt (1991), is legitimate and even necessary in formulating hypotheses for
research in cognitive ethology. In between these two ideas there exists quite a bit of
ground, having to do with proposed sources ofthe probiem, solutions to the probiem and
explanations for the supposed inevitability of the practice of anthropomorphism. I will
thus first examine the idea that various different strands of anthropornorphism exist, as
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advanced by John fisher, who offers a framework for distinguishing them (1996). I will
also examine one ofthe various sources for the tendency that is cited by Hank Davis
(1997). There have additionally been numerous solutions advanced to solve the problem
as indicated by John Kennedy (1992). I will examine Pamela Asquith’s arguments
against adopting Kennedy’s solutions, and her argument for the inevitability of
anthropomorphism (1984, 1997).
In the literature, anthropomorphism is usually submitted by authors as a charge
based on the enor of categories, in a dismissive matrner that is meant to put the issue to
rest, and almost neyer backed up by supporting arguments. It ofien has the effect of
leading the reader to dismiss the whole issue of mental states in animais and thus the
whole project of cognitive ethology prematurely. As a prima facie argument
anthropomorphism is taken seriously and usually prevents further discussion in the forrn
of rebuttal by cognitive ethologists being charged with it. How does it have this effect?
2. Category Error
John Fisher thinks that anthropomorphism is flot clearly defined and is the topic
ofso much confusion that it fails to make its point. It also fails as a viable critique ofthe
project of cognitive ethology, at least when it is based on the underlying charge of
category error. In citing the history of its usage, he characterizes it as a vacuous
rhetorical weapon. It is vacuous because the charge of category error doesn’t go through,
as will be seen in a moment, and it is rhetorical because ofthe way it has been employed
throughout history. He cites an example that serves to give the term anthropomorphisrn
its rhetorical connotations. Ernst Cassirer used the term to describe outmoded forms of
explanation that have been replaced by more modem ones, i.e., classical physics versus
quantum physics (1996:3). The term has thus corne to be related to forrns ofthought that
are arcane, outmoded and quaint but false, and that must be overcome by new discoveries
in science.
One of the rnost ofien cited sources of anthropomorphism according to Fisher is
that it rests on a category enor (1996:3). As Fisher notes, Gilbert Ryle originally gave us
the notion of category error, which is the practice oftreating an entity ofone type as if it
C were an entity of another type. This notion applied to animals wouÏd entail that it is a
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category error to appiy characteristics that are restricted to humans, entities of one type,
to animais, entities of another type. Here the underlying assumption is that humans are in
fact entities of a different type than animais, otherwise the charge does not go through.
Fislier daims that the underiying assumption lias flot been dernonstrated and that the
charge does flot go through.
I am in agreement with Fisher on both the points made above. I think that both
notions taken together are what give the charge of anthropornorphisrn its weight. Upon
doser examination, we find out that the phenomenon upon which rests the charge has not
been demonstrated, and that the charge itseif rests more on reputation than actuai factual
enor. Add to this the idea that anthropomorphism was initially associated with the
attribution ofhuman characteristics to god-Ïike entities, which was considered a form of
sin, and we now get that it is a sin by association to attribute human characteristics to
animais, even though it lias not been demonstrated yet that there is not some sharing of
characteristics between the two species.
Fisher asks the question “Even if we were to find out, at some point in the distant
future, that humans are of a different category than animais, does this mean that it is
aiways a category error to attribute a human characteristic to an animai?” And is it aiso a
category error to attribute animai characteristics to a human? (Fisher, i 996:4) He daims
that it depends on what the set of human characteristics in question is, but that these
characteristics must be definitiveiy uniqueiy human in order for the charge of
anthropomorphism to stick. For instance, it would be anthropomorphic to attribute
human speech, in the form of words, to a dog, for they cieariy cannot speak liuman
ianguage. There are not many researchers who would daim that dogs can speak in the
way that humans can, however. It is not so clear, however, that some mentai attributes
such as thinking and reasoning cannot be attributed to animais, that these characteristics
truly are uniquely human. Whether or not these predicates can or cannot be attributed to
animais is an empiricai question, according to Fisher, decidable only by empirical
evidence. There is reason to think, in my opinion, that animais partake of some of the
mentai predicates characteristic ofhurnansjust as they partake of some ofthe
physioiogicai apparatus of humans, such as possessing similar senses and internai organs.
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3. Varieties of Anthropomorphism
Fisher offers a framework for the varieties of anthropornorphism that exist,
because part of the problem, according to him, is that there exist different forms of
anthropomorphism, and authors either conflate several different forms or fail to take the
different forms into account when making their charge. For instance, authors try to
associate what I would eau warranted forms of anthropomorphism such as hypotheses
concerning attributions of mental states to animais with unwarranted forrns such as the
attribution of human speech to a dog. Another common occurrence is authors who use
the tcrm to make the charge and don’t back up their daim with any argument, as if there
is a single form of anthropomorphism that speaks for itself and nothing more needs to be
uttered apart from the word.
There are two broad categories of anthropomorphism according to Fisher’s
framework, one of which can then be further bifurcated into two other types. The two
broad categories are Imaginative and Interpretive. Imaginative anthropomorphisrn refers
to the practice of representing animais in fiction or animated movies as similar to us
(1996:6). This practice ofien shows up in chuldren’s movies, for instance, a taiking dog.
As rnentioned above, this is not the type of attribution toward animais that reseai-chers
make daims about and attempt to find proof for. It is the conflation of this type of
‘Disneyesque’ obvious anthropomorphism with the interpretive type that seems to make
the interpretive type less viable, through a sort of ‘guilt by association’. Interpretive
anthropomorphism concerns cases of inference from animal behavior to attributions of
mental predicates, where these inciude descriptions ofthe anirnai’s physicai behavior in
terms of intentionai actions (1996:6). It shouid be noted here that this is the form most
often represented in the iiterature on cognitive ethoiogy. Any attribution of any mental
predicate to an animal is considered anthropomorphism on this definition. b conflate
interpretive anthropomorphisrn, a much debated topic in the literature, with the
imaginative type, encountered in Disney movies, lias the effect of diminishing the
credibiiity ofthe interpretive type.
Fisher then divides interpretive anthropomorphism further into two other types,
situational and categoricai. Situationai anthropomorphism involves the attribution of a
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mental predicate to an animal which, while it might flot apply to the animal in that
particular situation or context, might apply in another situation (1996:6). For instance,
attributing the mental state of anger to an ape that bares its teeth whiÏe sitting in the lap of
Jane Goodall might flot be appropriate to the situation, whiie attributing the state of
happiness miglit. Here, the baring ofteeth by an ape is ambiguous until it is
contextualized. it occurs in aggressive dispiays, in the form of teeth baring, as well as in
happiness displays, in the form of smiles. We might say, generally speaking that the
situational type aÏÏows for attribution of mental predicates to animais, and it is the
appropriateness ofthe situation or context that is at issue. Categoricai
anthropornorphism, on the other hand, is the label given to the atternpted attribution of ail
mental predicates to ail animais. This is the type ofanthropomorphism that is based on a
category error (1996:6). The idea behind it is that humans and animais are two separate
categories. It is thus an anthropomorphic error to commit the category error of
attempting to apply any or ail characteristics that are of the human type to any animal.
The problem, as mentioned above, is that it is not in fact an eiror to attribute the mental
predicates to the animais until the empirical evidence has been carried out, because it is
not yet an established fact that humans and animais are in fact separate categories.
Here one might wonder why Fisher has chosen to split interpretive
anthropomorphism into two other types, rather than just contrast the interpretive type
with the situational type. Interpretive and categorical anthropomorphism are identical,
both are concerned to deny ail proposed attributions of mental predicates to animais.
There does not seem to be enough of a difference to warrant two distinct categories.
Categorical antbropomorphism is then further divided into two types, that of
species and that of predicate type, to distinguish the conditions under which it is
committed. $pecies type lias to do with applying a certain predicate to the wrong species
of animal. Predicate type has to do with applying the wrong type ofpredicate to a certain
species of animal.
Fisher gives an exampie of a charge of anthropomorphism that involves both
species and predicate type, that ofPeter Carruthers in his article ‘Brute Experience’
(1989). Carruthers doesn’t back up his charge with any supporting arguments or proof in
the article. The quote in question is: “For only the most anthropomorphic of us is
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prepared to ascribe second-order beliefs to toads and mice; and many of us would have
serious doubts about ascribing such states even to higher mammais such as
chimpanzees.” (Carruthers, 1989:261). Here the so-cailed anthropomorphic error would
be in attempting to attribute higher-order predicates such as beliefs about beliefs, that on
some accounts apparentiy require an individual to possess the concept ofbelief, to a
iower species on the food chain, such as a toad or a mouse. This is predicate type
anthropomorphism, according to Fisher, because no one has yet claimed that toads have
higher-order beliefs, although other types of lower-order predicates may be applicable to
them. k is aiso species anthropomorphism, since no one has claimed that other iower-on
the-food-chain-animals such as mice have beliefs, while it might be claimed that higher
end animais, such as chimps, have such higher order beliefs.
Carruthers’ quote makes two points ciear, one is the flippant manner in which
charges of anthropomorphism are made, and the other is why species and predicate type
anthropomorphism are vacuous categories. first, the article in which this quote occurs is
about the ethical treatment of animais, flot about what mental predicates we can attribute
to animais. lis point is that we treat the intellectuaily-challenged sub-set of our
population no less ethically than anyone else, in spite of the fact that they are
intellectually chalienged. We should thus treat ail animais equally ethically, without
regard for each species’ degree of intellectuai sophistication. The article is not about
anthropomorphism per se and he doesn’t quaiify or offer any arguments to back up his
daim relating to anthropomorphism. This is an example of the dismissive way in which
remarks pertaining to anthropomorphism are made.
Second, Fisher’s categories ofspecies and predicate types can oniy be discussed
in relation to each other, and not in isolation. Recaliing Carruthers’ statement as an
exampie, Canuthers hesitates to apply a certain predicate X to two different species of
animais. The problem is that one can neyer have an example of species type
anthropomorphism without also having an example ofpredicate type or vice versa.
Appiying the mental predicate of belief to a toad is an enor of both species and predicate
type as much as applying the ability for verb conjugation is to the species of rhesus
monkeys. Because one cannot have one type of error without the other, no new
information is gained and the spiitting of categories in the first place is superfluous.
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I think that spiitting categorical anthropomorphism into two further types is
unnecessary. Categorical anthropomorphism is based on the error of categories, and as
mentioned above, the charge does flot go through because the empirical evidence on
which it is based bas flot been carried out yet. In addition to this problem, there is the
consideration that research in cognitive ethology hasn’t got to the point of species
specific mental predicate attribution, so fisher’s two further categories based on species
and predicate are, in a sense, before the fact. One implication stemming from Fisher’s
speculative act of spiitting a category of antbropomorphism into further types is
indulgence in speculation on further types that are also ultimately based on a category
error. If cognitive ethology was at the point where species specific attribution was the
issue rather than whether any predicates at ail can be attributed to animais, ail the
discussion about antbropomorphism as a category error wouid aiready be moot.
On the other hand, if cognitive ethology was at the point in the distant future
whcre it was found that animais and hurnans shared traits, and it was agreed that mental
predicates could be attributed to an animal, the issue of species and predicate attribution
couid potentiaily be a subject of debate. One would then be charged with
anthropornorphism only if one attempted to attribute a mental predicate that was flot
attributable to a certain species (but was attributable to another species). This is flot a
viable path to take with regard to this issue, however. Although the charge of categorical
anthropomorphism would no longer apply here, because the attribution of mental
predicates would become sanctioned, the division into the two categories of species and
predicate is nonetheÏess untenable, since one cannot invoive one without involving the
other. One cannot charge sorneone with attributing the wrong type ofpredicate to a
particular species without also mentioning the other type of error because it acts as a
comparison. Without the other category, the charge is made in a vacuurn.
Rather than splitting categorical antbropomorphism into species and predicate
type, Fisher could instead make a distinction between strong and weak categorical
antbropomorphism. Strong anthropomorphism would correspond to tbe extreme position
where it would aiways be a category error to attribute any human characteristic to any
animal. Strong categorical antbropomorphism would impiy that humans and animals are
two distinct categories and that no properties are shared by the two categories. A less
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extreme position, and the more popularly heid ofthe two is weak categoricai
anthropomorphism, which holds that the attribution of certain, usually higher-order,
mental predicates to some animais is a category error. It is futile to flirther divide the
phenomenon of anthropomorphism into distinctions other than strong and weak as long
as cognitive ethologists are stiil debating with opponents the question of whether it is
possible to apply any mental predicates at ail to any animal.
This distinction between strong and weak anthropomorphism, while it is an
improvement on Fisher’s complex schematic, is stili flot satisfactory in my opinion, for it
assumes that Gilbert Ryie’s notion ofa category mistake truly applies in the case of
animais and humans. That the charge of anthropomorphism is made in advance of the
evidence concerning humans and animais as separate categories is probiematic, in my
opinion. What couid be wrong with the research strategy of attempting to find out just
what kind of mental life animais have, if any, and comparing this mental Ïife with that of
humans? It is ofien claimed that humans are animais. This daim has been no more
shown to be true than the daim that humans and animais are separate categories, and so
the issue is moot. If we give up trying to apply Ryle’s notion ofcategories to this
situation, what other arguments are lefi for the opponent to cognitive ethoÏogy, that aren’t
speculative? We should cease trying to find a distinction between humans and animais in
this theoretical manner because it is a futile effort, and start to investigate empiricaiiy
whether animais and humans share any mental traits.
fisher also identifies an extreme position most ofien occupied in the literature for
those who believe that any attribution of any mental predicate to animais is the error of
anthropomorphism, that of the hard anthropocentrist (1997:7). The label of hard
‘centrist, as he cails it, usually occurs in conjunction with anthropornorphism, and is
usually charged by those who believe that animais share some of the mental life of
hurnans, such as cognitive ethologists. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the terrn
refers to a human centered perspective. It is thus a charge that is thrown back at the
opponent as a sort of invitation to justify why we should hoid a human centered view of
the world. Fisher has identified Donald Davidson as a hard antbropocentrist. As we have
seen in chapter one, Davidson is indeed a hard anthropocentrist who believes that any
attempt to attribute any mental predicate to an animal is a form of categoricai
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anthropomorphisrn. He feeis there is an unbridgeable gap between humans and animais,
caused in part by language. Any attempt to attribute mental predicates, and particularly
language, to animais is therefore a form of categorical anthropomorphism. In charging
that Davidson’s views are anthropocentric, the cognitive ethologist is shifiing the burden
ofproofover to Davidson to justify why ianguage and mental state possession shouÏd be
restricted to humans.
The issue, in my opinion, centers on the applicabiiity of a set of characteristics
across species. The charge of anthropornorphism is meant to imply that mental traits are
human, and that il is wrong to appiy these traits across species. Further splitting
anthropomorphism into different types based on traits or situations is a waste of tirne in
my opinion, since these distinctions are based on indulgence of an assumption, that
animais and humans are separate categories. What is lacking is a symmetrical term for
the animal kingdorn, that would mean it 15 a mistake to apply animal traits to humans.
Lacking such a term at this point, T think we should use the term ‘anthropocentrism’. The
charge of anthropocentrisrn is meant to question the daim that the traits in question are
uniquely human and seems to me to corne ciosest to symmetricaiiy opposing the charge
of anthropomorphism, without implicating the assumption of category mistake. In rny
opinion, there should be two sides to the debate, that of the anthropomorphist versus the
anthropocentrist. The issue wouid be the applicabiiity of traits across species: which
human traits can aiso be found in animais as well as which animal traits can also be found
in humans.
4. Sources: Affirming the Consequent
The daim has been advanced that the practice of anthropomorphisrn stems from
the resuit of a classical iogical error known as affirming the consequent. flank Davis is
the only proponent ofthis view, to my knowiedge. His characterization of
anthropomorphism is that it is a form of inteliectual laziness, resulting from a failure to
make proper species differentiations (Davis, 1997:336). In Fisher’s terminology, lie
would be said to espouse a forrn of categoricai anthropornorphism as well, since he
beiieves that humans and animaIs are separate categories. Moreover, according to lis(E view, the boundary separating humans from animais is flot defined sharply enough, and
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this is a resuit of intellectual negligence in making species differentiations. He believes
that the impact of anthropomorphism in the literature is disastrous, resulting in flot only
the inference of higher mental properties in animais, but also in inferences about the
function of these entities, which he argues are baseless to begin with.
The source of the tendency to anthropomorphize, he argues, is that its nature is
rooted in a classical logical error called ‘affirming the consequent’. This is where one
lists an antecedent and then a consequent in the forrn of a syllogism, and by affirming the
consequent, one thereby fallaciously proves the antecedent. He gives an example for the
existence ofGod:
A) is taken to be ‘If there were a god’
B) is taken to be ‘The world would be a beautiful place’
C) The world is a beautiful place, therefore there is a god (1997:336).
The affirmation of the consequent, that the world is a beautiful place, thereby proves the
antecedent, that there is a God. His point is that this is a fallacy, and can be shown by the
fact that there couÏd be many reasons why the world is a beautiflul place, the fact that
there is a god is only one ofrnany possible causes. There is a problem with the form of
the fallacious argument as he has laid it out however, which prevents his argument from
being successflully made. According to Hurley’s definition ofthe error of affirming the
consequent, it consists of one conditional premise, a second premise that asserts the
consequent of the conditional and a conclusion that asserts the antecedent (Hurley,
1982:323). Davis’ first premise is not a conditional. In order for it to be a conditional, it
would have to be of the following form:
A) If there were a God, then the world would be a beautiful place.
B) The world is a beautiful place.
C) Therefore, there is a God.
This observation of mine is a technical point. Tt is merely the tip of the iceberg
concerning Davis’ argument, however. Not only is he off to a bad start in making his
argument, but this is not the only problem with his argument.
The example he gives relating to anthropomorphism is the following.
A) If Ithink
B) Then I scratch my head
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I am scratching my head
Therefore I must be thinking (1997:336).
Davis daims that this is the form of fallacious reasoning behind anthropomorphism and
the form typical of daims pertaining to mental states in animais made by cognitive
ethologists. As the argument stands, it is impossible to make Davis’ point. Again in this
case it is first necessary to rewrite the premises into the true form of the argument for the
fallacy of affirming the consequent:
A) If I think then I scratch my head
B) I am scratching rny head.
Therefore I am thinking.
Davis is attempting to draw an analogy between this failacy argument form and daims
made in cognitive ethology. The general argument form is the following. A capacity for
a mental state is conditional upon a certain piece of behavior in the antecedent and the
piece of behavior is then claimed in the consequent, thereby proving the antecedent, the
existence of the mental state. Davis goes on to daim that there is nothing inherently
wrong with premise pairs such as the one above, it is the illogical use to which they are
put that contaminates our conclusions regarding the mental life of animais (1 997:336).
for Davis, the problem with these daims is that other causes that are non-mental in
nature have not been ruled out as an expianation for the cause ofthe behavior evidenced
by the animal. For instance, various other antecedents, such as dandruff, caimot be ruled
out as causes ofscratching one’s head. We will see in chapter four on methodology that
this strategy of arguing that various other antecedents besides mental states cairnot be
ruled out as causes of a particular beliavior, is a tactic most ofien used to argue that
experimental resuits do flot support the hypotheses ofthe cognitive ethologists.
Davis states in an endnote (p. 347) that affirming the consequent may actually be
a useful adjunct to scientific discovery. He sees a difference, however, in the syllogism
put to legitimate use, presumably in science, and illegitimate use, presumably in
cognitive ethology. He believes that the difference lies in the extent to which other
possible antecedents have been ruled out, for the logical syllogism itself is blind as to
whether adequate steps have been taken so that the antecedent we are considering stands
C alone among causal possibilities (1997:327). Applied to the above, the question then is:
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is there a causal relation between scratching one’s head and thinking? This first has to be
established before we can test the argument in a syllogistic form, according to Davis’
view.
There are many shortcomings with the argument advanced by Davis. There is
first the problem that the form ofthe syllogism that he has advanced does flot even
correspond to the fallacious syllogism of affirming the consequent. The problem with
this syllogisrn as Davis has listed it concems the order ofthe antecedent and consequent.
Normally, in philosophical discussions, the usual practice is to reverse the order in which
Davis has listed the antecedent and consequent. In this case the order would then be the
following: If I scratch rny head, then I think. UsualÏy a behavioral indicator is taken to
indicate a higher mental process, and not the other way around. This modification makes
the syllogism a correct form of modus ponens, and invalidates the conclusion he
originally wished to make about anthropomorphisrn.
This does not get at the main problem with Davis’ whole argument, however.
The fact that there is a prima facie problem with the form ofthe syllogism is a superficial
critique. The real problem with the argument is that his daim that this type ofreasoning
is used in experimentation isn’t even accurate. Experimental tecimiques in the social
sciences do not normally employ syllogistic reasoning. That is, researchers normally
does not use syllogisms ofthe form ‘modus ponens’ to argue for experimental results. In
this case, that the behavior of scratching one’s bead is an indicator of a propositional
attitude, such as thinking, in the individual. The usual procedure in experimental
disciplines with regard to inferring intervening variables such as mental states is
inference to the best explanation, which takes the form of hypothesis testing.
Davis takes the work of Donald Griffin. grandfather of the discipline of cognitive
ethology, as an example ofthe illogical processes implicit in mental state attribution in
animais. He quotes Griffin ftom bis 1984 book ‘Animal Thinking’: “Animals make so
many sensible decisions concerning their activities that it lias become reasonable to
infer some degree of conscious thinking”(19$4:3-4). Davis misrepresents Griffin’s
rernarks into a syllogistic argument forrn, neglects to put the first premise into the form of
a conditional, and again reverses the order oftlie premises:
A) If I engage in conscious thought
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B) Then I will behave in a sensible manner (1997:338).
He lists no conclusion, so we have to presume what it is and that the argument really
looks like the following:
A) If I engage in conscious thought then I will behave in a sensible manner.
B) I am behaving in a sensible maimer
Therefore I must be engaging in conscious thought.
Davis states that the problem lies flot with the prernises themselves, but in the daim that
conscious thought is the sole basis for sensible behavior. What happens if one reverses
the order of premises to represent the way Griffin has originally stated it? The argument
is no longer an example of the logical error of affirming the antecedent. It becomes a
valid form of modus ponens. What it cornes down to in Davis’ opinion, however, is
whether a causal link bas been established between sensible behavior and conscious
thought. Ibis lias nothing to do with the correctness of Griffin’s daim put into the forrn
of a syllogism.
A few things must be stated here. First, the examples chosen by Davis are
ridiculous. No one lias attempted to prove a causal relation between scratching one’s
head and thinking, in humans or in animals. Perhaps Davis lias chosen these examples
deliberately to amplify his point. The effect it bas is to discredit legitimate attempts to
find out what mental predicates are applicable to anirnals and which are flot. He chooses
far-fetched examples to discuss and hopes that the legitimate examples will become far
fetched by association. A better example to discuss might be the following: a researcher
hides an apple in the sand in the courtyard of a windowed compound containing
nurnerous chimpanzees. He is watched by a single female chimp, who sees him hide’
the apple in the sand. Later the chimps are let out into the courtyard, and the female who
witnessed the burying of the apple waits for the other chimps to disperse before digging
up the apple and eating it by herself. Here is the argument, with the antecedent in the
proper conditional form and the antecedent and consequent within themselves in proper
order:
A) If the chimp waits until the other chimps disperse before digging up the apple,
then she is selfish.
B) $he waits until the other chimps have dispersed before digging up the apple,
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Therefore she must be selfish.
Although this anecdote can be made into a valid form of modus ponens, it does not
constitute one ofthe accepted research methods for disciplines such as cognitive ethology
or even experimental psychology. Modus ponens syllogisms, although an accepted forrn
of logical argumentation, are not part of the tools of researcli in either of these two
disciplines concerned with animal experimentation.
Second, although Davis mentions in passing the great advances in our
understanding of bats’ echolocation done by Gi-iffin, he mentions none ofthe conclusions
of Griffin related to this work. I’ll venture to bet that none of Griffin’s conclusions were
advanced using syllogistic reasoning. Instead of examining the conclusions, Davis
mentions an excerpt from an introduction to one of Griffin’s many books wherc Griffin is
commenting in a general way on the convergence of results that have been obtained
recently in cognitive ethology. Griffin did not put the excerpt mentioned above into the
form of a syllogism, and the way Davis has laid it out, it looks like the argument for the
contents ofthe book. The premises in the so-called argument have also been reversed.
Griffin’s conclusion in that paragraph, not included in Davis’ extrapolation, is that
communicative behavior arnong various species of animais might offer an opportimity for
ethologists to ‘listen in on’ (obtain access to) and gather data about the nature of animal
consciousness. The only daim that Griffin is putting forth in this context is that perhaps
observing the communication patterns of various species can be seen as one rnethod
among many offering an opportunity to understand what degree of awareness these
species possess.
Davis’ overali point in the article is twofold. He daims first that the idea that
conscious thought is the sole basis for sensible behavior is an unwarranted assumption to
make even about human behavior and two, that it only gets worse when attempting to
apply it to animals (1997:338). His objection is that we do flot how enough about the
role of conscious thought in determining human behavior to even attempt to extrapolate
to any other species. He concludes that we must ftrst achieve sufficient understanding of
the mental processes in humans that we then wish to extrapolate to animais. Thus it may
be said that one criterion for determining conscious thought in animals would be to work
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out a theory of consciousness in humans, otherwise extrapolation to animais rests on
shaky grounds, in Davis’ opinion.
Davis questions the role of thought even in determining human behavior, claiming
that it is stili the subject of considerable debate. Folk psychology, according to Davis, is
responsibie for offering credibility to anthropomorphism, because it offers a possible
mechanism that humans use for predicting and explaining the behavior of each other.
However, it is used only by the folk, it lias flot been experimentally proven, and it should
therefore be discredited, according to him (1997:334).
Even if folk psychology were to be proven as the mechanisrn underlying human
behavior prediction and expianation, the practice of anthropomorphism rests on an
additional error. The practice of extrapolating specific traits from hurnans to animais
rests on the questionable assumption of continuity between the species. This continuity,
according to Davis, lias flot been dernonstrated. We must be convinced that there is a
continuum of mental life that inciudes both hurnans and animais that we wish to
extrapolate from in order to sanction the atternpt at extrapolation. Thus a second criterion
for determining conscious thought in animais would be to have settied the continuity
issue, on Davis’ account.
A few things can be said about this two-fold conclusion made by Davis at the end
ofhis articie. In a general way, neither ofthe two criteria lie lists shouid stop cognitive
ethologists from continuing their studies with a view toward determining what mental
predicates we can attribute to animais. The first criteria that Davis thinks should be
achieved is an age-old problem in philosophy. The problem of defining and plotting
mental processes in humans has its own branch in the discipline known as ‘phulosophy of
mmd’ and there are a number of good theories out there, none of which is sufficientiy
robust to withstand criticism. This sliould not prevent attempts at constructing theories of
animal mentality just because such theories presuppose an answer to the human question.
We cannot put off interest in things that presuppose an answer to the issue of mental
processes in humans untit a viable theory of mental processes is found and accepted, for
the search could go on indefiniteiy. There are entire branches of knowiedge devoted to
this study, psychology is one ofthem, and it does not put other research stemming from(J this notion on hoid because a definitive answer lias not been found to this question.
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Davis’ second criterion, that of settiing the issue of Darwin’s continuity
hypothesis, is also an age old question that pits two opposing hypotheses about the
relation between humans and animais against each other, neither of which are easily
proven. One ofthese is the continuity hypothesis, expanded on by numerous authors,
among others Charles Darwin. From an evolutionary perspective. it is difficuit to plot
animais that are already extinct aiong a continuum and show that ail species are related,
or at Ïeast that man is an animal. If this were to be proved, then the issue of categorical
anthropomorphism would no longer be considered an objection. The opposing theory,
call it the discontinuity theory, that may lend credibility to animais and humans being
separate categories, relies largely on the idea that language is innate and is responsible for
the break in the continuum between animais and humans. We have not resolved this
debate by any means, and are flot in danger of solving it anytime soon. It shouid not
prevent ethoiogists from pursuing their studies. Additionally, the discontinuity theory by
itself, even if proven, does flot resolve the question adequately either. The question is
whether there are any mental properties arnong the properties of the animal category, not
necessarily whether any human category properties can be canied across the category and
attributed to animais. The charge of anthropomorphism, when it is based on a category
error, assumes a resolution to the question in favor of discontinuity and is thus a case of
begging the question.
5. Solutions: Metaphor and Analogy
John Kennedy (1992) has been identified as a dissenter of sorts in the
anthropomorphism debate. He is an ethoiogist but thinks that the threat ofthe
anthropomorphic error ought to cause change in the way that ethologists report their data.
One solution, according to him, is that ethologists avoid making attributions to animais
that couid be considered anthropomorphic. This puts him in the middle, conciliatory
position, for he is an ethologist, but he wants to avoid the practice entirely and so
prescribes avoiding using the language that causes one to commit it. He has been
criticized by other ethoiogists for espousing this avoidance attitude.
Kennedy believes that the tendency to anthropomorphize is buiit into us. It has
been pre-programmed into our hereditary make-up by natural selection (1992:5).
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Characteristic to his view is that the tendency to anthropomorphize is largeiy an
unconscious process. This is a convenient daim to make, for it guarantees that we cannot
avoid the tendency precisely because it is unconscious, and therefore outside of conscious
control. To daim it as an unconscious process aiso eliminates the need to show that the
tendency occurs in the first place, and also how the tendency arises. In my opinion. this
daim is convenientiy indisputabie because of its reference to the unconscious.
An anaiogy can be drawn between Davidson’s view in the previous chapter and
Kennedy’s view. As we saw at the end ofthe iast chapter, Davidson thinks that there are
two vocabularies, one for describing mindless things and a mentalistic or intentionalistic
one for describing purposeful or reflective hurnan behavior. He thinks that attempts to
apply the mentalistic vocabuiary to animais is unwananted, but that there is no other
vocabuiary availabie to describe the creatures that fail ‘in between’ the two vocabularies.
As I interpret him, Kennedy is in agreement with Davidson. Both are seeking to delimit
an in-between vocabuiary that wouid be of a higher level than mindless and yet lower
level than full-biown mentaiity and purpose. A rniddle level vocabulary such as the one
they seek does flot as yet exist. Davidson is resigned to the fact that we wili continue to
use the mentalistic vocabulary. while hopefutly keeping in mmd that we do not really
mean such terms in their full sense when we use them to describe animais. One
interpretation ofthis idea is that such vocabulary can be used as long as it is understood
that such terms are meant metaphoricaily and flot literaiiy.
Given that such a rniddle level vocabulary does flot exist, Keirnedy has three
prescriptions on offer to remedy the problem of unconscious anthropomorphism, the first
ofwhich resembtes Davidson’s (1992:162-5). It is that if ethoiogists insist on using the
mentalistic vocabuiary as opposed to the mindless one, they should expiicitly state that
the mentaiistic terms being used to describe the animais are being used in a metaphoricai
sense. The second prescription is an extension ofthe first, it is to translate the
metaphorical terrns used back into their literai counterparts. There is the assumption here
that the metaphorical terms are equivaient to subjective terms and that literai terms are
equivalent to objective terms. The third prescription foilows from the idea ofavoiding
mentalistic terminology ahogether and it is to use only objective terrns when describing
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animais. Each ofthese prescriptions wiii be taken up in turn. None ofthern, in my
opinion, constitute good solutions to the probiem.
Parnela Asquith has taken issue with the use of metaphor in anthropomorphizing
(1997). She thinks it is an inaccurate use ofthe term ‘metaphor’ that is being used to
justify anthropomorphic attributions. Her conclusion is that the terms used in
anthropomorphic attributions to animais are actuaiiy meant in their literai sense and flot
their metaphoricai sense. If she can make the case that attributions to animais are based
on an inaccurate use ofthe term metaphor, then Kennedy’s first and second suggestions
wiii no longer work. The iink between metaphor and antbropomorphism is such that
showing the role of metaphor in anthropomorphisrn to be inaccurate wili disqualify
Keimedy’s first two prescriptions.
Metaphor is defined as the application of a description to a terrn that is not
literaily applicable. An examination ofthe distinction between metaphor and literai
meaning makes clear that the term is misapplied in making anthropomorphic attributions.
Pameia Asquith offers a pertinent comment on the distinction between the two forms of
meaning, arguing that the distinction between literai and metaphorical meaning is
fundamentai to any discussion ofmetaphor (Asquith, 1997:3 1). Here I quote her at
length:
“Two distinctions can be drawn between literai and metaphoricai
meanings. first, literai meaning is that which is agreed upon by speakers
with a common language. The meaning can oniy be judged right or wrong
with reference to common or accepted usage. Literai meaning can,
therefore, change. By contrast, a metaphorical word cannot be corrected
by referring to proper usage-it can oniy be criticized as inappropriate or
inept. A metaphor wiii oniy be appropriate if the meaning of the word
used metaphoricaiiy can sornehow be associated with at ieast some of the
literai meanings of the word used in a metaphoricai way, or with other
words in the sentence. Second, metaphoricai meaning is parasitic on the
literal-that is, the force of the metaphor is derived partiy from the literai
meaning of the word, but no literai meaning is derived from the
metaphoricai.” (1997:31).
The two things to keep in mmd are first the idea that metaphor is neyer correct or
incorrect, it can oniy be criticized as being inept or inappropriate. The second thing to
note is that the metaphoricai is parasiticai on the literai, but that the literai is notC parasitical on the metaphoricai. We can start with an example of a metaphor applied
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humans in order to see how calling anthropomorphism a forrn ofmetaphor is a
misapplication ofthe terrn. Here is one from Shakespeare’s Hamlet: ‘When sorrows
corne, they corne not in single spies, but in battalions.’ The reader is being asked here to
link the notion of sorrow with a contrast between 1mw spies act and how battalions act.
The difference here between spies and battalions, and hence in sorrows, is that single
spies are stealth-like and strike without warning, whereas battalions strike in an obvious
and large manner (Honderich, 1995:555). Applied to soi-mw, Shakespeare wishes to
draw the reader’s attention to the metaphorical image that sonow ofien cornes in large
doses and is ofien obvious. The point is that this is a metaphor, sorrow does not in fact
act like a spy or a battalion, it is an emotion, flot a human spy or a group of men. Sorrow
has its own characteristics, it is just more interesting to try and find parallels with other
terms that one wouldn’t normally associate with sorrow, in order to bring out a richer
connotation of the terni.
Taking a typical example of a metaphor as applied to animals, a cat turns its back
on a veterinarian afier having received a hypodermic injection and is described by the
following staternent: ‘The cat is indignant’. Here one is invited to apply a description of
how a hurnan would react whose feelings were hurt due to a subjective feeling of being
treated unjustiy and apply this description to the cat. A cat does not really get indignant
in the form of hurt feelings, so the argument goes, it is just a metaphorical way to
describe the cat’ s behavior that neatly illustrates what the person offering the metaphor
intends. According to the proper use ofmetaphor, it is a metaphor to describe the cat as
being indignant, and not the real case. But what constitutes the real case here? The
literal meaning implied here is absent. In the case of sorrow, sorrow has its own set of
literai characteristics, one employs a metaphor to bring out other potentially interesting
and certainly flowery characteristics. In the case ofthe cat, what is the literal description
that the attribution of indignity is parasitic on?
Asquith gets at this issue by asking the pertinent question” What then is inferred
when an author maintains that mentalistic terms to describe animal behavior are being
used metaphorically and not literallyT’ (1997:32). Remembering that the metaphorical is
parasitical on the literai, the literai meanings must be those used to identify human(J characteristics. She asks “are not the metaphorical terms being meant in the same
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(human) way when applied in the animal case?” (1997:32). I think that the answer is
affirmative, the terms are being meant in the human way when applied to animais. Thus
the terms are being used, flot in a metaphoricai sense, but in a literai sense, when applied
to the animais. In the case ofthe cat, the term ‘indignant’ is not a flowery substitute for
a more concrete, objective, less flowery description, for there is none. Asquith is thus
right to say that anthropomorphism caimot be seen as a valid use of a form of metaphor,
because the so-called metaphorical terms used are actually intended literaily, and the
literai counterpart is ofien missing.
It wiii be remembered that Kemedy’s second suggestion is that we shouid avoid
the practice ofanthropomorphism aitogether by transiating metaphoricai or subjective
terms, such as ‘searching,’ back into their objective counterparts, such as ‘scalming’
(1992:162). Keimedy justifies this switching back ofterms by the idea that transiating
back into the objective description will bring to light many ofthe features that the
subjective term misses or glosses over. This is the exact sarne argument that cognitive
ethologists offer as justification for their use of intentionai terms in attributions to
animais, only in reverse. Ethologists prefer to use purposefui or intentional vocabuiaries
preciseiy because the objective purposeless vocabulary masks or leaves out certain
necessary aspects ofbehavior, such as the fact that it is purposefui. This extra ingredient
ofpurpose is exactly what Keimedy and others believe is unwarranted in the description
of an animai’s behavior. Kennedy’s third suggestion is thus to remove the intention from
the description and instead add in some iong-winded mechanicai description for which
the intentionai term is ofien a shorthand. Kennedy’s suggestion seems to cancei itselfout
and leave us back where we started.
6. Inevitability
Pameia Asquith (1984) offers an argument for the inevitabiiity of the practice of
anthropomorphism and then argues for its utiiity in primate studies. The inevitability
arises through the practice of using ordinary ianguage terms to describe animais in
scientific settings such as journal articles and textbooks, because there is no other mid
levei ianguage available. The utility of antbropomorphism is found in the ciaim that too
much valuable information would be iost if we were to stop using the terms. As we saw
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above, it is thc intentional or purposive element ofthe description that is at issue. Its
removal constitutes the valuable information that wouid be lost, according to Asquith.
One can see how anthropomorphism might arise in the scientific literature, if
researchers are using ordinary language, usualiy reserved for humans, to describe the
behavior of animais. There is a purposive element to the language, taken for granted or
assumed in humans, that according to Kennedy and others, cannot be assumed in animais.
b illustrate one way in which anthropomorphism arises from the use of ordinary
language terminology, Asquith bonows Purton’s distinction between A-purposive and O
purposive terminology used in descriptions of animal behavior (1984:143-5). In A
purposive, the A stands for agent, who is aware of what behavior he needs to dispiay in
order to attain the goal, whereas in 0-purposive, the O stands for organic, which refers to
the functional explanation for the behavior in question. 0-purposive descriptions of
behavior are given in non-intentional terms, whereas A-purposive descriptions imply
purpose and conscious awareness. Drawing an analogy with Davidson’s reference to the
two leveis of language in chapter 1, 0-purposive descriptions correspond to the language
we use to describe mindiess beings, and A-purposive descriptions correspond to
mentalistic vocabulary he wouid like to reserve for humans. Asquith argues that
anthropomorphism arises due to the use of ordinary language terrns that imply agency or
A-purposiveness that are then attributed to the behavior of animais. Again we seern to
find ourseÏves in Davidson’s predicament where we are looking for a rnid-level language
that would apply to animais but that, for whatever reason, does not yet exist.
Asquith aiso demonstrates how anthropomorphism occurs in the process of data
collection (1984:145-9). Borrowing a distinction used in data recording, between
behavioral units and behavioral categories, she illustrates how purposive terminoiogy is
consciously removed and how it creeps back in at a later stage in the process. Behavioral
units are single bits of data, such as discrete movernent patterns and vocalizations, that
then get grouped into behavioral categories according to pre-set criteria (1984:145). In a
data-recording situation, such as a group of researchers observing a group of primates in
a facility, these researchers would describe the behavior ofthe primates by breaking it up
into behavioral units. The behavioral units grouped together to form a grouping for(J aggression, for instance would include things such as spitting or yelling at someone,
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hitting or grabbing someone, menacing facial expression, or even srnaller data bits that
we have no name for. There is no name for the bits because they are partial descriptions,
they have no intention, hence the term ‘bits’. These bits will get a narne once they get
grouped together again into behavioral categories. They also have no name so that the
highest degree of obj ectivity can be achieved in the process of data recording. An
example of a behavioral category ofien used in the observation of humans is that of anger
or aggression. The exact point at which anthropomorphism arises is in the grouping of
the behavioral units into behavior categories (1984:146). This is also the point at which
purpose or intention creeps back into the descriptions.
The process, at least with regard to the gathering and writing up of data, is thus
the following: The generic form of anthropomorphism, that attributes a general
purposiveness to behavior, arises when researchers employ ordinary language in the
discussions of their observations of animal behavior. In order to mitigate the tendency in
behavioral observation, the behaviors are broken down into small bits that have to do
with physical movement. Anthropomorphism enters in when these bits of movement are
collated back into behavioral categories which are in the form of ordinary language in
order to be intelligible for discussion.
The problem is the sarne in both cases, and it stems from the fact that there is only
one vocabulary ofterms available, the same that we happen to use for humans. This
vocabulary contains a purposive or intentional element to it that detractors believe is
unwarranted in its application to animals. On the other hand, it is flot that ethologists
insist on using these terms despite the fact that these terms have proven to be too
sophisticated to describe animals, and that there is another vocabulary available to use
instead. There is no other vocabulary available. Moreover, if Davidson is right in
claiming that there exist only two vocabularies, one for mindless objects and one for
mind-full creatures, then ethologists are justified, in a certain sense, in choosing the
mind-fuli vocabulary over the mind-less one to apply in hypotheses regarding mental
state attribution in animals. Moreover, it is flot as if ethologists assume without testing
that animals have all the capacities that humans enjoy. The aim of cognitive ethology is
to find out which, if any, of the capacities that humans have can also be applied to
animals.
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7. Conclusion: Utitity
Against the argument that ordinary language terms with purposeful connotations
should flot be used in scientific reports about animal behavior, Asquith argues that this
terminology is the best one to use because it gives the clearest, most understandable
presentation of animal behavior (1984:165). It aiiows for connections to be made
between behaviors that descriptions in behavioral units do not. It also aliows for general
theories to be formuÏated about higher order behavior, i.e., on a social level, or
community organizationai level (1984:166). This is because both these phenomena,
connections between behaviors and social behavior, require the elernent of purpose in
order to be made sense of.
As it tums out, there is one construal of anthropomorphism that constitutes an
accepted practice, but only in its restricted form. Kennedy cails it ‘mock
anthropomorphism’ to distinguish from ail the other construais. It is taken to refer to
pretending, for argument’s sake, that an animal can think or feel as we do. It is
sanctioned as a iegitimate practice because ofthe heuristic value it has, in particular for
hypotheses that can be generated about the function ofthe animai’s behavior.
It is in the mention of hypotheses about function that the constraints of the method
of mock anthropomorphisrn emerge. Ethoiogists are interested in two aspects of
explanation with regard to an animai’s behavior, its function, which corresponds to
ultimate cause, and its intention, which corresponds to proximate cause. Mock
anthropornorphism is the practice of assuming that animais can think and feel as we do
for the sake of generating hypotheses related only to the function of an animai’ s behavior.
Ail other forms of anthropomorphism, because they are concerned to seek the proximate
causes ofbehavior, related to mechanisrn or intention, are to be avoided. Predictions
based on mock anthropomorphism, according to Kennedy, are no more than hypotheses
that need to be tested. The probiem with mock antlwopomorphism is the constraint
restricting study to the function of behavior only. Cognitive ethologists are interested in
the proxirnate causes ofbehavior that relate to purpose or intention. This practice of
mock anthropomorphism is unhelpful in that it stili does flot sanction the seeking of such
C expianations.
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There exist other legitimate forms of anthropomorphism construed as a practice
that do flot contain the above constraint of restriction to ultimate cause. Other versions
include ‘criticai’ anthropomorphism or ‘pragmatic’ anthropomorphism (Burghardt, 1991,
Silverman, 1997). Ail such construais have the common elernent of iegitimacy, when
used for heuristic purposes only, to generate hypotheses about animai behavior. The task
remains, according to Keimedy, of how to discriminate between the legitimate form and
the illegitimate form, for the onus is now on the author making the daims to state how
the mental state or intentionai term is meant. As Kennedy notes, unless the author
explicitly states that he or she means to anthropomorphize in either a mock or genuine
manner, we can’t tell the difference. I don’t agree with Keirnedy on this point, and in my
opinion his view leads to an inconsistency on this point. On his view, it will 5e recalled,
the tendency to anthropomorphize is unconscious. Tt is thus impossible for the author to
consciousiy state whether the attribution is a case of genuine or rnock anthropomorphism.
Moreover, the practice is sanctioned in the case of generating hypotheses, there is thus no
need to state whether it is mock or genuine. In hypothesis generation no conclusions are
made, so there is no fear of being guilty of anthropomorphisrn since it is hypotheses that
are being generated and flot conclusions that are being advanced.
8. Conclusion
Upon doser examination ofthe term anthropomorphism, it wouid appear that
making a distinction between the practice of anthropomorphisrn and the charge of
anthropomorphism is the crux ofthe issue. I hope I have demonstrated that construed as
a charge, it does flot hold much weight, and bous down to a case of question-begging.
When the charge is based on a category error, anthropomorphisrn is actually an empirical
question that has not yet been answered. It is one of the goals of cognitive ethology to
answer this very empiricai question. The various sources of the tendency to
anthropomorphize that have been advanced in the chapter range from logical error, to
unconscious compulsion, to a probiem of missing vocabulary. The daim of logical error
misses the mark, and as it turns out iogicai syiiogisms aren’t even employed in scientific
hypothesis testing. The daim for the phenomenon ofunconscious compulsion turns out
to be circular and therefore vacuous. We are again lefi with Davidson’s dilemma of a
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missing mid-level vocabulary. The fact remains however, that anthropomorphism
construed as a practice for hypotheses generation is at the least a legitimate heuristic tool
that can be employed while we wait for the rnid-level vocabulary to be conceived of.
C
CChapter Three
The Problem of Other Minds
1. Introduction: The Vanishing Subjective Point ofView
The third challenge I will be looking at in this first half of the thesis is the
problem of other minds. It is flot advanced as a challenge in and of itself to the proj ect of
cognitive ethoiogy. That is, no one has seriously ciaimed that cognitive ethoiogy cairnot
pursue its investigation into the possibility of mental states in animais because anirnals
are other minds, and scientific investigation into other minds is impossible. While it is
not a challenge in and of itself, it is worthwhile to investigate because it underiies other
issues. The case could be made that the other minds problem involves or underlies issues
visited in the two previous chapters, that is, the issues of language and
anthropomorphism. Although we can infer mental states in other humans based on
behavior and verbal reports, the verbal report avenue is blocked in the case of animais.
The argument by analogy is made more difficutt in the case of animais, because one is
basing one’s analogy on sornething that is absent in animals: verbal reports and language.
It might thus be said that the other species of mmd problem underlies the language
problem in animals.
This other species of mmd problem is also what underlies the complaint that
attribution of mental states to non-humans is anthropomorphisrn. Allen and Bekoff
(1997:52) are ofthis opinion. They define anthropomorphism as the interpretation of
what is flot human in terms of human characteristics. As seen in chapter 2, underiying
the charge of anthropomorphism is the assumption that humans and animais are two
different categories. The fact that animals lack language can also be construed as a
reason to believe that animal minds are a different species than human minds, and to
attribute the sarne kinds of mental states to them would thus be anthropomorphic, on this
reasoning. The charge applies only to other animais since attributing mental states to
other humans cannot be considered anthropomorphism by definition.
In this chapter I will be examining the problem of other minds as it relates to two
issues. The first is the idea that we cannot have direct access to the mental states of
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animais. The second. slightly different, is that by extension we cannot have direct access
to the subjective experience of animais.
The generai problem ofother rninds is whether and if so how one can know orbe
justifled in believing that other individuais have thoughts or feelings (Honderich,
I 9’)5:637). Introspection provides one an access point for one’s own mmd, so there is no
apparent problem there. We don’t have the sarne direct introspective access to other
humans’ minds however, and so justification for the minds ofothers must proceed by
argument based on inference from anaÏogy.
The probiem of other rninds regained the spotlight in the literature in 1974
hecause ofa paper written by Thomas Nagei entitled “What is it Like to be a Bat?”
Nagel was inspired to write this paper after attending a talk given by Donald Griffin at
Rockefelier University on bat echoiocation. In order to make his taiks more vivid,
Griffin used to set loose a bat or two in the lecture hall afler lie was finished speaking.
The paper that Nagel was inspired to write was about the dichotomy between the
subjective point of view ofthe individual andthe objective point of view given by
science. He used the exampie ofa bat to illustrate the irreducibiÏity ofthe subjective
point of view to the objective point ofview contained in scientific theory. Two points
From Nagel’s paper became topics of discussion in the years following it. One discussion
was taken up by scientists concerning the absence ofthe subjective point ofview in
scicntific theorv [for instance Erwin Schrôdinger Mind and Matter” (195$)]. The other
point found its way into discussions of animai behavior, that we can neyer know what it
is like to he a bat or other animai, depending on how different our physiologies are, and
su we should not bother with this tYpe of investigation. Griffin, credited with starting the
discipline of cognitive ethology, was in turn inspired by Nagel’s paper to write a book
about the subjective experience of bats and other animais, titled The Question of Animal
Awareness: The Evolutionary Continuity of Mental Experience” (1976). Griffin’s work
was not weii received initialiy. and became the target ofmany critiques concerned with
cognitive ethoiogy as a questionable endeavor.
The problem of other minds is an age-oid probiem. and I wiii flot pretend to soive
il in this chapter. My discussion ofit stems from the general fact that it underiies sorne of
thc challenges made to cognitive ethology discussed in the other chapters. More
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specifically in this chapter, the problem of other minds bears on the searcli for a
subjective point ofview in both animais and humans. What shah be done with this
problem, which is more of a puzzle or paradox, according to some authors? There are a
number of possible reactions to it witnessed in the literature over the years; I’ll discuss
two ofthem in this chapter. One reaction is to reject Nagel’s original question ‘what is it
like to be a certain animal?’, and maintain that there is no significant answer to the
question. Daniei Deimett (1991, 1998) takes this tactic, and offers two ‘solutions’ to the
question that I suspect are more than a little tongue in cheek, although both are currently
implemented in the practice of cognitive ethology. Kathleen Akins (1996) also takes this
tactic, arguing that the subjective point of view is poorly deiineated, based on intuition,
and that we should not be too worried about capturing it since we have no clear idea what
we are even looking for. The second reaction is to embrace the dichotorny, and
acknowledge that perhaps there is an answer to the question. Pursuing the answer to this
question is a route taken by many cognitive ethologists and has resulted in the creation of
a new area of study for cognitive ethology, the study of subjective or private experience,
which I will evaluate in the hast section of the chapter. It involves acknowledging that the
subjective point ofview is flot reducible to or even capturable by objective theory, but
that ht should sti]l be examined because of its link with cognitive capacities. Another
implication of studying the subjective experience of animals entails a recognition and
subsequent theoretical distancing by cognitive ethologists ftom what lias been up to now
anthropocentric perspective, that uses humans as a benchmark or point of comparison,
toward a ‘bottom-up’ approach to studying animals, known as “therornorphism”. This
approach means taking each species of animal on its own terms and attempting to
discover how it represents the environment in addition to what capabilities it might have
(Timberlake, 2002:105). In light of the implications this relatively new strategy lias, my
aim in the chapter is to clarify what this perspective entails and evaluate sorne ofthe
objections raised concerning whether this strategy is implementable on a practical level.
Given the lack of a shared system of communication between humans and animais, is it
possible to translate this perspective into a research strategy? If it is found not to be
possible, should researcli in cognitive etliology be given up?
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2. The Problem Posed
I’iI start the discussion with Allen and Bekoff s portrayal ofthe problem (1997).
Their portrayal is interesting because it makes a distinction between the other mind’s
problem as appiied to other humans and as applied to animais. Some authors who make a
distinction in the other mind’s problem as appiied to animais and humans probabiy do 50
because they believe, like Davidson, that animais and humans are two distinct categories.
I do flot include authors such as Allen and Bekoff in the above category. As they
mention, the issue, on some views, with the other minds probiem is that whule we humans
might have access to our own mental states, we do flot enjoy the sarne access to the
mental states of other human beings. It is safe to say that we do flot have direct access to
the content of the mental states of others (Allen & Bekoff, 1997:53). Allen and Bekoff
note the fact that psychologists ofien sheive the problem of other minds, even though it is
no less of a problem in their field. Behavioral scientists, whuie admitting that knowledge
of other human minds is possible, regard the mental states of other animais as forever
closed to us. Allen and Bekoff cail this the ‘other species ofmind’ problem, to separate it
from the other human minds problem.
Allen and Bekoff offer two forms of the generai argument for the daim that we
can neyer have scientific knowledge of other minds, one for other humans and one for
animais. Here is the argument in premise form for humans:
1. Mental phenomena are private phenomena.
2. Private phenomena cannot be studied scientifically.
Thus mental phenomena cannot be studied scientifically (1997:53).
This argument depends on the view, according to them, that mental phenomena are
private. There are numerous interpretations of the term ‘private’ and the soundness and
thus success of the argument really hinges on this term. Allen and Bekoff choose to
interpret ‘private’ in the sense of ‘not directly sensible by others’. Taken in this sense,
quarks are also private phenornena. Quarks are nonetheless studied scientifically by
inference to the best explanation, which is a selection ofthe most plausible hypothesis
among the competing alternatives for the explanation of observable phenomena. On
Allen and Bekoff s view, mental states can be studied in the same manner as quarks.(J There is only sense of private that would invalidate the using of inference to the best
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explanation as a method. That is the sense where the ‘privacy of the mental state’ means
that the mental state lias no effects whatsoever beyond the individual possessing the state
(i.e., behaviorally or otherwise). Allen and Bekoff argue that even though we are not yet
sure in what sense mental states have effects, it is pretty much agreed that mental states
have effects on behavior at least. Mental states, because they have visible effects, can
thus be studied using inference to the best explanation. Thus, Allen and Bekoff argue,
the first prernise ofthe argument is probably untrue if ‘private’ is taken to mean ‘has no
effects whatsoever beyond the individual possessing the state’, yet the second premise is
only true if ‘private’ is taken to mean just that. Either way, they conclude, the argument
is unsound. Since this argument says nothing about animais specifically, it must be taken
to include animais as well as humans.
The argument can also be further restricted in order to apply to animais. Here is
the version for animais.
1. Mental phenomena are private phenomena.
2. Private phenomena cannot be studied scientifically in non-human animais.
Thus mental phenomena caimot be studied scientifically in non-human anirnals
(1997:540).
This argument makes explicit reference to animais. and while sorneone, say a behavioral
scientist for instance, might accept that we can infer the presence of mentai states in
humans via language, lie may flot accept that we do the same for animais. That is, we
can’t ask an animal what mental state it is in and it cannot answer us. Another common
source for the behavioral scientist’s view is that in the absence oflanguage use by
animais, their behavior is not discriminating enough to allow for the attribution of mental
states. The fact that animais themseives also do not use a reasonabiy humaniike ianguage
amongst themselves means that their behavior is flot discriminating enough for us to
attribute mental states to them.
Alien and Bekoff don’t really offer a critique of this argument. They choose not
to get into a discussion about whether or not animals do indeed possess some sort of
ianguage by citing the Ïatest evidence that some primates have successfully been taught
human ianguage. They instead take the tactic of concluding that it is up to cognitive
ethologists to break down the notion of mentality, identify its various aspects and show
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how each ofthese aspects is amenable to scientific investigation. This is a good tactic.
However, Ailen and Bekoff could have taken the same tactic as they did with the first
argument. namely to daim that just as progress in cognitive science has contradicted the
argument against investigation into human mental states, so wiil progress in cognitive
ethoiogy contradict the argument against investigating animal mentality.
The case couid aiso be made that a separate argument for animais is flot even
necessary. The wording of the two arguments is exactiy the same, save for the additionai
phrase ‘in non-human animais’. The mere act oftacking on the phrase ‘in non-human
animais’ to the premises does not constitute an extra ingredient that makes it different
from the human case and that by flat adds more weight to the argument. Moreover, a
separate argument for animais impiles that it has aÏready been established that the two
species are distinct categories. The behavioral scientist who thinks that scientific
investigation is possible for humans but not for animais is likely basing his or her view on
a type of distinction between humans and animais that has flot yet been demonstrated,
such as the category enor argument. As we saw in the discussion on anthropomorphism
in chapter two, the category error lias not yet been demonstrated. Aiternatively, the
behavioral scientist could offer tlie lack of language in animais as the reason why
investigation into the mental states of animais is not possible. This will not work for two
reasons. First, it would have to be shown that animais do flot have language. Second, it
wouid have to be shown that animais couidn’t be taught to use liuman language. In fact,
if one removes the avenue of language, since some have argued that introspection and
verbal reporting in humans are notoriously inaccurate method of accessing the content of
mental states, then humans and animais are on equal footing with regard to the other
minds problem.
3. Nagel’s Bat
h wouid be useful to look at the original question as it was posed by Thomas
Nagel (1974). The titie ofthe article and hence the question is: what is it like to be a bat,
or what miglit the phenomenology of a bat be like? The larger theoretical issues tliat
Nagel aiso discusses in this article are the distinction between the objective point ofview
of science and the subjective first-person point of view, and how reductionist
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explanations cannot reduce the subjective to the objective without losing some aspect of
the subjective point ofview. The example ofa bat is brought in to exempiify the probiem
ofthe inaccessibility ofthe subjective point ofview. A further difficulty involved is to
construct an objective theory ofthe subjective point of view ofthe animal. The issues
discussed by Nagel apply to animais as weil as to humans. It should be noted that
Nagel’s essay is flot, strictÏy speaking, about the problem of other minds, nor is it about
the other species of mmd probiem. Rather the problem of other minds underlies the issue
discussed by him, that ofthe inaccessibility ofthe subjective point ofview.
This is howNagel poses the problem (1974:166-16$). He daims that conscious
experience is a widespread phenomenon. It occurs at many leveis although we cannot be
sure of its presence in the simplest organisms. It is very difficuit to provide evidence of
it. Some extremists deny it in manmials other than man. No doubt it appears in countless
other forms unimaginable to us. Nagel then derives the subjective point of view from
consciousness. 11e ciaims that the fact that an organism has conscious experience at ail
means that there is something it is like to be that organism. 11e caÏls this ‘what it is like’
phenomenon the subjective character of experience. 11e then daims that this subjective
character of experience is flot adequately captured by any present theory. A reductive
analysis of the mental doesn’t capture it because it is also Iogically compatible with the
absence of it. Explanatory systems of functional or intentional states don’t capture it
either, for they also are applicable to automata. Explanations in terrns of the causal role
of experience also faii for the sarne reason. He then makes an interesting point that both
Dennett and Akins, in their critiques, will emphasize. The point is that without some idea
of what the subjective character of experience is, we cannot even know what is required
ofthe theory that is supposed to account for it.
11e then states that every subjective phenomena is connected to a single point of
view, and that any objective theory will abandon that point ofview. There is an
argument of sorts that leads up to this daim (1974:167). The first statement is that the
subjective character of experience appears to be the most difficult phenomenon to explain
out of ah the things that a physicahist theory must explain. One caimot exciude this
phenomenon as one might a by-product of a chemical reaction, that is, by explaining it as
an effect on the mmd of a human observer. The phenomenon must be given a physical
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account. It would seem that this is impossible because every subjective phenomenon is
coimected with a single point ofview, and it seems inevitable that an objective physical
theory will abandon that point of view.
Nagel admits that facts about ‘what it is like to be an X’ are very peculiar, and this
peculiarity makes some doubt their reality or daims made about them. His strategy is
thus to point out the relation between the subjective and the objective with a view to
illustrating the importance ofthe subjective point ofview. b help him make the point
he uses the example of a bat. We assume bats have experience, and he has chosen bats
rather than some other animal lower down on the evolutionary scale precisely because we
would agree that bats have experience, while there might be some question as to whether
a slug has experience. He has also chosen bats because their sensory apparatus is so
different from ours, he believes that the problem is made exceptionally vivid by this
difference.
The argument is as follows (16$-9): The essence ofthe belief that bats have
experience is that there is something it is like to be a bat. Bat sonar is flot sirnilar to any
of our senses, so there is no reason to suppose it is anything like anything we can
experience or imagine. In trying to imagine what it might be like, one is restricted to the
resources of one’s own mmd and these are inadequate to the task. for instance, one
could imagine oneselfwith some ofthe physical transformations that are prominent in the
bat’s unique experience, such as webbed wings, the apparatus for sonar etc. This will not
work, Nagel argues, because there is an unbridgeable difference between a human’s
experience of behaving like a bat, even complete with some of the transformations that
enter into the experience of a bat, and what it is like for a bat to be a bat. The conclusion
is that such an understanding may be perrnanently denied to us by the lirnits of our
nature.
Nagel makes one last noteworthy point that is taken up by ethologists who evince
the reaction of embracing the dichotomy and advocate researching the animal’s
subjective point ofview. It is the hypothesis that there might exist hurnanly inaccessible
facts. He puts forward the idea that there could exist facts that could flot ever be
represented or comprehended by human beings, even if the species lasted forever, simply(J because our structure does not permit us to operate with concepts of the requisite type
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(1974:171). Attempts to reflect on the bat’ s subjective point of view might fail within
this category offacts.
I am ofthe opinion that Nagel’s essay is the most eloquent attempt to illustrate the
plight ofthe subjective point ofview with regard to its apparent disappearance in
objective theories and to advance the idea that there exists a set offacts that are beyond
our human comprehension. However, his arguments, or lack thereof, are not beyond
critique. One cou!d argue, for instance, that while it is true that the objective theories that
we construct fail to represent a particular subjective point ofview, it is unclear that
objective theories should endeavor to include the subjective point ofview in the first
place. He mentions that we could neyer know what it is like for a bat to be a bat. Is there
any significant difference between what it is like for a human to be a bat and what it is
like for a bat to be a bat? If there is, would lmowing what it is like for a bat to be a bat
have any bearing on humans? Dennett and Hofstader interpret Nagel as seeking “. . . a
distillation of that which is common to the experiences of ail bats, not the set of
experiences of some particular bat.” (1981:407). In some sense, what Nage! is afier is not
a personal point of view of a particular bat, and so we cannot immediately rule out that
the objective theory w!!! fail to capture itjust because it is a single personal point ofview.
In Hofstader’s view, Nagel is interested not in ‘what is it like for me to be X?’ but rather
‘what is it like to be X?’ In other words, Nage! wants to know objectively what it is
subjectively like to be an X (198 1:409).
The same critique can be applied to the notion of facts beyond human
comprehension. How can we even prove that there are facts beyond human
comprehension if these facts are, by definition, beyond our comprehension? If knowing
what it is like for a bat to be a bat falis into this category of facts, what good does that do
us? Indeed the human mmd can contemplate the unknowable, but what exactly is the
point ofthe exercise? It doesn’t advance our knowledge, or the issue, any further to
contemplate such ideas.
Indeed it is true that Nagel has discovered a fact, that the subjective point of view
is flot found in the objective theories that are constructed from it. I wonder, however, if
there is anything significant in the subjective point of view that is therefore missing from
the objective theory that is constructed from it. In other words, yes indeed there is a
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Q missing element, but is that missing element of any significant value? In other words, isit possible to know objectively what it is subjectively like to be an X, and is this any
different fromjust knowing objectively what it is like to lie an X? This is one of
Dennett’s main points. He asks “Do we have any reason to believe that there is anything
interesting or theoretically important that is inaccessible to us?” (1991:442).
Nagel’s conclusions could be taken to imply a constraint on the field of cognitive
ethology. That is, in animals as in humans, his conclusions irnply that we do not have
any access to the subjective experience of others. Investigation into the cognitive
capacities of animais is thus possible, but only if the avenue through which the
information is gained is not the subjective point of view. Rather than having the effect of
preventing ethologists from carrying out their investigations, or even giving pause to the
project, Nagel’s article has actually been inspirational for people working in the field.
Nagel’s conclusions don’t provide ariyprimafacie compelling reason to give up the
project of cognitive ethology. Afier ail, questions ofphenomenology and subjectivity
should present no obstacle to the search for mental states or other cognitive capacities in
animals. In fact however, otlier cognitive capacities probably occur via subjective
awareness, or at least in the same vicinity as subjective awareness, and so his idea that
tliere exists a subjective point of view lias been applied to animals and lias opened up a
new research area. This will become obvious in my discussion of the second reaction to
the issue.
4. Solution One: Reject
Daniel Dennett offers a sustained critique ofthe problem as Nagel has posed it
(1991, 1998). Dennett doesn’t in fact believe that there is a problem, but he is willing to
entertain Nagel’s worries and lias two rather comical answers to them, that have in fact
already been implemented in research in cognitive ethology. He first notes that the
question Nagel posed in his article along with his ensuing response, that the situation is
hopeless, lias had the curious effect of discouraging subsequent researchers from asking
and answering such questions (1991:441). This isn’t altogether true, as evidenced by the
ongoing debate on qualia, inspired partly by Nagel’s essay. In one aspect, however, it is(J a tension or a puzzle and a swift dissolution of it lias not been forthcoming. When a
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puzzle is truly a puzzle, a swifi dissolution of il is flot forthcoming, and it is obvious from
Dennett’s remarks that he is flot comfortable with the idea of an insoluble puzzle.
Dennett does note, however, that Nagel didn’t really put forward a set of arguments for a
conclusion, but rather assumed a conclusion and discussed its implications.
Dennett deerns Nagel’ s strategy to be one of rhetoric, employing one-sided use of
evidence (1998:33 9). One such example, Dennett advances, is the fact that Nagel chose
bats as an example, and the fact that he took the trouble to relate a few fascinating facts
about this species. Dennett believes that Nagel chose to relate a select few facts about
bats for two reasons. One, because these facts support our convictions that bats are
conscious, and two, because they support Nagel’s conviction that bat consciousness is
very much unlike ours. The rhetorical peculiarity ofthis strategy is the idea that if a few
facts can establish the two above contentions, can’t a few more facts solve the puzzle?
Dennett asks: what kind of fact is it that only works for one side ofthe empirical
equation? This is a good question and I think that Dennett has honed in on one source of
the puzzle. A good puzzle, and I think this is a real puzzle, gets much of its intrigue, just
like a good joke, from its setup and delivery. The few selective facts about bats that
Nagel chooses to use along with the successful establishment of the existence of a
subjective point of view serve to set up the puzzle quite well. Dennett is right to then ask,
what would a few more facts establish about bat phenomenology? I think he has in mmd
a list of the commonalities we share with bats, or at least a list of what we do know about
bats, since this would also serve to give us knowledge about what it might be like to be a
bat. Or, as Nagel admits himself, if he had chosen an animal that shares a sensory
structure more similar to ours, the puzzle would not be as vividly reproduced. I wonder if
Dennett suspects that if Nagel had supplied different facts about a different species such
as a primate, then the puzzle would not be as much ofa puzzle. In other words, if Nagel
had chosen an animal with a sensory apparatus and physiology more similar to ours, the
contemplation of what it might be Ïike to be that animal might flot be as far of an
empathetic stretch. If Nagel had chosen bricks as an example of something it might be
like, there would be no puzzle. Nagel would say that this is because bricks have no
experience, but can we be sure that bats have experience?
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In asking what a few more facts might establish, Dennett is aimost implying that
if a few more facts were established, there would be no puzzle at ail. This is further
established by Deimett’ s comment to the effect that the reader should beware of being
charmed, that emotions and feelings are too easily provoked for them to have any use but
to unnecessarily sway the reader into being convinced that there reaiiy is a problem.
I don’t think that a few more facts would dissolve the puzzle in this particular
case, where the goal is to know what it is like to be a certain species of animal. Even if
the question were to ask about what it might 5e like to 5e a primate, where our genetic
rnakeup is very similar to primates, it would stili be quite a stretch to imagine what it
might 5e like to 5e that animal. This is because it is not rnerely a matter of knowledge in
the form of physiological and neurologicai facts. Knowing ail there is to the species’
physiology and neurological makeup will flot by fiat give us knowledge ofthe animal’s
phenomenological point ofview.
To take a mundane example, let us imagine what it might be like to be a dog. One
small aspect that goes to make up the animal’s point of view is sensory intake that is a
function of its spatial location in the enviromnent. A crucial part ofthe subjective point
ofview must be supplied by the dog’s sensory apparatus, which is fed in large part by its
acute auditory and sensory capabilities and the fact that it is a four legged creature. In
short, the world doesn’t look the same nor feel the same for a dog given its senses and
position in space as it does for us humans, and this difference, in part, goes to make up its
subjective point ofview. In addition to Dennett’s facts, other aspects, such as the
animal’s location in space and the acuity ofits senses must also be included to make up
the totality ofthe subjective point ofview, in rny opinion.
Deimett serves up his own example, a particularly vivid example, to demonstrate
the intuitive card in Nagel’s strategy (1998:341-3). The example is in the same question
form as Nagel’s, except that it asks what the smell ofa rotting carcass (the vulture’s
staple food) might be like to a vulture. No amount of third person investigation, Deimett
informs us, could ever teil us what the smell of carrion might 5e like to a vulture. This
contention, he adds, is not asserted on the basis of argument, but is an intuitive card that
is played. The problem here, he thinks, is the coupling of assertion that there is(J awareness in the animal, along with no attempt to investigate what this assertion of
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consciousness might amount to. This assertion takes the form ofthe crude conviction
“We know what we’re taiking about even if we can’t expiain it yet.” This conviction
underlies the daim that animais have awareness as well as the daim for the existence of
the subjective character of experience.
It is here that Dennett offers his first solution to the problem (1998:344). The
problem is posed as an issue about how to replace the uncertain and vague assertions
about consciousness in animais. His solution is to devise a theory of human
consciousness and then to determine which human features, such as memory, problem
solving etc., would apply to which animais, if any. Assuming we have a human theory of
consciousness on hand, the idea is to then divide this theory up into the various sub
capacities that together make up the phenomenon of consciousness, and finally
investigate whether these capacities exist in animais. It’s obvious he doesn’t believe that
this strategy will work, because he goes on to then challenge the notion that
consciousness ofthe human type i.e., an overseer or an muer eye, exists in animais.
Dennett’s conciuding argument against Nagel’s puzzle makes reference to his
theory of consciousness developed at length in “Consciousness Explained” (1991). In a
nutshell, he argues that only humans have a characteristic that is necessary to
consciousness, what he calis ‘informational organization’ in its most compiete form.
This characteristic is not innate but rather an artifact of our immersion in human culture.
In order to be conscious, or for there to be something it is like to be a creature, he argues,
an organism must have that informational organization that includes the power of
reflection and re-representation. These characteristics are not autornatically present with
sentience. Other species may have somewhat similar organizations, but the differences
between humans and them are so great that analogies do flot make sense. What must be
added onto the mere responsivity and mere discrimination present in most species of
animais is this further characteristic of informational organization. It is this characteristic
of informational organization that gives humans a ‘user illusion’, “the illusion that there
is a place in our brains where the show goes on, toward which ail perceptual input
streams and whence flow ail cognitive intentions to act and speak” (1991:346).
He then challenges the idea that there might be an muer eye of consciousness also(J present in animais, acting as the overseer ofthe ‘what it is like’ feeling. He gives an
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example of a snake and asks if we can talk about what the snake itself has access to or
just about what its various parts have access to. Nagel’s ‘what it is like’ question, when
applied to the snake’ s parts instead of the snake itself no longer makes sense to ask.
Animais, lacking the characteristic of informational organization, probably also lack the
concomitant ‘user illusion’, and so it makes no sense to ask if there is anything it is like
to be that animal.
Dennett’s overall position on the matter is the foliowing: he thinks that the idea
that there is a dividing line between those animais where ‘there is something it is like to
be that animal’ and mere automata is an artifact of our traditional suppositions. He
doesn’t believe that consciousness is an ail or nothing phenomenon: “there is no
principied way of distinguishing when or if the mythic light bulb of consciousness is
turned on (and shone on this or that item).” (1991:349). He further daims that if it is this
light bulb theory of consciousness that participants in the debate on animal consciousness
are carrying around, then the mystery will be maintained.
Deirnett thinks that although consciousness is not necessarily an ail or nothing
phenomenon, the characteristic of informational organization is. Although consciousness
has various grades or degrees, informational organization does not, it is present in its
compiete forrn in the animal, or flot. Animais who are sentient have the capacity for
discrimination and responsivity, but not necessarily the ciaracteristic of informational
organization. This characteristic, which includes the capacity for re-representation and
reflection, is presumably responsible for the “what it is like” part ofthe phenomenon and
is missing in most species of animals.
Dennett seems to be arguing that without the necessary characteristic of
informational organization, there is nothing it is like to be a certain creature. Since rnost
species of animais do flot have this characteristic, we are forced to the conclusion that
there is nothing it is like to be a particular animal.
Dennett takes a slightly different tactic concerning the very same question of
‘what it is like to be an X’ entertained in a chapter ofhis book, Consciousness Explained
(1991:443-8). Here he puts forth his second solution, that ofconstructing
heterophenomenological narratives for species of animals. In this critique ofNagel
Dennett chooses to again question the assumption that there is sorne lefiover
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unexplainabie feature to consciousness, the ‘what it is like’ phenomenological ‘feel’. He
thinks that rather than trying to turn our minds temporariiy or permanentiy into bat rninds
ta literai interpretation ofNagei’s ‘what is it like’ question), we should instead
concentrate on what we do know about bat phenomenology. Heterophenomenologicai
narratives could then 5e constructed from the knowledge that we do have. These wouid
just be neurophysioiogical and ecologicai stories about the animal in question. Dennett
takes care to note here that in recommending that we treat bats and other species for
interpretation in the same way we do humans, he is not shifting the burden ofproof, but
merely extending the human burden of proofto other entities. It’s obvious by this remark
that Dennett is trying to avoid being iabeied anthropomorphic yet he ends up in the
anthropocentric camp instead despite his efforts. Extending the human point of view into
examining the capacities of animais ensures that these capacities wiIl be seen from a
human point of view instead of in their own right. Sorne capacities are Sound to 5e
overiooked because they are not sufficiently akin to the human point of view.
These two solutions, to develop a hurnan theory of consciousness and apply it to
animais and developing animal heterophenomenologies, are the same solution. They
both recommend attacking the problem in terms of what we do know about the animal in
question. Both solutions, regardless ofhow seriousiy Deimett takes them to be, are
aiready being irnpiernented in cognitive ethology. Above and beyond this, Dennett does
flot believe that there is anything lefi over in the manner of ‘what it is like’ to 5e the
animal in question.
While I do believe that Dennett has aptiy characterized Nagel’s arguments and
shown them to be more intuitive than forceful, I am not convinced by Dennett’s
conclusion that a series of facts about the animai’s neurophysiology wiii exhaustively
capture the ful1 extent of the animal’s point ofview. In devising a hurnan theory of
consciousness and determining which features apply to non-humans. or extending the
human burden of proof to animais, there is the potential probiem that one will end up in
the anthropocentric point of view, thereby masking the actual capabilities the animai does
have, and further distancing one from discovering the animal’s point ofview. De;rnett’s
second solution of constructing heterophenomenologies about the species is a Setter tactic(J since it obtains information from a variety of sources and there is less chance that the
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human benchmark will interfere. However, there is the possibility that
neurophysiological and ecological stories about the animal in question are not the only
elernents that go into constructing the phenomenology oftlie animal.
Kathleen Akins (1996) offers a detailed analysis ofNagel’s problem, except
without a free subscription to her own theory of consciousness, because she doesn’t have
one and so subscribes to Dennett’s. She thus cornes to rnuch the same conclusion as
Dennett, that the inner eye of consciousness applied to animais is a mistake. Her focus is
on the idea that objective theories in science will omit the subjective point ofview.
To begin the discussion, Akins is ofthe same opinion as Dennett, that Nagel’s
conclusion in his article, the irreducibility ofthe subjective point ofview, lias been
accepted without much further debate or question. She sees Nagel’s article as having
outlined the limits of scientific explanation. On her view there is a dichotomy between
scientific explanation and phenomenal experience. Phenornenal experience is necessarily
an experience from a particular point of view; hence the facts of experience are
essentiaÏly subjective in nature. Contrast this with the kinds ofphenomena that science
seeks to explain, which are objective in nature, or viewer independent. Any appeal to
scientific facts in explaining the alien point of view will only further distance us from the
very property we seek to explain (1996:346).
Akins, like Dennett, believes that intuition is the culprit behind acceptance of
Nagel’s conclusions. The intuition is that science will necessarily omit the one essential
element ofphenomenal experience, its intuitive ‘feel’. She believes that this negative
intuition is grounded in our everyday experiences, manifested in such ways as trying to
describe the experience of the pain of a migraine headache. If one extends this difficulty
to the phenomenal experience of an alien creature, that shares almost nothing of our
sensory and physiological apparatus, the difficulty in imparting the point of view or
experience becornes almost insuperable. Her argument is the following: If we can
comprehend only those sensations we have experienced, and our own sensations are very
unlike the alien creature in question, we will be unable to understand the alien creature’s
phenomenology. If one then extends these considerations to the efficacy of science, one
wonders in what way science could possibly bridge the difficulty and offer us an answer.(J On the other hand, scientific expianation is not completely irrelevant to the understanding
73
of an alien creature’s experience, at least to the extent to which that experience is based
on neurophysiology. So what, she asks, is given and what is not by science? (1996:348).
She employs a thought experiment, where she has corne ftom the future, which is
at the point ofthe end of neuroscience. In other words, ail there is to know about animal
and human neurophysiology is known. $he has two 3 dimensional colour rnovies in her
possession. These two movies are shown to an audience in a theater, the first is of a
hurnan hang-glider’s experience as he or she flues through the air, with a carnera placed
on the forehead of the hang-glider like a surgeon’ s light, capturing the visual scene of the
hang-glider’s perspective. The second is ofthe bat’s experience as it flues through the air
in a dark room, catching meaiworms thrown up into the air by an experirnenter. The
audience watches both movies, and while it is easy for the audience to visually process
the human glider’s point ofview, it is nearly impossible for them to make any sense of
the bat film. The human’s point of view is easily simulated for two reasons: 1) because
the sensory system us the same, and 2) because a human from the audience can
artificially simulate the hang glider’s visual input. It would be as if you or I were up in
the air with a camera placed on our forehead, we would see the exact same scene, in the
exact same way, because our visual systems are identical. The bat’s point ofview, on the
other hand, is nearly impossible to simulate, because none ofthe human senses can
simulate echolocation in the bat. Visually, the movie looks to a human like a
disorganized mix of colored patches. As Aikens mentions, the bat’s auditory experiences
have been cued with a visual kaleidoscope of color patches on the screen. So, for
instance, color hues are encoded as frequencies of sound waves, brightness is represented
as volume or intensity of sound, and configuration of the color patches represents the
spatial properties of the sound waves. Not having the same system of echolocation as the
bat, and flot having a transiator in the brain that can immediately translate the visual
analogue of echolocation into something that a human can process, the audience cannot
make sense ofthe film. The bat’s visual system, which is very impoverished, is far
outstripped when compared with the acuity of the visual system of humans. On the other
hand, echolocation, which the bat uses to navigate through the air, is cornpletely alien to
any of our human capabilities.
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What the film demonstrates, on Akin’s view, is that even if we were able to
successfuÏly simulate in ourselves the ‘feei’ ofthe bat’s experience with the help ofthe
film, we stiil would flot understand the bat’s point ofview. The ‘feel’ ofthe bat’s
experience is the qualitative aspect ofit and the point ofview aspect is the
representational aspect. In order to understand the bat’ s experience in ail of its
phenomenological spiendor, we would need to have access to both the representational
and the qualitative parts ofthe bat’s experience. Lacking the auditory representational
capacities ofthe bat, namely echolocation, we do not experience the colored patches on
the screen in the sarne way as the bat does.
Akins is of the opinion that it might flot even make sense to ask if we could
separate the representationai from the qualitative aspects in our conscious experience.
Applied to the bat example, this would entail a two-step process. We would first have to
strip away the entire representational content of the experience. Then we would have to
overlay it with the qualitative content ofthe bat’s representations. Akins submits that we
have no idea how to tease these two aspects of experience apart, nor how to put them
back together, because our intuitions do flot provide a concrete distinction between the
qualitative and representational aspects of perception.
With regard to Nagel’s main daim, Akins is ofthe same opinion as Dennett. that
il is intuition that is responsible for this nagging feeling that something is lefi out in the
transition from subjective point of view to objective point of view. According to Akins,
the problem starts when we intuitively and mistakenly construe understanding the point
of view of the bat as analogous to the everyday problem of understanding the
phenomenal experiences of each other, such as what a migraine headache feels like.
These experiences are generally ineffable, and we mistakenly think it is the qualia ofthe
experiences, their ‘feel’ that are inaccessible. In other words, according to Akins’ view,
we treat conscious experience as if it were merely a bunch of qualia.
There are two overlooked points in this intuitive and mistaken construal ofthe
problem, according to Akins. First, one cannot distill qualia from conscious experience.
In other words, just because we can sometimes isolate and talk about a particular
phenomenal experience, such as a particular shade of red or the taste of a fruit, this does
not mean that that qualia exists in vacuo, or that it is possible to isolate phenomenal
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experience from the representational content of conscious experience. Second, a point of
view is not merely a collection ofqualia.
Akins offers a postscript having to do with considerations ofthe light bulb theory
ofconsciousness on the subjective point ofview. Taking up the bat exampie again,
Akins daims that watching the bat film makes us realize that given the special task
aïlocated to the bat’s auditory system, as a kind of compensation for its poor visual
system, we can say that the bat’s experience is different from ours. In imagining how the
bat’s experience differs from our own, we irnmediately adopt a hypothesis that
incorporates our own visual system into the experience (1996:356). In doing this, we end
up in the anthropocentric position. Perhaps we do the same with consciousness and
assume that the bat aiso has an overseer ofwhat it is like, that is successively attending to
different mental events. Just because this seems to be the way it happens with us does
not mean this is what happens in the case of animais. She conciudes that it is possible
that this is flot what truly occurs in the animal. Perhaps even our own experience is only
retrospectively like this. In other words, perhaps it is only in retrospect that we are under
the impression that events occur in succession instead of ail at once and that an overseer
is present, taking note of these events.
Her conclusion is the following. Nagel’s original daim is that we can neyer
understand the point of view of an alien creature. That is. we can neyer know the
phenomenal experience of a bat, which is not transmittable by description and which one
cannot have without similar personal experience. But if introspection does not yield any
distinction between the representational and qualitative parts of experience, we have no
idea what we are looking for in the first place, and we certainly cannot therefore say what
science has lefi out ofthe explanation. Given that we are not sure what the subjective
view looks like and we have no reason to believe that it necessarily exists in animaIs, we
cannot begin to construct theories about it. Without a good reason to stop empirical
investigation in animais with regard to cognitive capacities, we should continue it.
Research into other areas of cognition should nonetheless continue.
This is good practical advice. No one has yet solved this puzzle, and so it is
conceivable that research into cognitive ethology could go on for the next thirty years and
C
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we would stiil flot have a solution to the puzzle. After ail. the problem ofa subjective
point of view bas no direct bearing on research into cognitive ethoiogy. Or does it?
I am ofthe opinion that subjective experience has a major role to play in the study
oF cognitive capacities in animais. I wouid first like to question Akins’ contention that
one can oniy comprehend those sensations that one has experienced, since the force of
the argument rests on the truth of this daim. It cannot be the case that one can oniy
comprehend those sensations that have been personaiiy experienced. If it were, it wouid
constitute a prettv severe constraint on the range of foreign experiences a person couid
contemplate. The term vicarious experience’, taken to mean that which is experienced
imaginatively through another person, would have no meaning if we couid oniy imagine
those sensations we have personally experienced. The act of empathy would also be
vac uous.
I would also question Aikin’s daim that we would not comprehend the bat film,
in part because we cannot separate the representational from qualitative aspects of
experience. I do not think that we can consciously and immediately perforrn the
dissection and at any rate there is no reason to need to be able to do so. If conditions
xvcre manipulated, however, I think h is possible that humans could eventually learn to
adapt to processing the colored patches on the screen as sounds. For instance, in
Kohler’s famous experiment where subjects wore inverted image glasses that made the
subects sec evervthing upside down, the subjects were eventually abie through
adaptation to ride bicycles in traffic and ski down huis (Dennett, 1991:393).
Second. I think that the subjective point of view problem more than has a direct
hearing on research into cognitive ethology, it opens up a whole new research area, based
on the mode of empathy as a bridge to the animal’s point ofview. As mentioned above,
there is a great probability that many ofthe other cognitive capacities will either work in
conj unction with subjective awareness or at least in the vicinity of it. Moreover, the mere
idea that an animal might have a point ofview, regardless ofwhether it is borne out
empiricaÏly, at least raises the issue that humans have been thus far conducting research
into animais with a human benchrnark in place. One ofthe conclusions that can be drawn
from Aiken’s work is that she has identified one way in which the anthropocentrïc view
arises. Fier daim is that the human adopts a hypothesis ofhow the bat navigates by
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incorporating his or her own visual system into the experience. It is trying to imagine
how the bat’s experience is different from ours that we incorporate our own visual system
into imagining the experience. As we will see in the next section, one ofthe issues is
whether or not this implicit incorporation of our own human experience can be dropped
once it is recognized to occur.
5. Reaction Two: Embrace
The second strategy, taken by an increasing number of cognitive ethologists, is to
embrace the subjective-objective dichotomy and advocate examining the subject’s point
ofview. in this case, the anirnal’s subjective view ofthe world. The idea that animais
rnight have a point ofview originates from the renowned ethoiogist, Jakob Von UexkulÏ
(Rivas & Burghardt, 2002:10). 11e coined the German term ‘umwelt’ to represent the
animal’s sensory and perceptual world. Before considering the theoretical viewpoint of
taking the animai’s perspective, I first want to discuss the precursor to this new view,
developed by Gordon Burghardt among others, that of anthropomorphism by omission.
Burghardt has identffied a fiirther type of anthropornorphism called
anthropomorphism by omission. It is defined as a tendency to commit
anthropomorphism, to attribute human-like qualities to animais, because of a failure to
consider that animais have a different sensory world than ours (2002:10). Burghardt
daims that it occurs ofien in the literature on cognitive ethology, most oflen where the
underlying theoretical perspective of the researcher entails comparing animals to hurnans,
or using human standards as the benchmark. Akin’s pointing out ofthe tendency in
humans to incorporate their own visual system into the experience of bats would
constitute a good example ofone ofthe possible mechanisms leading to
anthropomorphism by omission.
Examples of anthropomorphism by omission abound in the literature, according
to Burghardt, and even he and his colleagues have not been immune to it. I wiil discuss
two theoretical examples. The first cornes from Colin Beer, who, in his discussion on
anthropomorphism, puts forth a point of view reminiscent of Davidson’ s views in chapter
one. It is a good example ofthe implications that arise when one is speaking from an(J anthropocentric point ofview. Beer makes the daim that “the reach and complexity of
7$
connections attaching to ideas in the human case will usually far exceed what is
conceivable for any animal.” (Beer, 1997:203). Taking an example ofa cat watching a
mouse escape down a hole in the floor, he compares a human description of thoughts on
the event to the cat’s. He states “Only a small part ofthe network within which
mouseness is nested for us extends into the cat’s world.” (Beer, 1997:203). In other
words, ftom the human’s perspective, the cat only has a fraction ofthe thought network
that a human has. Ihis is the same type of argument made by Davidson with regard to
the impossibility of determining the exact contents of the beliefs of Malcoim’ s dog, from
a human perspective. The mistake here is aptly summed up by Millikan: “To atternpt to
express the contents of the cognitions of animals by transiating these or conelating them
with English sentences would not be accurate.” (Millikan, 1997:196). b further
conclude from this that the mouse therefore has no network or only a very small network
of thoughts is unwarranted. Burghardt notes that it is unfortunate that Beer neglects to
consjder that the cat lias a different worldview from us humans. If he were to consider it,
he would find many phenomenological aspects that are absent in our worldview but
present in the mouse’s, such as those arising from the mouse’s sensitive sense ofsmell
and hearing. The case can thus be made that the animal’s worldview far exceeds that of
the human, at least with respect to the auditory and visual capacities (Rivas & Burghardt,
2002:13).
Ilie same consideration extends to the issue ofhuman and animal language.
When the issue arises, it is often stated that animals do flot possess a language, at least
not in the humanlike sense ofpossessing a syntax and semantics. When the definition of
language is enlarged to aïlow animal systems of communication to be compared with
human language. it is ofien stated that human language is far superior to animal systems
of communication. Yet dolphins have been found to have a system of communication so
sophisticated that hurnans have sought to reproduce it in subrnarine communication.
Sonar is at least comparable to human language in terms of sophistication. It is actually
much like the echolocation system in bats, dolphins use sound to determine the distance
of objects in the water that they cannot see (Herman & Morrel-Samuals, 1996:290). Here
again, in using human standards as the benchmark, those aspects of as yet undiscovered
C
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animal communication that might be quite sophisticated and worthy of further
investigation are overlooked.
The above exampies demonstrate theoretical occurrences of antbropornorphisrn
by omission, which show the implications that arise when one implicitly takes a human
centered perspective on animais. The perspective ofactually taking the animal’s point of
view is an approach called ‘theromorphism’, coined by the ethologist William
Timberlake (2002). It is defined as using experience-based knowledge to view the world
as though one is a particular animal. It involves orienting one’s perspective toward not
only ‘putting oneseif into the shoes’ ofthe animal, but also wearing the shoes ofthe
animal (2002:105). The phrase ‘wearing shoes’ is meant to symbolize the process of
embodiment. That is, taking the animal’s sensory environrnent as a function of its spatial
location into consideration. Burghardt speculates that this process of imaginative
projection is no different, conceptually, from understanding a person who is different
from oneseif in age, gender, sensory and motor abilities etc (Rivas & Burghardt,
2002:11).
This idea is well illustrated with an example. It was found that researchers were
able to gain much more information about what it is like to be a dinosaur by walking
around with a weighted suit frarne molded in the shape of a particular species. This
experiment gave researchers added information about the maneuverability of dinosaurs
that they might not otherwise have thought to consider (Rivas & Burghardt, 2002:11).
The eccentricity ofthis point ofview or perspective compels one to ask how it
might be possible to implement. In other words, what theoretical research methods have
been constructed as a function of this novel perspective? Timberlake thinks that the best
way to go about implementing theromorphism into a research plan is to construct models
ofthe various species of animais, much like Dennett’s heterophenomenologies.
Information would include that aÏready known concerning the mechanisms, function and
evolution of cognition of the species in question. He acknowledges that this is flot a
trivial task, but that humans are well suited to such a task. Contrary to the tendency
humans have of viewing other species according to a human benchmark, Timberlake
argues that we also have a special ability to use our experience to integrate information
C about an animal’s sensory physiology, behaviorai organization and iearning to understand
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and predict an animal’s behavior. This capacity, coupled with talking to people who have
such a model of animais in place because it bears on their livelihood, such as fishermen,
hunters and trackers, should provide a solid informational base. These modeis, in
Timberlake’s opinion, allow an observer to predict behavior by virtually placing him or
herseif in the position of a specific animai, not as a human, but as the animal.
At issue here is whether or not this new animal perspective is empirically
tractable and thus a worthwhile pursuit for cognitive ethologists. The first question to
contemplate is whether a subjective point of view even exists in the animal, and whether
it is possible to study it. The second question is whether it is possible to remove the
human tendency to view other animais through human colored giasses. Is it possible to
virtuaiiy place oneseif in the position of an animal, as the animai? A third question, that
bears directiy on the work ofNagel, is whether or not we shah still be abie to recognize
this experience as experience, if it turns out to be as ahien as Nagel hypothesizes. With
our human comparison benchmark removed or bracketed, how wiil we recognize these
so-called ahien experiences if there is no common ground or overiap between the two
types of experience? A fourth question, again based on Nagei’s thoughts, is whether we
will be able to construct any objective theories from this subjective point of view.
Concerning the existence of this subjective point of view in an animal, we saw
that Dennett questions whether there is anything lefi over that would constitute a
subjective point ofview that is flot already accounted for by neurophysiological facts. He
questions that there even exists an overseer of what it is iike that would be witness to the
phenomenoiogical feei of experience. Akins believes that there is such a thing as
subjective experience, but that it is so ill-defined, scientists need not concern themselves
with whether or not they have captured it in objective theories. The privacy of the mental
argument, discussed by Ahlen and Bekoff, guarantees that we will neyer directly know
what the animal’s subjective experience consists in.
Given ail these conflicting theoretical points of view on the phenomenon, what
are we to think about the existence ofthe subjective point of view in animals? I am not
convinced by Dennett’s overseer argument that questions the existence ofthe
phenomenon of ‘what it is like’. Whiie the daim that ail animais are reflective beings
C might stiil require some additional proof I think that Nagel is right to say that the essence
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ofthe beliefthat a creature has experience means there is ‘something it is like’ to be that
creature. Aiken’s opinion on the matter is accurate: this phenomenon is at present not
very well defined. There is no good reason to stop doing research at this point however.
It is my opinion that notwithstanding the privacy of the mental argument, research
into the subjective point of view ofthe animal can go on in spite ofthe lack of a
philosophical resolution to the other minds problem. None of the considerations of the
problem of other minds bear directly nor negatively on the proposed examination of the
subjective point ofview. Even acknowledging that we will neyer have direct access to
the subjective point of view of another human, let alone that of an animal, should not stop
us from trying to gain that knowledge through indirect means. The lack of a
philosophical theory for phenomena such as consciousness lias not held up researcli into
this facet of study in animais, and it should flot in the case of phenomenal experience
either. Unfortunately, the lack of any philosophical guidelines in the form of a theory
makes discussions much more confused, ofien degenerating into a case of one researcher
talking past another. Nonetheless, the lack of a theory shouldn’t hinder examination, it
should rather inspire it.
6. Conclusion: A Fifth Aim for Ethology
Gordon Burghardt, stealing a trick from Dennett’ s bag, lias decided to act ‘as-if
the phenomenon of subjective experience does indeed exist and has carved out a research
area devoted to studying it. The original four aims of ethology, conceived of by Nico
Tinbergen (1957), do not include the study of subjective experience. Briefly, the four
aims are to study:
1. Causation: the identification ofthe internai and external factors underlying
behavior.
2. Ontogeny: the identification ofpatterns and processes in behavioral change.
3. Evolution: the identification ofhistorical patterns and processes in behavioral
change.
4. Survival value: the identification ofhow behavior patterns contribute to
reproductive and inclusive fitness in the various species of animais
(Burghardt, 1997:257).
The fifih aim, so far inexistent, according to Burghardt, would be called ‘private
experience’ and its concern would be the identification ofpatterns and processes in life as
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it is experienced by the animal. The idea behind the creation ofthe fifih aim is to return
to the effort of Von Uexkull, to attempt to understand the perceptual and inner worlds of
other organisms, both human and non-human, and to try to gain some understanding of
what it is like to be the animal, to make inferences about private experience and to see
what such an understanding can contribute to studies in the traditional four aims
(Burghardt, 1997:260).
The next question mentioned above concerns whether or not it is possible to
remove or bracket the human perspective in studying the lives of animais. Certainly the
human tendency to see animais in terms of humans is a hindrance. In short, it masks us
from discovering the true capabilities the animal might have. The problem is that in
attempting to gauge the world ftom an animal’s perspective, whether it is by getting
down on all fours on the ground or donning a dinosaur suit, one is still a human looking
at the world from the perspective of an animal. One is only going to get information on
what it is like for a human to be a dog or a dinosaur. The privacy ofthe mental argument
thus guarantees that, because we don’t have direct access to other hurnans’ states of mmd,
we have even less access to animal minds, and thus we will neyer cornpletely know what
it is like to be another animal.
Should the above argument be taken to be the end ofthe story? I don’t think it
should. The first step forward on the issue was a recent recognition that investigators
were impiicitly adopting a human centered perspective in studying animais. This led to
the creation ofthe label, anthropomorphisrn by omission, and lent credence to the already
existing idea of anthropocentrism. From there, Timberlake took an empathetic viewpoint
and labeled a new perspective, that oftheromorphism, which means to take the animal’s
point of view. Theoreticaliy, there should be no trace of anthropocentrism in this view,
the human point of view should be successftilly bracketed. Practically speaking, and
considering the nature ofthe creature carrying out the research, a human, is this possible?
I think that it is as possible as many analogous activities that humans successfully
perform every day with each other, such as getting advice from a psychotherapist, for
instance.
The impossibility of removing the human benchrnark seems to also bear on the(J issue ofwhether we wili recognize the subjective experience of animals or not (the third
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question above). Perhaps it is that tendency to see things through human-coiored-giasses
that causes us to consider the pure subjective point ofview ofthe animal as alien. The
experience ofthe bat ïs unrecognizable, as Akins pointed out, because we are not bats but
humans trying to look through the eyes of the bat, and the bat has poor vision compared
to us humans. If we could somehow consciously bracket the anthropocentric tendency to
relate to experience as a human, the gap between our perspective and the bat’s could
begin to be narrowed.
On the other hand, perhaps the subjective experience of animais faïls into the set
offacts that are beyond human comprehension. If this is the case, then it could possibly
be forever unrecognizable. I don’t think that this view is anything more than pessimistic.
The idea of landing on the moon may have seemed inconceivable many years before it
occurred, particularly when we lacked the telescopic apparatus to even view the moon
accurately.
In any case, the attempt to implement this idea ofthe anirnal’s subjective point of
view into a research program would seem to be severely constrained if not impossible by
Nagel’s conclusion that it is not possible to capture the subjective perspective in an
objective theory. Even if we were to be able to gauge animal experience by some miracle
ofmodern technology, we wouldn’t be able to construct theories about it.
This conclusion may also turn out to be hasty and preemptively pessimistic. First
of ah, h may turn out that the idea of constructing a theory, any type of theory, from
subjective experience is physically impossible. A theory involves organizing bits of
disparate information into a set of generalizations. Oflen, in the construction of the
objective theory, the data in its original form is missing, having been turned into a theory
through generahizations and collation of data. In this case the raw data containing the
subjective perspective would not be found anywhere in the objective theory. There are
other possibilities however. One is to construct a theory comprised of the properties of
subjective experience. Gordon Burghardt’s research perspective of ‘critical
anthropomorphism’ is a good candidate for this type ofresearch plan, since it requires
gathering information from a variety of sources that could then be used to compile a set
of properties of subjective experience. Some of these sources of Burghardt’ s proposed(J method include our own perceptions, feelings, and identification with the animal. These
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sources together constitute an anthropomorphic ernpathy, hence the term
‘anthropomorphism’. The practice ofanthropomorphism is ‘critical’ in the sense that
these antbropomorphic empathetic intuitions obtained by asking ourselves ‘what we
would do in the situation if we were the animal in question’ are then rigorously tested in
the form of hypotheses and predictions of experimental outcomes. The method of
critical anthropomorphism is particuiarly apt for two reasons. One, adopting the method
means acknowledging that one is generating possible explanations for an anirnal’s
behavior from the anthropocentric stance based on the mode of empathy. Researchers
deliberately ‘try out’ explanations from a human perspective as a heuristic predictive
device. These explanations are then empirically tested to determine if they are accurate
or not. The method is thus a type of conscious anthropomorphism, because we are using
our own experience as a basis, but with an inherent corrective device, that of empirical
testing. This method is also apt because it focuses on the creature’s internai stimuli and
subjective responses to these stimuli. As Burghardt argues, examination ofthese aspects
is necessary to an adequate understanding of behaviors such as problem solving,
deception and courtship in the animal (Burghardt, 1994:1).
Burghardt cites a second candidate research model for studying private experience
in animais. The common element to his model and the one he suggests is this notion of
testing empathetic intuitions obtained by first taking the anthropocentric stance and
wondering what one would do in a situation; formulating these intuitions into
anthropomorphically based hypotheses and testing them; and aiso gathering and
comparing evidence and data from nurnerous different objective sources for the purposes
of cross referencing and checking for accuracy. This second model cornes from Frans De
Waal, the famous primatologist and has four components. The first two components are
compiled from naturalistic observation of subj ects, and entail collecting data in both
qualitative and quantitative forms, that later can be cross-referenced for accuracy of
observation and to factor out any observer bias. As we saw in Chapter two, quantitative
data is numerically coded data, whereas qualitative data is in terms of verbal description,
not previously coded. It is possible to compare these two types of data, taken from the
same observation period, and check for accuracy. The third component is controlled
observation, the strategy taken by Cheney and $eyfarth in their study ofvervet monkeys
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in Kenya. It basically entails performing an experiment, or manipulating certain
variables, in the species’ natural habitat. The fourth component is experimentation
carried out in a laboratory environment, where greater control over extraneous variables
such as environmental conditions is apparently achieved. Included in De Waal’s research
method are all possible types of objective data, which can then be used to either support
or contradict the hypotheses generated by the researchers. For instance, the accuracy of
an animals’ reaction obtained in a laboratory experiment can be cross-checked with the
same data obtained in the animal’s natural environrnent, both with experimental
manipulation and without, i.e., pure naturalistic observation.
With the creation by Burghardt ofthis new fifth aim in ethology, it wouid thus
appear that research into the subjective experience of animais will be carried out
regardless ofphilosophical agreement or a guideline regarding the existence and ontology
of the subjective point of view. While the researcli effort may prove a dismal failure, its
existence will at least shed light on and subsequently minimize the tendency to view
animal capabilities tbrough human eyes. That accomplishment alone should prove to be
quite an advance.
Cliapter Four
Methodology and Theory of Mmd
1. Introduction: Experimentation and Interpretation
The final objection to the project of Cognitive Ethology that I will be examining
in this first haif has to do with methodology. I treat this objection last because in rny
opinion it is the most darnaging objection that could be made to the project of searching
for mental states in animals. Methodoiogy is the foundation ofthe discipline, and if the
methodological foundation is found to have cracks in it. the whole discipline rests on thin
ice. I also treat this objection last because it lias major implications for the second haif of
the thesis. As mentioned, there is a lefiover problem that gets solved at the end of
chapter six.
The objection in its most general construal is that the study of mental states in
animal minds is empirically intractable or experirnentally impossible largely because
animals lack language. In an experimental situation, since animais can’t speak a human
language they can’t inform researchers ofthe state they are in. Humans, in contrast, can
speak a human language and thus answer any questions bearing on mental states that are
asked by researchers. There are other specific implications on methodology due to this
Ïack of language. One of tliem is that experimental design must be quite a bit more
intricate and sophisticated, to get around the fact that verbal response is impossible. The
fact that experiments are more intricate invites the question of interpretation. That is, do
the experimental results represent evidence that would justify the attribution of mental
states to animais? A second related implication lias to do with naturalistic observation
and anecdotes, important empirical tools oftlie cognitive ethoiogist that get around the
lack of language problem. The challenge to naturalistic observation is that resuits from
naturalistic observation and anecdote, because tliey lack control and rigor, cannot 5e used
to provide evidence for say, a theory ofmind in primates.
The philosophical question of whether animals may be attributed mental states
does flot rest uniquely on empirical evidence. The question also caimot be decided
uniquely on theoretical debate atone. As we saw in chapter one with regard to the
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language issue, examining the issue purely from a theoretical standpoint leads one to the
anthropocentric stance and appears one-sided considering the empiricai evidence that is
out there with regard to animais. On the other hand, empirical evidence by itseifwiÏl not
decide the issue either, and constitutes the view that I will argue against in this chapter. I
believe that both aspects, theoretical considerations and experimental evidence, are
necessary for a thorough examination of the question of whether animais may be
attributed mental states or not. I thus also hope to show in this chapter what the relation
is between empirical evidence and theoretical discussion.
One of the debates going on within the proj ect of cognitive ethology is the
investigation ofthe possibility ofa theory ofmind in primates. A theory of mmd theory
is a hypothesis about the type ofrnechanism underlying an organism’s capacity to explain
and predict another’ s behavior. Theory of mmd explanations are thus concerned with
two-person interactions, and witli the mutual attribution of mental states to predict and
explain behavior. This is a different aim ftom that of cognitive ethology, which is
concerned with investigation into whether animais possess mental states tout court. On a
theory of mmd account, mental states are attributed to a creature because they are
hypothesized as being the link or intervening variable between the observed behavior and
the expianation or prediction given about the behavior. The usual scenario is that
creature X will explain or predict creature Y’s observed behavior tbrough the attribution
of mental states. Researchers are interested in whether or flot this capacity exists in
primates. To help clarify the issue, Premack (198$: 179) bas developed a very useful
tripartite distinction corresponding to various possible degrees of a theory of mi. The
lowest level corresponds to species that make no attributions of mental states of any kind.
The second level corresponds to species that make attributions that are limited in a
number of respects. The third corresponds to species whose attributions are unlirnited.
The first level, that of no attributions, probably includes most species of animais,
Premack suggests. The second level might apply to some species of primates. The third
level corresponds only as of yet to humans.
It could be objected that the second and third ievels are not very heipful, that the
phrases ‘limited in a number ofways’ and ‘uniimited’ do not serve to qualify what types(J of attributions are made at these levels. One solution is to modify the second and third
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levels so that an additional difference between them becomes explicit. One can
distinguish between the two upper levels of mental state attribution based on whether it is
first order attributions that are made or embedded attributions that are made. first order
attributions are attributions ofpropositional attitudes such as beliefs. Embedded
attributions are also attributions of propositional attitudes, but of a multiple order. This
second difference is the same as Malcolrn’s distinction in belief made in chapter one, that
between beliefs and beliefs about beliefs. The levels thus become the following: the
lowest level remains unchanged, the second level refers to species, possibly primates,
whose attributions are of the first order type, and the third level, probably restricted to
humans, refers to those species that make embedded attributions.
There is one further modification that could be made that would make the
schematic complete. Tt entails creating an additional level that would correspond to the
possibility of representing things other than mental states. This new level would thus
includes the possibility of representation of items in the animal from the physical world,
but flot representations of mental states. The new schematic would be the following:
first level: No representation of any kind.
Second level: Representation of the physical world only.
Third level: Representation of mental states ofthe first or lower order, i.e., beliefs
about trees.
Fourth Level: Representation of embedded mental states, i.e., “John believes that
Mary knows he likes her”.
Premack originally titled his schematic as three degrees of a theory of mmd.
Taken in a strict sense, his schematic should flot include as a possible degree of a theory
of mmd those levels in which no mental states are postulated, since levels in which no
mental states are postulated are flot, strictly speaking, levels of a theory of mi. It seerns
to me that the two lowest levels, those of no representation and representation but not of
mental states, fall under the minimum condition for a theory of mmd. I will thus make
reference to this framework in a more general way throughout the chapter, since the
rivals to theory of mmd therories, such as behaviorist or associationist theories, can also
be fit into the framework, namely at the first or second levels. This schematic will thus
serve as the frarnework for the ensuing discussion.
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Cecilia Heyes (199$) calis into question certain of the daims made by cognitive
ethoÏogists, in particular Donald Premack and Peter Woodruff, who investigate the
possibility ofa theory of mmd in primates (1978). According to Heyes, one oftheir
daims is that there is observational and experimental evidence that apes have mental
state concepts, such as ‘want’, ‘know’ and ‘see’ (1978:515). Heyes is ofthe opinion that
we should stop asking the question ofwhether primates have these concepts, or possess a
theory of mmd, until we can get better designed experiments that will. in and of
themselves, decide the issue (1998:102). In this respect it could be argued that she is of
the opinion that whether or flot primates have a theory of mmd is an empirical question in
the sense that the experiments themselves provide a decisive answer to this question. In
this chapter I am going to argue that the issue is flot strictly empirical. It is not necessary
to wait until an experimental design is produced that will decide the issue because such a
type of experimentation is flot forthcoming. Experiments will not decide the issue
because they are flot the only consideration. Experiments caimot decide the issue in this
particular case due to the special nature ofthe issue: the postulation of mental states as
intervening variables to explain behavior. Since there is the possibility of interpretation
ofthe resuits, theoretical discussion must also be pertinent. Part ofthe reason why
empirical evidence is indeterminate is not poor experimental design as Heyes thinks, but
rather her incomplete presentation ofthe experimental resuits. However, even with an
improved representation ofthe relevant research, experimental results are stili subject to
interpretation. This is in part due to the fact that the intervening variable of a mental state
is not something that is observable, it must be inferred.
Heyes makes an interesting preliminary argument against the daim that there is
evidence for a theory of mmd in primates. She draws a relation of asymmetry between
the disciplines of developmental psychology and research on theory of mmd in primates,
arguing that although much progress has been made in developmental psychology, no
substantial progress has been made in the case of primates. She states that thanks to the
empirical tractability of a theory of mmd in children, researchers have been able to
determine the origin, on-une controt of and epistemic status of human folk psychoÏogy.
The same amount ofprogress should 5e evident in studies of primates, since non-verbal
C young primates are similar to children in age, etc (1998:102). This daim is gratuitous in
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my opinion, although it serves on the surface of it to strengthen Heyes’ case. There are
ail sorts of difficulties with studying primates, such as limited availability, cost of
housing and raising them that are not present in research with chiidren. The progress
made in developmental psychology is relative: some say it is quick, other say it is
agonizingly slow. The often-cited problem for lack of quick progress is the lack of
language in pre-linguistic chiidren, which is an analogous problem with primate research.
furthermore, as will be obvious from a reading of the four objections in the first half of
this thesis and with Heyes’ critical comments in this chapter, advances made with regard
to evidence for a mental life in animais are for the most part treated with the severest
skepticisrn by detractors. It is no wonder that progress in research is slow. At any rate,
nothing is gained for Heyes’ arguments by pointing to a lack of relative progress in
Theory of Mmd research and comparing it with research in human development.
In every case where a theory of mmd component lias been professed to be found
in primates, the experimental results, according to Heyes, are also explicable by three
other possibilities (1998:102). These three other possibilities fail into the category of
alternative non-mental explanations, and constitute her set of rival explanations to the
theory of mmd hypothesis. One possibility is that the resuit could have occuned by
chance. By chance, Heyes means the variable that is statistically pre-set in experirnents
and that could vary from 20 to 50%, depending on the amount of subjects and trials in the
experiment. The second possibility is that the result could be a product of non
mentalistic processes, such as associative learning. The third is that the result could be a
resuit of inferences based on non-mental categories. Relative to the schernatic outlined
above, Heyes’ first explanation of chance is not included in the levels. Her second and
third explanations, non-mental processes and inferences based on non-mental categories,
would fail into the lowest level. That is, these explanations allow for representation, but
not of mental states.
2. Theory of Mmd Defined
There are many substitute terms for ‘theory ofmind’, which is a rather vague
shorthand to represent a variety of mental capacities. Other terms used are
metarepresentation, mindreading, metacognition, Machiavellian intelligence and mental
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state attribution. Heyes employs a particular construal of Theory of Mmd in her
discussion that is too strong, in my opinion. There are two noteworthy aspects to her
construal. The first is that the individual must possess mental state concepts such as
‘believe’, ‘know’, ‘want’, and ‘see’ and that an individual with these concepts uses them
to predict and explain behavior. The second aspect is that the individual must believe
that the mental states play a causal role in generating behavior, but does not identify
mental states with behavior. Here the implications are that the individual must possess
mental state concepts, and hold a theory of causality with regard to mental states or at
least possess the concept of cause. This construal ofHeyes’ is much too strong in my
opinion, and moreover not the one held by Premack and Woodruff. On Premack and
Woodruff s view, an individual bas a theory of mmd if the individual imputes mental
states to himself and to others. These mental states are much like the ones humans
impute, such as purpose or intention, knowlcdge belief and pretending (1978:5 15). On
any given variety of theory of mmd theory, one need not possess the concepts of belief,
desire and the like, and one need not believe that these mental states play a causal role in
generating behavior. Most theory of mmd theories require minimally that the individuals
involved attribute mental states to each other in order to explain or predict behavior, and
ofien nothing beyond this.
Now that Heyes has defined the theory of mmd camp, she next draws a contrast
between the unifying features of theory of mmd hypotheses and her non-mentalistic
alternatives. The unifying feature of the theory of mmd hypotheses is that primates
categorize and think about themselves and others in terms of mental states. The unifying
feature ofthe non-mentalistic alternative explanations is that they do flot assume that
primates represent mental states. Rather, primates respond to or categorize and think
about themselves and others in terms of observable properties of appearance and behavior
(199$: 102). It could be argued here that although mental state representation is not
assumed on Heyes’ definition, it could stili occur. That is, her use ofthe phrase “does not
assume” is ambiguous enough to cause collapse between the two types of explanations.
The presence or absence of mental state representation should be the defining feature of
theories ofmind, otherwise what else is there to prevent collapse between the two
explanations? It is then flot surprising that current experiments cannot point to either
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explanation exclusively, and that Heyes is able to advance a non-mental explanation
alongside every theory of mmd explanation. Thus the phenomenon of too much overlap
between explanations is one reason why both explanations can be advanced for an
experimental result.
For the purposes of the ensuing discussion, the theory of mmd and non-mentalist
explanation must be qualified in order to bring out a usable distinction between them, and
to allow for hypotheses to be formulated. There are two problems with Heyes’
definitions. First, Heyes’ distinguishing features of a theory of mmd are not strong
enough to prevent collapse between the two explanations. I would thus reject ber two
distinguishing features, possession of concepts such as belief and desire and belief in
mental states as causes of behavior, in favor of a general unifying feature. I am going to
assume for the purposes ofthis discussion that theories ofmind have the unifying feature
of some sort of mental state attribution. It need flot be ofthe higher order type, i.e., a
belief about a belief, but the individual, on a theory of mmd account, must attribute some
sort of intervening mental state either to himself and/or to another individual in the
explanation or prediction ofthe other’s behavior.
Second, Heyes’ stipulation that non-mentalist explanations do not assume that
primates represent mental states must be modified in order to imply a stronger distinction.
That is, non-mentalist explanations must not make reference to mental states ai’ ail, in
order to be properly distinguished from the theory ofmind explanations. The non
mentalist alternatives that Heyes cites cannot postulate mental state attribution as an
explanation ofbehavior because otherwise both explanations will be indistinguishable. It
will then be impossible to declare that one explanation over the other is able to account
for the results. Thus while Heyes’ non-mental alternatives can make reference to
eliciting stimuli, stimulus-response associations or stimulus-response pairings as an
explanation for behavior found in the experiments, they cannot make reference to mental
states.
3. Six Indicators of a Theory of Mmd
Heyes evaluates six different indicators that have been offered as evidence of a
C theory ofmind. It should be noted here that neither a theory ofmind nor mental states
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are observable entities, and so attempts to demonstrate the existence of a theory of mmd
is a maller of inference. It is a matter of one individual explaining or predicting the
behavior of another through the inference of attributing a mental state to that individual.
Moreover, the indicators, such as ‘seif-recognition’ or ‘imitation’, are not to be identified
with the behavior evidenced in the experirnent, nor are they mental states. In other
words, the indicator of role-taking caimot be identified with the mental statc of role
taking, for such a mental state does not exist. An example would clarify the issue.
‘Deception’ is thought to be an indicator of a theory of mmd because it involves one actor
causing another actor to either believe something erroneously or act in a mistaken way.
The erroneous belief can take any form, but is not to be identified with the mental state of
‘deception’, for such a state does not exist. Generally speaking, both ofthese situations
involve the attribution of mental states, either to one or both ofthe actors, in the
prediction or explanation of behavior. Ail of the indicators are thouglit to be indicators
because they involve postulating an intervening variable of mental states as an
explanation for the behavior.
The six indicators are imitation, seif-recognition, social relationships, deception,
role taking or empathy and perspective taking. They are each evaluated as representative
of a theory of mmd by Heyes based on two criteria, Competence and Validity.
Competence is defined by whether there is reliable evidence that the individual bas the
relevant behavioral capacity that, if present, would indicate a theory of mmd. In order to
try and ease understanding in the reader of the competence criterion, Heyes states that the
competence criterion attempts to establish which environmental cues the primates use to
guide their behavior (1998:102). The established presence ofthis behavior in the
experiment might then indicate that a theory of mmd is present in the primate. I say
‘might’ rather than ‘would’ because the indicator then has to pass the validity test.
Validity is understood as: if present, would this behavioral capacity indicate a theory of
mmd? (1998:102). An indicator would fail this criterion if there were another equally
plausible non-mentalistic alternative explanation at work. In other words, if Heyes can
show that one of ber alternative non-mentalistic explanations also fits the experirnental
results, then the theory ofrnind explanation cannot rule out other alternative explanations(J and fails the validity test. In an attempt to ease understanding for the reader, Heyes
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characterizes the validity question as the following: validity asks about the psychological
processes that led the primates to use these cues instead ofothers (1998:102). To sum up,
the competence criterion is passed if the behavior is present in the experirnent. The
validity criterion is passed if there is no rival explanation for the resuits. It could be said
that the validity criterion is passed through the process of elimination of other
explanations.
Heyes gives an example that should help to shed light on what job she has in mmd
for the competence and validity criteria. One of the proposed indicators of a theory of
mmd is ‘seif-recognition’. This indicator would pass the competence criterion if there is
evidence that the primate uses a mirror to gain information about itself. That is, if the
primate shows behavioral evidence such as looking in the mirror and touching some area
of its body, the competence criterion is passed. The indicator of seif-recognition passes
the validity test if Heyes camot offer some other alternative non-mentalistic explanation
for the primate looking into the minor. The general framework is the same for ail six
indicators discussed. In each case, the presence of a behaviorai indicator is taken to be
evidence for a theory of mmd, if no other explanations for the behavior exist.
Due to Heyes’ less than thorough discussion ofthe six indicators, I have been able
to identify a missing elernent that, if not discussed, contributes to allowing her to
conclude that current research is not decisive. The missing element is hypotheses, and
the fact that they are not rnentioned means that prediction of experirnental outcornes are
also lacking. The way an experirnent is normally conducted is the following. An
experiment is designed. The researcher commits in advance of the performance of the
experiment to a possible outcome of the experiment, that is, to a particular set of results.
The two possibilities are either that the hypothesis is confirrned, i.e., the behavior is in
evidence, or that the hypothesis is flot confirrned, i.e., the behavior is not evidenced. In
some more complicated experimental designs, there is sornetirnes one other different
potential outcome of the experirnent and it ofien favors the other competing hypothesis.
In the simplest of experimental designs, the two possible outcomes are either that the
behavior is displayed or it isn’t. Most ofthe experiments discussed by Heyes have been
conducted by the theory of mmd side, thus the hypothesis mentioned in the experiments(J is aiways a theory of mmd hypothesis. Theory of mmd experiments do flot fit into
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simple design mentioned above. $ince the experirnents have been conducted by the
theory of mmd side, and are designed to determine if a theory of mmd is attributable, they
make reference to intervening variables such as mental states to explain the behavioral
resuit obtained in the experiment. In these experiments, the deciding factor is flot the
presence or absence of the behavior. The crucial distinction between theory of mmd
hypothesis and non-mental hypotheses is rather whether the behavioral resuit obtained
warrants a higher level explanation or not, i.e., mental state attribution. In Heyes’
discussion ofthe six indicators, she regularly fails to mention the theory ofmind
hypotheses. This might be why she is able to advance numerous alternative explanations
for the results. The fact that she fails to mention predictions but advances numerous
explanations could invite the charge that her explanations fit the data because they are all
‘afier the fact’ and so they are ad hoc explanations. Perhaps another mitigating factor in
Heyes’ failure to formulate hypotheses based on non-mental explanations is that she
simply caimot because mechanistic explanations have no predictive power. We will
corne back to this question at the end of the chapter.
There is a second problem that has to do with the validity question, the proposed
link between the indicator and the theory of mmd hypothesis. The way Heyes puts the
issue is to have the experiment answer the question. That is. if she can find no other rival
explanation for the results, then the indicator is representative of a theory of mmd. I
rather think the link should be framed the following way: Is an indicator such as
deception, because it implies the attribution of an intervening variable of a mental state, a
reasonable indicator of a theory ofmind? The only way that deception could be taken to
be a reasonable indicator of a theory of mmd is because it postulates the attribution of a
mental state as an intervening variable. Heyes mistakenly, in rny opinion, assumes that
experirnental results should be able to answer the validity question, that is, be able to
show whether the proposed mental state indicator is indicative of a theory of mmd only
by eliminating ah other potential explanations of the resuits. Proof of this is that the
validity criterion is passed if she can’t find another explanation to account for the results.
Ruling out alternative explanations is thus the only aspect considered in the vahidity issue.
The fact that she can’t advance any altemate explanations for the results is only one(J consideration amongst others, in my opinion. It certainly doesn’t teli us whether
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inference to mental states is warranted. for this reason the validity question is also very
much a theoretical issue that can 5e argued for or against completely separately from the
experimental resuits. It cannot be determined merely by a lack ofthe existence of
alternative explanations. Moreover, where is the criterion that evaluates the mental state
attribution as an intervening variable? It seems to me that an evaluation of a proposed
indicator for a theory of mmd should include some kind of determination as to whether
an indicator implies the possession or attribution of mental states. In the case oftheory of
mmd, this is the crucial issue, Le., this is why the indicator is being proposed in the first
place, because it requires the attribution of mental states. In other words, the validity
criterion, as Heyes has construed it, as a kind of mechanical experiment decider is
insufficient. h must at least include an answer to the question: what behavior indicates
which mental state? This issue, I maintain, can be debated separately from the
experimental resuits, and this is where theoretical discussion becomes important.
3.1. Imitation
The first indicator discussed is that of imitation, defined as the spontaneous
reproduction ofnovel acts yielding disparate sensory inputs when observed and executed
(1998:102). The point about imitation, or ‘aping’, as it is sometimes called, is that the
observer reproduces the same action that he or she has just observed or otherwise gleaned
through the senses in another individual. An example would help to illustrate this
indicator. The action, say, an alarm cail, is observed with the eyes and heard with the
ears by the watcher and then reproduced by the same watcher with its mouth. It is
thought to 5e an indicator of a theory of mmd because it involves ascription of purpose or
goals by the irnitator to the model (1998:103).
Heyes discusses two experiments on imitation, although the first cannot truly 5e
deemed an experiment. It is the so-called ‘Hundredth Monkey Phenornenon’ where
increasing numbers of Japanese Macaques on Koshima Island have been observed to
bring sweet potatoes down to the river to wash off the diii before eating them. 15e
phenomenon, thought to 5e started by a single monkey, is claimed to have spread to the
entire population through the process of imitation (1998: 103). A possible problem with
C the experiment is that the potatoes were deliberately made available to the monkeys by
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the researchers, but without any attempt to experimentally manipulate any conditions.
There was also no hypothesis made by the researchers.
Heyes cites another experiment designed to demonstrate the phenomenon of
imitation. The aim was to see whether monkeys would imitate the demonstrator’s use of
a human gardening tool, in this case a rake, to get food out ofreach (1998:102). The
hypothesis is that the monkeys would reproduce certain of the researchers’ behaviors, i.e.,
obtaining fruit with a rake. This experiment could be charged with being sornewhat
anthropocentric, equally anthropocentric would be to teach the primates how to use a
food processor. Although primates have and use tools in the wild, the rake and the food
processor are not in their repertoire oftool use. Interestingly, the resuits showed that
encultured chimpanzees (animais with extensive training history) more than non
encultured chirnps did appear to imitate the experimenters’ use ofa variety ofhuman
tools to solve problems such as obtaining food that was out of reach.
Heyes doesn’t think that imitation actuaiÏy occurred in the experiments, SO both
fail the competence criterion. She further does flot believe that imitation is an indicator
of a theory of mmd, having been able to advance alternative explanations for the resuits,
so the experiments also fail the validity test.
The alternative explanations advanced by Heyes include instrumental learning,
rnatched dependent behavior, coïncidence and emulation learning for reward (1998:103-
4). Heyes explains the hundredth monkey phenomenon by the daim that the macaques
may have observed one particular macaque wash its potato in the water and reproduced
the behavior purely by chance by chasing the macaque into the water while holding a
potato. This is an example ofthe supposedly non-mental capacity of acquisition of a
behavior through instrumental learning by coincidence. What this explanation Iacks is an
account of why a macaque wouÏd pick up this particular behavior and not the thousand
others that occur in similar chance circurnstances, in other words, an account of when and
how the association was first formed.
Concerning the rake use experiment, Heyes refuses to grant that these animals
were indeed imitating the experimenters. Heyes instead daims that the resuits could have
been due to stimulus enhancement, which is where the primate manipulates an object that(J has been made more salient through contact with the experimenter. This explanation stil!
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leaves out an account as to why this object is more salient than others, that is, what
distinguishes those objects that are manipulated from those that are not. As with the
potato washing explanation, this explanation is also ad hoc, it only fits the resuits after
the fact, but fails to predict when or explain why the primate appeared to ‘irnitate’ this
particular behavior and flot the thousand other behaviors of the model that the primate
was also witness to. In other words, the non-mentalist explanation cannot predict which
of the behaviors of the model that the ape will choose to ape. In short, Heyes’
explanation for the resuits is just that, an explanation afler the fact.
Moreover, the potato washing experiment lacks a clear-cut hypothesis by the
theory ofmind side. It suffers from many problems, and it fails somewhere between a
piece of naturalistic observation and an experiment. The phenornenon is not a case of
pure naturalistic observation because it involved artificial intervention, i.e., the potatoes
were given to the monkeys by a group ofresearchers. It is flot an experiment because the
researchers did not try to manipulate any variables and gave no hypothesis ofthe resuits.
The researchers just made a novel food source available to a group ofmonkeys to see
what would happen. This phenomenon thus cannot provide much weight to argue for the
theory ofmind side.
Although the second experiment is a better example of a piece of evidence that
can be used by the theory of mmd side, Heyes fails to mention an interesting
phenomenon that was displayed by the uncultured primates. The experiment was, on
some accounts, designed to determine whether the primates would use the rake to solve a
problem, such as obtaining food that was out of reach. It was found that the cultured
primates, those with extensive training history, did imitate the trainers’ demonstration of
the use ofthe rake to obtain the food. The group with no training history was able to
solve the problem but did not employ the trainers demonstration. They rather ‘invented
their own tactics. It seems to me that given the uncultured group’s tactics of invention as
a contrast tends to give more weight to the hypothesis that the cultured chimps were
displaying sornething akin to imitation.
In my opinion, the competence criterion bas been passed in the rake use
experiment. Given the contrast in behavior between the cultured and uncultured(J primates, imitating the antics ofthe model versus inventing their own solution, there is a
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clearly delineated behavioral resuit that merits a passing ofthe cornpetency criterion.
Concerning whether imitation is a valid indicator of a theory of mmd, I agree with Heyes
that it is lot, because I don’t think it requires the attribution of mental states. I do think,
however, that imitation, by definition, has a cognitive element to it. The idea of
reproducing an action that is a resuit of disparate sensory input and output is quite
sophisticated a feat and while it might flot require attributing goals to the model, the
primate must stiil somehow transfer what it has seen in the mode! into an action that it
then reproduces.
3.2. Self-Recognïtion
The second indicator is that of seif-recognition. There isn’t a clear definition of
this indicator. It is also known as ‘mirror-guided body inspection’ where individuals use
a minor as a source of information about their own bodies. This indicator is thought to
be an indicator of a theory of mmd because it implies the potential to imagine oneseif as
one is viewed by others. It is taken by some primate researchers to further imp!y
possession ofthe concept of self.
In one such type of experiment, primates are anesthetized and painted with a
coloured dot on their head that they caimot see without a mirror. The test is to compare
how many times they touch the spot, first in the absence of a mirror, with how many
times in the presence of a mirror. There is a clear hypothesis made by the theory of mmd
side in this case: if the primate’s rate offavoring the spot is significantly higher in the
presence ofthe mirror than in the absence ofthe mirror, then the competence criterion
should be passed.
Again, Heyes argues that not only is the behavioral indicator flot present in the
experiments, but that even if it were present, she is able to advance alternate explanations
for the resu!ts and so it is not a valid indicator of a theory of mmd. It thus fails both the
competence and validity tests. Heyes’ alternate explanations are bordering on
implausible, and include the daim that primates who have a longer recovery time from
anesthesia wil! be more active than those with a shorter time. This wou!d exp!ain the
discrepancy between activity without the mirror (very low, because the monkeys were(J stiil siuggisli from the anesthesia) and then with the mirror (higher, because the
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anesthesia had worn off completely). This explanation has been invaÏidated by other
researchers, however. They contend that if Heyes had done a thorough review of the
literature, she would have found that the test was flot performed until sometimes 24 hours
afier the primates had been anesthetized, plenty of tirne for the effect to wear off
completely. Moreover, in some experiments the primates were flot anesthetized at ail but
were rather marked while they were awake (Gallup, Anderson, Shillito, 2002:328). A
second alternative explanation is that the control group of primates (with no marks) are
too busy responding socially to their image in the mirror to engage in the groorning
behavior that the experimental group had engaged in that led by chance to their touching
the marks. Heyes attributes the control group’s behavior to the fact that chimps typically
exhibit social behavior on initial exposure to a mirror. It turns out that social behavior in
this context means that the primates respond as if their image is another primate. It
seems to me that Heyes cannot rule out that the labeling behavior ofthe primates requires
mental states, namely the recognition of the other as ‘friend’ or ‘enemy’ or at least as
different from oneseif
The contrast in behavior between the control and experimental groups in this
experiment is, in my opinion, good evidence for passing the competence criterion. The
control group’s actions indicate that the primates were responding to the mirror as if the
image was of another primate. The experimental group acted as if they had gone beyond
this level ofresponding, to a level where they ‘recognized’ themselves in the mirror and
groomed themselves in impossible to see places. Given this contrast, and the fact that
mirrors don’t exist in the wild, which could explain the latency period from social
responding to self-grooming, I think that the competency test is passed.
Heyes’ validity question should ask whether the indicator, as evidenced by the
presence of a certain behavior, really is indicative of a theory of mmd. In this case the
question would be whether self recognition or the concept of self is indicative of a theory
of mmd. This is a question of interpretation that can 5e discussed regardless of the
experimental results. I am in agreement that the primate’s actions with the mirror are not
a reasonable indicator of the concept of self. I don’t think that the concept of self is
amenable to experimentation, in part because it is flot clear what mental state would(J indicate the presence of the concept. The concept of self is a vaguely defined and
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controversial topic in human theories of mmd. Many are flot certain of its parameters or
even whether it exists, perhaps there is just the illusion that it exists. I do think that the
fact that a primate can inspect parts of its body that are flot normally visible to it without
a mirror is significant of sornething, although it might be more closely related to self
recognition.
3.3. Social Relationships
The third indicator ofa theory ofmind is social relationships. This would be
understood in its most narrow sense as the observation of a structured interaction between
one or more conspecifics (1998:105). Primatologists employ a larger sense ofthe terrn,
however, where an individual acts on an earlier observation of two other interacting
individuals, such as starting a fight with the winner of a fight occurring earlier between
two other individuals. This might be more aptly described as knowledge of social
reÏationships. Knowledge of social relationships is thought to be an indicator of a theory
of mmd because a primate acts, for instance, aggressively toward a second primate on the
basis of a mental state such as the belief that the other primate is in a higher rank.
One ofthe experiments to test this indicator involves training a ‘privileged’ subset
of apes to perforrn an action to obtain a treat that they could then share with the rest of
the group who have not been trained and who have no treats. The other two thirds ofthe
group, flot knowing how to obtain treats, would have to rely on this special subset of apes
to obtain the treats. It was found that those apes that received food from the trained apes
spent more time with and groomed these trained apes.
Heyes distinguishes between two types of social relationships, mere knowledge of
social relationships, where the relationships are observable properties and awareness of
them is obtained though associative learning, and a more abstract sense ofthe term,
where one individual attributes dispositional mental states such as loyalty, dislike or
affection to another conspecific. In the former, more behaviorally obvious case only, on
her view, it is possible to say that the existing evidence supports the daim that apes know
about social relationships. She thus takes the rcsults ofthe experiments to indicate not
that certain individuals seek contact with high-ranked individuals because they are(J believed to be high ranked, but because the apes made an association between the
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preferred activity and the ape who learned it. So although the apes display the behavioral
indicator of social relationships and pass the competence test, there are other explanations
and so the validity test is failed.
Her alternative non-mental explanations include the daim that the responses of
the non-special group are based on an earlier exposure to a contingency, between that of
happenstance grooming ofthe special primate and obtaining a reward. The other
explanation bas the same basis: the learning of an association between grooming and
obtaining food reward, also known as acquired-afflhiative-social-responding (1998:106).
As with the indicator of imitating, Heyes’ explanation is ad hoc, she can explain after flue
fact how the behavior occuned but her explanation bas no predictive power, i.e., it cannot
predict when one chance encounter over another will be the one where the crucial
association is made. Moreover, if the non-special group neyer obtained rewards for
hanging around the privileged set of primates, Heyes lias no situation to point to where
the association was first made in the minds ofthe non-special group.
In my opinion, the initial problem stems from Heyes’ distinction between two
types of knowledge of social relationship and lier subsequent exclusion of the second
type from consideration. b reiterate, she distinguishes one construal that requires
mental state attribution and is based on both past and present social events, from ber
sense, where social relations are observable events and the primate shows behavioral
evidence of ‘affiliate social responding’ to a higher ranked individual. After
distinguishing the two types, she exciudes the first one from the possibilities, presumably
because it makes reference to mental state attribution. This has the effect of setting the
situation up in advance to be doomed for the theorist of mmd. If mental state attribution
is not a potential underlying mechanism in the experimental task, then the experimental
results won’t be justifiably attributable to a theory of mmd explanation. The validity test
will then automatically be failed. Moreover, at a minimum, any comrnunity species is
going to have a social or interactive aspect to its behavior, almost by definition. This
social behavior, in ail its observed nuances and varieties, caimot be explained solely on
the basis of stimulus-response behavior. It must make reference to mental states to
explain antagonistic behavior, for instance, between a leader primate and one of its
C
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I don’t think that knowledge of social relationships is particularly amenabÏe to
laboratory experimentation without preliminary naturalistic observation. In my opinion,
passive observation in a naturalistic setting is a necessary preliminary step in collecting
evidence of social relationships, because it requires extensive tracking of the animais to
determine whether and what social and status relations are in effect. These relationships,
once they are determined, can be manipulated in an experimental setting, but only if a
large enough number ofthe group is brought in to study. One can’t study whether
mothers recognize their children’s alarm calls if one or the other parties is left behind in
the wild.
3.4. Role-Taldng
The fourth indicator is that of role taking. 0f ail the indicators, role-taking is most
definitive of a theory of mmd. It is the act of identifying with a model’s circumstances in
order to predict what the model would do in that situation. This capacity is thought to be
an indicator of a theory ofmind because it requires that the role taker attribute beliefs and
desires to the model (1998:106). In my opinion, this capacity does flot necessarily
require the attribution of any mental states, at least not on all theory of mmd variations,
but Heyes does not entertain this consideration.
One set of experiments designed to test this indicator involved showing
videotapes ofproblem scenarios to $arah, the ape who was taught sign language. The
tape was stopped at the end of the problem and two photographs were shown to Sarah to
choose between, one that solved the problem and one that didn’t. The theory ofrnind
hypothesis was that Sarah should choose the photo that solved the problem, and it was
found that Sarah did indeed consistently choose the problem-solving photo.
In another experiment, chimps were divided into two groups and each trained on a
different task. One group was trained to choose one item out of a set of four that a tramer
was pointing to. The second group observed a tramer bait one of four containers that
they then had to accurately select by pointing to the container. The tasks were then
switched on the two groups so that in the test session, each group was performing the task
ofthe other group, a task new to them. The theory ofmind hypothesis was that the new(J task should be performed by the chimps without a decline in performance. It was
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that the rate of successful performance of the new task indeed did flot decline for three
out of four ofthe primates in each group.
In the first experiment conducted with Sarah the chirnp, Heyes cairnot dispute the
fact that performance did flot decline for the most part, and so ends up granting that the
cornpetency criterion is passed. The alternative explanations for Sarah’s behavior include
choosing a photograph based on familiarity, physical matching, and formerly learned
associations. Ail three ofthese activities have as a common element the fact that Sarah
might have been matching or associating an aspect ofthe problem that appeared in both
the problem videotape and the solution photograph. based on familiarity between the two
things. Here Heyes ought to say that an aspect ofthe problem is identical with an aspect
in the photo, because familiarity implies that Sarah would have to abstract the two
aspects in order to compare them. Abstraction requires more than stimulus response
conditioning whereas choosing on the basis of identity, it could be argued, does not.
However, nothing in the task of choosing a photograph requires the attribution of mental
states, and so the results cannot be said to argue for the theory ofmind side.
Heyes makes a strange point at this juncture, claiming that since there exists no
single unitary non-mental explanation for their results, Premack and Woodruff s work on
role taking is unique in the literature in this respect. This is an odd daim to make, since
Heyes has supplied three alternative explanations: familiarity, physical matching and
formerly learned associations. Moreover, why is Heyes all of a sudden restricting herself
to one alternative explanation, when she has advanced multiple alternative explanations
for each ofthe previous sets ofresults? Heyes then makes an even stranger move, cites
Premack and Woodruff s work as a standard, and daims that no progress has been made
since their research in 197$. I presume that Heyes means here, although she fails to
mention it, that the work done by Premack and Woodruff passes both the competency
and validity tests and is thus a standard in that it is the only research, from her
perspective, to have shown evidence of a theory of mmd in primates.
3.5 Deception
The next indicator is deception, which is taken in a functional sense to mean theÇ performance of a cue by one animal that will lead another to make an incorrect or
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maladaptive response. It is thought to be indicative of a theory of mmd because the
deceiver must cause the deceived to make an enor, and this requires some type of
imaginative projection on the part ofthe deceiver, which requires mental state attribution
(1998:106).
There are not many experiments on deception in the literature, although there is a
great deal of anecdotal evidence from naturalistic observations. One of the only
experiments conducted involves the ape watching a tramer hide a reward in one of two
containers. Either a cooperative (dressed in green) or a competitive (dressed in white)
tramer then cornes into the room and searches the container that the ape points to. The
cooperative tramer aiways shares the found food with the ape. The competitive tramer
only does so if the ape points to the wrong container (i.e. ernpty container). The theory of
mmd hypothesis predicts that the ape will learn to deceive the competitive tramer by
aiways pointing to an empty container.
Heyes cites another, in my opinion, very telling anecdote obtained through
naturalistic observation where a female primate approached and began grooming a male
who had caught and was guarding a carcass. The male eventually lolled back into a
supine position and let go of the carcass, perhaps due to the relaxing effect of the
grooming. The fernale then snatched the carcass and ran off with it.
While Heyes accepts that deceptive behavior is in evidence in the experirnent, and
so the competence test is passed, she does not accept that deception is indicative of a
theory of mi, because there exist alternative explanations for the behavior. The
alternative reasons as to why the behavior might have occuned include: by chance, as a
resuit of associative learning, or as a product of inferences about the observable features
ofthe situation rather than about mental states. An explanation based on chance is ad
hoc, it does flot account for why the fernale seizes the opportunity during this situation
and flot during others where another primate is lying in a supine position eating some
food. To postulate associative leaming as an explanation in this case, one would have to
be able to point to the previous situation when the association was first formed. What is
the likelihood that just such a situation occurred in the recent past?
In my opinion, deception is one ofthe most promising and clear-cut indicators of
C a theory of mmd. first, because the behavior involved in deception is quite
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delineated and easily behavioralÏy manifested. $econdly, because deception requires that
one cause a second individual to believe or act on misinformation, it requires the
attribution of mental states, such as beliefs. Moreover, the experiment with the
cooperative and competitive trainers has a clear theory of mmd hypothesis and the resuits
support this prediction.
3.6. Perspective-Taking
The last indicator is that ofperspective-taking, which is different from role-taking
in that the role taking experiments require the animal to predict what a subject might do
next to solve a problem, whereas perspective-taking requires the animal to make the
connection between ‘seeing’ and the propositional attitude of ‘believing’. In other words,
if a primate has visual access to an event or an object, they are likely to behave in
consequence ofthis knowledge if they understand the relation between seeing and
knowing (1998:107). Heyes divides the perspective taking experiments into two types:
‘seeing and knowing’ and ‘seeing and attending’.
The seeing and knowing experiment is a two-stage experiment much like the one
for deception. The ape watches a tramer bait one of four containers aithougli the ape
cannot see which ofthe four is baited. The tramer then leaves the room. Two other
trainers corne into the room and each point at a container. One tramer is the knower, who
knows where the treat is, and the other tramer is the guesser, who does not know where
the food is. The theory of mmd hypothesis is that the ape should learn to point at the
knower more ofien than the guesser. There is a second stage to the experiment, where the
guesser tramer has a bag over his head. This second stage was added to ensure that the
primate’s discrimination was based on the trainer’s visual access to the baited container,
and not an association made by the primate that is based on some visual aspect of the
knower’s appearance. Results were initially poor, leading Heyes to propose that animais
learned a new discrimination between bagged and unbagged trainers.
In the experiment to test seeing and attending, apes were rewarded for making
begging gestures in front ofa pair oftrainers in a variety of poses. In one situation, one
tramer wore a blindfold on his eyes while the second wore the blindfold on his mouth.(J Another trial involved one tramer who was turned completely away from the ape while
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the other tramer was also turned away but lis head was turned toward the ape. The apes
should pick the tramer whose eyes they could see to beg food from.
In these two sets of experiments the resuits are flot very strong, leading the
researchers themselves to doubt that they have found evidence of seeing and knowing or
seeing and attending. Surprisingly, Heyes defends the resuits, claiming that the task of
the experiment for the apes was ambiguous and does flot thereby provide negatwe proof
for the indicator of seeing in apes. There is a possible confounding factor to both these
experiments. It is claimed that in the primate world, staring at one conspecific by another
is a threat. Given this, it is possible that primates do flot use visual gaze to inform
themselves of some state of affairs or mmd other than impending aggression but rather
use some other form ofbody language.
Heyes then considers hypotheses for both sides in the indicator of perspective
taking. This is the first time she has mentioned hypotheses for any ofthe experiments. I
am flot convinced that this is because no hypothesis had been stated by researchers for
any ofthe other experiments, as she maintains. I think she has just failed to mention
them, thinking they have no bearing on the interpretations ofthe resuits. In her view,
experimental outcomes alone ought to be able to determine whether theory of mmd or
non-mentalist explanations are at work, so there is no need to mention hypotheses. She
then states that the Povineili experiments were presented as if certain outcomes would
have supported a Theory of Mmd interpretation over a non-mentalistic account. Is this
statement to be interpreted as meaning that the Theory of Mmd hypothesis would predict
a different behavioral outcome than the non-mental alternative? I think a distinction must
be made between hypotheses and actual experimental outcomes, the two are discussed
interchangeably as if there was no difference between them. As I mentioned earlier, ail
sorts of ad hoc alternative explanations can be given for the results, especially when there
is no hypothesis made by the researcher conducting the experiment. Concerning her idea
that certain outcomes support one theory over another, is this ever in fact possible
without a clear mention of hypotheses? In my opinion. there exist no experimental
results that Heyes cannot advance an alternative explanation for.
In any case, Heyes daims that the Povinelli experirnents do not represent a true
C difference in rival explanations. In other words, aithough the simple discrimination
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procedure upon which the experiments were based teli us which cues the primates use,
they do not teli us why they use these eues instead of others. It will be recalled that this
is the validity criterion: it asks about the psychological processes that lcd to the primates
using these eues instead of others. Would it be practically possible to implement this
difference in the two explanations, i.e., why the primates use these eues instead of others?
As I mentioned earlier, in the validity criterion there should be some sort of evaluation of
the mental state that is inferred on a Theory of Mmd explanation, in my opinion. That is,
the real distinguishing feature ofthe Theory of Mmd hypothesis is that it makes reference
to mental state attribution whereas the non-mental hypothesis does flot. Merely
demonstrating that the resuits rule out ail alternative explanations says nothmg about
whether postulating the mental state as an intervening variable ofthe mental state is
justified or flot. Is there a way to implement this distinguishing feature of warrant into
an experimental design?
4. Conclusion: Empirically Equivalent Explanations
I agree with Heyes that the indieators she diseussed, with the exception of
deception, social relationships and role-taking, are not ideal indicators of a Theory of
Mmd. However, I think her une ofreasoning leading up to this conclusion is mistaken. I
have mentioned that lier construal ofthe validity criterion is insufficient as a tool of
evaluation. I now want to discuss what I think the source ofthe problem inherent for the
three failed indicators is, that is, the apparent situation of empirically equivalent
expianations.
Out ofthe six indicators surveyed by Heyes, only two were found to pass the
competency criterion, i.e., were behaviorally evidenced in the experiments, those of
social relationships and deception. As mentioned, her competcncy criterion runs contrary
to the type of experiment involved, where the issue is flot the presence or absence of the
behavioral resuit, but whether the behavioral resuit warrants the attribution of mental
states or not. None of the six were found to be valid indicators of a Theory of Mi, that
is, none ofthe indicators could rule out alternative explanations. We thus seem to be in a
situation of empirically equivalent explanations for a piece of experimental behavioral
data. Given these results, Heyes main daim gains some credibility; perhaps cunent
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experirnental design cannot decide between rival explanations. The case could be made
that this phenomenon is due to over!ap in explanations. On Neyes’ definitions, there is
indeed some explanatory overlap between the Theory of Mmd and the non-mental
alternatives. Afier ail, both sides are able to account for the experimental resuits.
However, even if there is some degree ofoverlap, the two explanations are not identical.
The two explanations are deemed rivals in the first place because there is some extra
element appealed to by the theory of mmd side over the non-mental side, and it has to do
with the postulation of mental states as intervening variables.
Neyes doesn’t report on any experiments where the two competing explanatory
camps really do advance different hypotheses. That is, the behaviorist hypothesis would
predict resuit A and the theory ofmind hypothesis would predict result B. The following
experiment is a theoretical one conceived of by Daniel Dennett, and concerns a typical
behaviorist stimulus-response hypothesis. A rat is trained in a Skinner box to take
exactly four steps forward, press a bar with its nose to obtain a food reward. If the bar
were to be suddenÏy advanced so that the rat had to take a fifih step in one of the
experimental trials, Skiimerian behaviorism would not be able to predict that the mouse
would take the fifih step necessary to get the reward. The laws of behaviorism would
dictate that the rat would only take four steps and jab the air with its nose (Dennett,
1978:14). Setting aside the fact that this experiment is not concerned with non-mentaÏist
versus theory of mmd explanations per se, the fact rernains that the behaviorist camp is at
pains to predict the resuits of this experiment. The mentalist side, treating the rat as an
intentional system, would be able to make a prediction about the rat’s behavior, and it
would be different from the behaviorist prediction, or lack thereof.
It has been claimed that mechanistic explanations cannot explain nove! or
spontaneous actions or actions that have not been so!icited by stimuli. Predictive power
of the behaviorist camp wi!! drop off sharp!y if either the experimenta! conditions are
changed, or the soliciting stimulus is removed altogether. As we saw for many ofthe
experirnents described in the chapter, Heyes’ non-mental explanation, particularly when
it was based on a standard S-R framework, has very !ittle predictive power. Without a
history ofprevious stimu!us-response pairings to refer to, behaviorist theory will often
( resort to explaining a piece of behavior afier the fact.
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Dennett, in a critique of the notorious behaviorist B.F. Skinner (“Skinner
Skinned” 197$), cites two categories that behaviorisrn has trouble accounting for: those
of novelty and generality. Novel or spontaneous behavior is characterized by the fact that
it is different from previous behavioral responses to the same situation in the past.
Behaviorism has difficulty in accounting for novel behavior because, as the experirnent
mentioned above demonstrates, the sameness ofthe stimulus dictates that the anirnal’s
response wilI also be the same. By generality, I think that Dennett is referring to a
behavioral response that is a resuit of generalizing from a previous situation that is flot
similar enough to be generalized from except by the process of abstraction or learning.
Behaviorism has difficulty accounting for this type ofresponse because the stimulus is
not the same in both cases, and without previous history of S-R pairings to refer to,
behaviorism cannot account for the process of leaming.
A second example of an experiment where two rival explanations are translated
into different predictions ofthe results is the following taken ftom Stephen Budiansky
(1998:95). The experiment has been cited as demonstrating a rather complex cognitive
capacity in primates, namely the ability to build up complete and correctly ordered lists
from pairwise chaining trials and then run through the complete lists to make correct
judgements about the relative order on non-adjacent items. In the experiment, primates
were trained with rewards to choose E over D, D over C, C over B and B over A. They
were then presented with a novel choice, such as D versus B. It was found that the
primates consistently chose D, even though both choices had previously been rewarded
with equal frequency. In this experiment, Budiansky daims that the behaviorist model
would have predicted a totally different resuit from the one obtained. The behaviorist
model would have predicted, given the fact that B and D had been rewarded with equal
frequency, that B and D would have an equal chance of being picked.
The two above described experiments are ideal in that each camp had a different
hypothesis ofthe experimental outcome, but they are not Theory of Mmd experiments. Is
il possible to implement this distinction between rival explanations into a theory of mmd
experiment? Theoretically we are looking for an experiment where the theory ofmind
theory would predict a different outcorne from the non-mentalist alternative. The
difference in resuit is a function of the fact that theory of mmd explanations postulate a
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mental state as a kind of intervening variable. Non-mental explanations do flot postulate
such a variable. Let’s consider the experiment on perspective taking that Heyes rejected
as a good theory of mmd dernonstrator even though it was presented as such by Povinelli
and Eddy. It will be recalled that Povinelli and Eddy heralded the experimental design as
being decisive in the theory of mmd versus non-rnentalist debate in that it would
dernonstrate the seeing and attending phenomenon, a phenomenon not accountable for by
the non-mentalist side. Heyes neglects to mention the researchers’ hypothesis. We may
guess that it is the following: if the primates understand the relation between seeing and
attending, they will make use ofthe trainer’s gaze or body posture to determine whether
or not they should beg food from them. The primates should then only make begging
gestures to the trainers who are looking at them or tumed toward them. Results were
only at chance on some trials, leading the researchers to doubt that primates understand
the relationship between seeing and attending. If the chimps had performed better, the
researchers would have been able to conclude that primates do understand the relation
between seeing and attending.
To sum up, I have found five identifiable problems with Heyes’ survey ofthe
theory of mmd research, that contribute to her conclusion that current experimentation is
indecisive in theory of mmd research. The first is that her definition oftheory ofrnind
theories is too strong, it includes the unnecessary stipulation that individuals with a
theory of mmd must possess mental state concepts as well as hold the belief that mental
states cause behavior. On the other hand, the second problem is that her distinguishing
feature between non-mentalist and theory of mmd theories is flot strong enough to
prevent collapse between the two theories. The third problem is that Heyes fails to
mention hypotheses, which I have argued are necessary to an appropriate evaluation of
the experimental resuits. The fourth problem is that Heyes’ competency criterion is
incompatible with the experimental design employed in theory of mmd experirnents. As
mentioned, the issue is not whether or not the behavior is in evidence in the experiment,
for it usually is, but rather whether the behavioral resuit obtained warrants an explanation
that appeals to mental state attribution or not. And fifth, Heyes’ validity criterion is also
incompatible with the current experimental design employed in theory of mmd research.
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Since neither side can declare a victory in terms of explanation, we end up in the standoff
situation of empirically equivalent hypotheses.
Conceming research into the possibility ofa Theory of Mmd in primates, I do not
believe that the project has no value and should thus be discontinued. On the contrary,
what is needed is more theoretical input, hopeftully from philosophy, on issues such as
what exactly constitutes a theory of mmd theory on a behavioral level, on what basis
could one design experiments that would produce truly competing hypotheses and
explanations as well as other theoretical issues. The most important source of input
coming from philosophy would be to develop or discover a trait that would distinguish
the theory of mmd or other mentalist type explanations from stimulus or mechanistic
types. In chapter six, afier rnuch looking around, I daim to have discovered a theory that
contains just such a trait.
o
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Interim Summary- Conclusion to Part One.
I hope I have demonstrated that there is no conclusive reason to hait or abandon
the search for mental states in animais. The challenge to the scientffic status of cognitive
ethology is perhaps not as grave as Bekoff and Allen report, but the situation, in rny
opinion, certainly required doser examination. Thus the objections that I have treated in
detail in the first four chapters, while they might have had prima facie value, turn out not
to have the force they appeared to have once examined in further detail at close range.
One ofthe benefits of examining the objections at such close range is discovering the
grain of truth that can be retained from each ofthern. Generally speaking, Allen and
Bekoff s opinion on the issue is particularly apt here: the difficulty in determining
whether or flot animals have mental states should flot be taken for the impossibility of
doing so.
It is possible to distili a thread running through the four objections, that is to say,
two elements common to ah objections, having to do with the relation between language
and anthropomorphism. The common thread through all the objections is that they ahI
reduce to anthropomorphisrn construed as an error of categories, with language as the
most ofien cited distinguishing factor between the two categories. I have explored this
thread somewhat at the beghming of chapter three, claiming that the iack of human
language in animais renders the problem of other minds doubly intractable as compared
with humans. With regard to methodology, the lack of language in animals makes
experimentation that much more difficuit than it is in the case ofhumans.
What do then we retain from each chapter that represents the moral or ‘grain of
truth’ to each objection? From chapter one the mundane conclusion was that animals
certainly don’t possess human language and that concluding this doesn’t amount to
saying much. What we should retain from chapter one is a motivation to look ffirther into
animal language because there is good reason to belicve that it is a language when
construed as a system for the communication of information. We retain from chapter two
that, lacking a so-called mid-level language (between mindless and mind-fuil) to describe
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things like animais, computers and the like, perhaps we shouid exhaust the possibilities of
our existing language first, intentionality-imbued though it is. Anthropomorphism, when
it is used to deveiop hypotheses, is thus sanctioned under the circumstances.
Examination of the other minds problem in chapter three brought the benefit of
uncovering a new research area and method that shows promise with regard to the search
for mental states in animais. It also brought into sharp relief the anthropocentric bias that
colors the views of many detractors, as weil as much of the research in cognitive
ethoiogy. Chapter four brought out the most important and damaging objection made to
cognitive ethology on a methodological level, that theory of mmd or other non-mentaiist
explanations are indistinguishable from mechanistic ones. Thus there is no need to
postulate mentalist explanations because they can’t even be demonstrated from a
methodological point of view.
I thus conclude that whule I may have gotten us around the objections to the
search itself for mental states in animais, I have not succeeded in entirely solving the
methodological objection. The fact rernains that even when experimentation is properÏy
carried out, behaviorist expianations apply equaiiy weli to the data as do those that
postulate intervening mental states. This iacunae in mentalist expianations, i.e., the
inabiiity to rule out other competing hypotheses and explanations, remains with us into
the second haif ofthe dissertation.
Introduction to Part Two
The aim ofthe second part ofthis thesis is to examine two areas ofcurrent
research in cognitive ethology: the attribution of mental states and the attribution of
concepts to animais. In the first two chapters ofthis second haif I will examine some of
the research actually carried out in cognitive ethoiogy at the present time with regard to
theories of intentionality, given a set of four guidelines that I have deveioped as a resuit
of discussions in the first half The resuit shouid be an intentionality ‘guide theory’ that
navigates the search for mental states in animais on a path that gets neatly around the
various limitations irnposed by the objections visited in the first half. Two ofthese
guidelines arise from the discussion on language in chapter one, that a good theory
should have an account of enor and should also be able to identify the content of mental
states to a certain extent. The third guideline cornes from chapter three’s discussion of
the empiricai tractabiiity ofthe fiflh aim in ethology, a good theory must be ernpirically
demonstrable in animais. The last guideline cornes from chapter four’s discussion on
experimentation and also constitutes the lefiover problem from the first half: a good
theory of intentionality must be able to distinguish between intentional and non
intentionai behavior, that is, demonstrate a clear victory for explanations postulating
mental states over mechanistic ones.
What exactly does the word intentionaÏity mean and why have I grouped the four
theories exarnined under the heading of ‘theories of intentionality’? The word
intentionality has at least two meanings, one corresponds to the ordinary-use of the terrn
and the other corresponds to its technical philosophical sense. Understood in its ordinary
use sense, the term coirnotes purpose, and so we are trying to determine whether the
mental states of animais, if they exist, are purposeful. A loose analogy can be drawn
between this ordinary-use connotation of intentionality and some terminological
distinctions referred to in the first haif ofthe thesis. In the second chapter, reference was
made by Pamela Asquith to Purton’s distinction between Agent-purposive and Organic
purposive behavior. Both types ofpurposive behavior would be, generally speaking,
considered intentional behavior in the sense that both types are purposeful. As will be
C remembered, however, the distinction between A and O is that only with A-purposive
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behavior, the agent is aware of the goals of the behavior. This notion of agent awareness
can be compared with the distinction mentioned in chapter one made by Malcoim
concerning two kinds of belief, one refen-ing to the content of the belief itself and the
event of having it, and the other type of belief that is higher order, in other words a belief
about a belief. In this higher order belief type, the agent is aware ofhis or her belief.
Michel Seyrnour appears to have captured the distinction ailuded to by Purton and
Malcolm most succinctly with his distinction in types ofbelief, namely between material
and intentional beliefs. In having a material belief, if I have interpreted Seymour
correctiy, the agent is flot necessarily aware of having the belief, whereas having an
intentional belief requires that the agent be aware of having the belief (1999:312-3). This
notion of intentional belief can be compared with A purposive behavior and Malcoim’ s
notion of a higher-order belief (although should flot be equated with these notions) in that
in ail these cases, the intentional mental state or behavior is reflexive, there is self
awareness ofthe state on the part ofthe agent. This notion ofreflexiveness or agent
awareness also corresponds to the technical sense ofthe term intentionality.
Understood in its most general technical sense, the term intentionaiity rnerely
connotes a directedness of mental states toward objects. On this reading, we are trying to
determine whether mental states in animals are intentional in the sense that these mental
states are about sornething. I will be using the term intentionality in this general sense
rather than in the sense aliuded to above, i.e., as self-awareness ofones mental states,
since at least two of the theories discussed employ the ordinary-sense construal of
intentionality as purpose or intention.
I am thus looking for a guide theory to the search for intentional mental states in
animais. b this end I start with an examination of a theory conceived of by Anthony
Dickinson and Ceceiia Heyes, behaviorist in nature, that specifies three criteria that have
to be met in order for a bit of behavior to be deemed intentional. from there I look at a
theory conceived ofby David Beisecker, normative in nature, that carves intentionality
on a normative dimension. Following this I next examine Daniel Dennett’s Intentional
Stance, pragmatic in nature, that daims degrees of intentionality within the intentional
reaim, and finaiiy I examine Jonathan Bennett’ s theory that offers a solution to the
methodological problem, i.e., that offers a way of distinguishing intentional behavior
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from non-intentional behavior. I evaluate these four theories according to four guidelines
that I have compiled, also as a result of discussion ofsome ofthe objections in the first
haif. The idea is to delineate the constraints out of which any satisfactory theory must
evolve if it is going to help guide the search for mental states in animais. The bonus is
that out of this examination, we end up with a solution to the methodological probiem lefi
over from the first haif.
In chapter seven I am looking for a theory that attributes concepts to animais, with
the caveat that it must not depend on language in order to get around the ‘lack of
language in animais’ problem. This time in the search for such a theory I hit a theoretical
snag. According to Chater and Heyes, the term ‘concept’ cannot be understood in a way
that is independent from naturai language. Many of the theories of concepts on offer in
the literature are dependent on ianguage, or at ieast rely on language for their elucidation.
I disagree with Chater and Heyes’ opinion on this issue and SO take the opposite point of
view through an examination of some of the more popular theories of concepts in the
literature. I end up proposing a theory mentioned in chapter one, that of the eminent
ethologist Colin Allen, that offers three behaviorai criteria for the attribution of concepts.
o
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Chapter Five
Intentionality I
1. Introduction: Two Senses oflntentionality
As I hope to have made clear in the first haif ofthe thesis, there is no good reason
flot to think that animais might have mental states. Proceeding on the supposition that
animais might have mental states, it is natural to ask whether they do have mental states
and if so, what is the nature ofthese mental states. In other words, if they exist, are the
mental states of animais intentional, do these mental states have content, and if so, what
is the nature ofthat content?
The goal of the next two chapters is to examine severai theories of intentionality
that have been specifically developed for applicability to animais, in order to determine
what an adequate theory would need to minimaliy consist of. In the case of humans,
some form of intentionality of mental states has already been estabïished, so to speak.
There are numerous theories that have thus been developed to account for this already
existing intentionality in human beings. Cognitive ethoiogists have lately wondered if
perhaps the behavior and even the mental life, if there is any, of animais also evidences
intentionality. Since researchers don’t have the luxury of being able to study the verbal
locutions of animais to determine if they are intentional or not, their behavior becomes
the next most obvious site of examination. According to Colin Beer, the attempt to
determine whether the behavior of animals is intentional is completely misguided. He
speculates that the use of intentionally imbued language in descriptions of animal
behavior constitutes a latent and pervasive kind of anthropomorphism (Beer, 1997:205).
I’m ofthe opinion that this speculation is unduly pessimistic in that it assumes that an
enor of categories has already been made in the attempt to attribute intentionality to
animal behavior.
The philosophical use ofthe term “intentionaiity” must first be distinguished from
the ordinary use of the term. I suspect that two of the four theories visited in the next two(J chapters employ a sense of intentionaiity that conflates the ordinary-use term with its
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philosophical counterpart, and this leads to uimecessary confusion. The verb ‘intending’
and the noun ‘intention’ in ordinary language are rnost ofien meant as synonyms for
purpose. This ordinary-use connotation refers to just one type of intentional state,
understood in its philosophical technical sense, among others such as believing, desiring
wishing etc. The ordinary language terms of intending or intention have no priority
amongst the various attitudes, they are no more basic or important ($earle, 1983:3).
However, one can understand the tecimical sense of intentionality by taking the ordinary
use ofthe term as ajumping off point.
In order for the reader to properly follow the discussion in the next two chapters it
is necessary to flesh out more ofthe various features that have been associated with
intentionality in its tecimical philosophical construal. The description of features that
follows borrows largely from Ruth Millikan, John Searle, Colin Beer and David
Beisecker’s understanding of the term. Intentionality is that property of rnany mental
states and events by which they are directed at or about or of objects and states ofaffairs
in the world. This feature of ‘aboutness’ or ‘directedness’ is intentionality (Searle,
1983:1). In Millikans’s opinion, the word intentionality understood in its technical sense
is used by philosophers to refer to items that are ‘about’ other things (Millikan,
1997:194). As a first pass, we may say that intentionality thus encompasses the
propositional attitudes (Beer, 1997:21). However, flot ail mental states are intentional
(Searle, IBID). for instance, some mental states such as sensations or anxiety or dread
do not have an obj ect, are not about anything and are thus not intentional. The
commonality amongst intentional states is that they are attitudes toward or about
something, they have content (Beer, IBID).
One consideration that will help the reader to understand the term is to ask what
the relation is between the intentional state and the object or state of affairs it is in some
sense directed at. The answer, according to Beisecker, is that intentional states are
objects of the mmd that are directed at (are about) things and happenings in an external
world (Beisecker, 1999:282). Every intentional state consists ofa representational
content in a certain psychological mode (Searle, IBID). for instance in the sentence
“John believes that Jack will leave the room”, the representational content, ofien
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introduced by a ‘that-clause’, is” Jack will leave the room” and the psychological mode
is “believes”.
The reader might get the impression based on the above discussion that mental
states are intentional states, that intentional states encompass the propositional attitudes.
that a paradigm propositional attitude report is ofthe form ‘X beïieved that Y’ and thus
that intentional states might take the form of linguistic sentences inside the head. The
impression is further reinforced by the fact that John Searie’s theory ofintentionality
applies primarily to speech acts. for this reason Ruth Millikan’s understanding of
intentionality is included, since it is more general and applies particularly well to anirnals
with an as yet undiscovered language. Her version is flot so rnuch different from
Searle’s, but rather more apt for animais since ber target is flot restricted to speech acts.
According to Millikan, external items that exhibit intentionality are called
representations. Ail cognitions, including beliefs, hopes and desires are muer
representations. To attribute intentional purposes to an animal is to attribute to it some
kind of inner representational system, some way of mapping the world and its goals,
which serve as its means of achieving those goals (Millikan, 1997:194). Notice here that
on Millikan’s view, intentional states are flot necessariÏy construed uniquely as
propositional mental states, although the possibility is there. Tntentionality applied to the
animal cornes in some form of a representational system, that will be used by the animal
to achieve its goals.
In this chapter, I will examine two theories of intentionality. I will first look at
Cecilia Heyes and Anthony Dickinson’s theory, in the forrn ofbehavioral criteria for the
attribution ofintentional states to animais (1990). They are rnotivated by the following
argument: Contemporary cognitive ethologists have attributed intentional states to
animais on the basis of passive observation of their behavior under free living conditions.
Since intentionaiity is flot directly rnanifest in behavior, such observation, however
careful, can be misleading. Their aim is thus to specify the behavioral criteria that must
be met if an action is to warrant an intentional account. In their opinion these criteria
caimot be appÏied through passive behavioral observation in an uncontrolled
environment. An interesting point to note here is that i;nplicit in their argument is a bias(J against naturalistic observation. Heyes and Dickinson mention that one ofthe downfalls
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ofnaturalistic observation is that intentionality is flot directly manifest in behavior, and so
without intervention in the form of experimentation, intentionality will flot be capturable.
The question is how will experimentai manipulation better capture intentionality if it is
not directly manifest in behavior in the first place? Furthermore, how can one develop
behaviorai criteria for Intentionality at ail if it is flot directly manifest in behavior?
I will next look at Allen and Bekoff s critique of Heyes and Dickenson’s theory
(1995). Allen and Bekoff find fault with their emphasis on laboratory manipulation to
the detriment of naturalistic observation. The second constructive theory that I will look
at is an improvement on Heyes and Dickinson’s. David Beisecker’s normative theory
offers a different set of criteria for intentionality, arguing that a failure to distinguish
different kinds of intentionality is the main problem with theories concerned with the
attribution of intentional mental states to animais (1999). He initially considers and
rejects other attempts, such as Millikan’s biological account and Dennett’s intentional
stance, before eventually advancing his own theory that is based on normativity, and the
importance of learning.
My aim in this chapter and the next is to evaluate four theories of intentionality
that are on offer according to a set of guidelines that I have compiled ftom a discussion of
the issues presented in the first four chapters. Each of the four theories emphasizes a
different aspect of intentionality, and can be grouped according to how intentionality
should be measured. for instance, Heyes and Dickenson offer a theory that has criteria
that are behaviorist, whereas David Beisecker offers criteria that are normative in nature.
In the next chapter, Daniel Dennett offers a theory that is pragmatic, and Jonathan
Bennett offers one based on behavioral patterns and explanatory power. As to the source
for the guidelines that I have developed, the first two result from chapter one’s
examination ofthe issue oflanguage and Davidson’s comments. The first issue is to
account for error, and one of the guidelines is thus that a theory of intentionality should
contain an account of error. The second issue from that chapter is that a theory should be
somewhat able to identify the content of propositions, and this becomes the second
guideline. from chapter three the challenge is put forward to find a theory or method that
is practically implementable or empiricaiiy tractable, given the fact that animals are(J ‘other minds’ and that we have only indirect access to the contents ofthose minds. The
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third guideline is thus that a theory should be applicable to animais, and irnplernentable
on a practical level. Chapter four’s discussion on methodology and Heyes’ comments on
the issue raises the issue of finding a way to decide between competing hypotheses for a
tiven hit ofbehavior. This translates into determining whether a given bit ofbehavior is
intentiunal or not. The fourth guideline is thus that a theory of intentionality should be
able to discriminate between hehavior that is intentionai from behavior that is not. This
guideline ensures that candidate theories ofintentionality do not beg the question. The
two theories discussed in this chapter as well as two more in the next will be evaluated
uccordinu to these four guidelines.
2. Behaviorist Criteria
Heyes and Dickinson inform the reader at the beginning ofthe article that they
vli adopt a realisi view of intentionality rather than an instrumentalist view (1990:88).
An instrumentalisi view maintains that beliefs and desires do flot have an existence of
their own. A realist view entails that the intentional account of action isa type of causal
explanation, and also that these states have a separate existence oftheir own. Adopting a
realist view, on 1-leves and Dickinson’s account. means that it is necessary to translate
i ntenti onai explanations into counterfactual daims. Counterfactual daims entail what the
aninuil \\ould have donc if circumstances had been different from those that actually
occurred. This makes clear the reason for their attitude toward naturalistic observation.
It is their view that the main problem with naturalistic observation regarding the
attribution of intentionality is that since no manipulation is involved one cannot view
more than one set of environmentai circumstances at a time and one cannot vary any of
the conditions svstematicallv in order to evaluate the counterfactuai daims (1990:87).
Natura]istic observation is thus unhelpful because one cannot manipulate environmental
conditions to find out if the animal’s actions are intentional. This point becornes
important in Allen and Bekoff s critique later on in the chapter. Another prelirninary
point to he made about Heyes and Dickinson’s theory concerns one ofthe main
characteristics of intentional actions. They state that intentionality is a property of an
agent with respect to a particular action rather than ofthe agent per se (1990:91). Thus
some but not necessarily ail of an agent’s actions may be intentionai.
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There are three components to the theory behind Heyes and Dickinson’s
intentional account of action: instrumental beliefs, desires, and a practical inference
process. In order to warrant an intentional account, a behavior or an action must be
represented by an instrumental belief that has a content similar to: action A causes B to
occur. The animal must also have a desire, the content of which includes the goal of the
action. The practical inference process will then specify how the instrumental belief and
the desire interact to produce a third mental state, an intention (1990:89). The content of
this intention is ofien represented as an action verb such as ‘perfonTi’ or ‘approach’.
Heyes and Dickinson list two noteworthy features of the theory. The first is that the
explanation is causal in the sense that it is the interaction of the belief and the desire that
determines the content of the intention. If one of these elements, the instrumental belief
or the desire, is missing from the account, the relevant intention will flot be produced and
the action will flot resuit. This entails that every intentional action, on this account, must
have at least one instrumental beliefand at least one desire to produce it (1990:89).
The second feature is an assumption ofrationality. As we will see in the next
chapter, this assumption cornes from Dennett’s account ofthe Intentional stance
(Dennett, 1987). The assumption is that. by and large, an animal’s behavioral pattems,
like a human’s, are rational. Applied to Heyes and Dickinson’s account, the rationality
assumption requires that the action must be a rational outcome of the belief and desire
interaction. Their motivation for this feature is the same as it is for Dennett: with the
rationality assumption, predictability and empirical tractability ofthe animal’s behavior is
possible. Without the rationality assumption, it would be impossible to predict the
outcomes ofthe animal’s intentions and impossible to empirically evaluate these same
intentions. Heyes and Dickinson admit that this theory is little more than rudimentary.
They note for instance, that it is a single factor analysis of intention in that it isolates only
a single belief and desire in each case of action. It thus fails to account for how
competing desires are resolved in action. They also note that it lacks an account ofthe
individuation of the contents of belief and desire (1990:89).
In order to get from the rudimentary theory described above to a proper
behavioral account of intentionality, there is a rniddle step, and it is the following. There(J are two counterfactual daims supported by the theory, namely that an action would not
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have occurred in the absence ofthe appropriate belief, nor would it have occurred in the
absence ofthe appropriate desire. These two counterfactuals suggest two corresponding
behavioral criteria that must be met in order for an action to warrant an intentional
account, and they are the belief criterion and the desire criterion (1990:90).
Belief is much easier to translate into a behavioral criterion than desire, according
to Heyes and Dickinson, especially when one is attempting to design an appropriate
experiment that will isolate the desire variable while holding all other factors constant.
Heyes and Dickinson model their belief criterion on the idea behind the Looking Glass
World ftom the book Alice in Wonderland (Carrol, 1916). In a Looking Glass World,
things tend to retreat when you run towards them and run afier you when you attempt to
retreat from them. Designing an experiment with this idea, where a food bowi retreats
when the animal approaches it, Heyes and Dickinson predict that the animal should
modify or at least remove from its repertoire the belief that approaching the food bowi
will give access to the food. The removal of the belief is contingent upon whether or not
the behavior ofthe animal is sensitive to the environmental contingencies that support a
belief with the appropriate causal content. If an action is acquired under contingencies
that would support a contradictory belief, then the action does flot warrant an intentional
account. In this case, if the animal persisted in approaching the retreating food bowl,
then the environmental contingencies would support a contradictory belief, narnely that
running afier a retreating food bowl will give access to food. The action of the animal
would not warrant an intentional characterization in this case (1990:92). On their
account, generally speaking, if a behavior appears to be relatively insensitive to its causat
consequences, then it is non-intentional.
In order for an action to warrant an intentional account, it also has to pass the
desire test. In the case of desire, Heyes and Dickinson have determined that if desire is
significantly reduced or diminished in the animal, the performance ofthe action to satisfy
the desire should decline (1990:93). This is great in theory, but designing an experiment
where desire is isolated and manipulated, and all other factors are held constant, is
extremely difficuit. This is because one cannot be sure that desire has been properly
identified and isolated and that ah other factors are held constant. Heyes and Dickinson
have designed an experiment based on what is known as the ‘irrelevant incentive test’
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(1990:93). The variable that is meant to represent desire is thirst. It shouÏd be noted here
that employing a variable such as thirst, which is ofien thought to be one ofthe only
instincts in animais and thus flot under COflSCiOuS control, could be problematic as a
representation of a desire. The reasoning behind this experiment is that change in the
desirability of the goal or incentive should affect instrumental action. The experiment is
as follows: two groups of hungry rats are trained to press a lever and pull a chain
concurrently for two rewards, either food peliets or a sucrose solution. One group is
rewarded with food pellets for pressing the lever and the other is rewarded with a sucrose
solution for pressing the lever. Both groups are then trained with the same rewards this
time for pulling a chain. The test portion entails satiating the rats so that they are not
hungry, waiting until they are thirsty, and seeing which group will press the lever to
obtain the sugar solution in the absence of any rewards. According to their theory, the
group that has initially been trained to press the lever to obtain the sucrose solution
should press more than the group initially trained to press the lever to obtain the food
pellets. This is because the motivational state ofthe group has shifted from hunger to
thirst, thus the group that has been rewarded with a thirst-quencher for their lever
pressing efforts in the past will be the group to press the lever more during the test period.
The desire for food should become reduced in the test phase, since the rats have just
eaten, whereas the desirability for sugar solution should increase. The group that had
been trained to get the reward by performing the appropriate action in the training phase
(even though they were hungry at that time as opposed to thirsty) should then perforrn
this same action in the test phase in the absence of rewards, presumably because they are
now thirsty. Heyes and Dickinson remark that, to their knowledge, the only animal that
passes their behavioral criteria for intentionality is the behaviorist’s prototypical example
of a non-intentional, stimulus-response habituated creature, a rat engaged in lever
pressing in a Skiimer box (1990:94).
In my opinion, this experiment does not demonstrate that changes in the
desirability of a goal can affect instrumentai action, although it might appear to support
this daim. In the training phase, rats were trained to execute an action in order to obtain
a reward or incentive irrelevant to their state ofhunger, which was sucrose solution. The
Ç fact that they performed the appropriate action in the test phase given their state ofthirst
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does flot aiiow Heyes and Dickinson to conclude that it was indeed a change in the
desirability ofthe goal as a potential thirst quencher, and not the pre-training, that cause
the rats to press the lever. The fact that the sucrose solution was an irrelevant incentive in
the training phase and flot so in the test phase does flot rule out other possibilities as to
why the rats performed the right action. They are certainly flot warranted to then
conciude that the only case of intentionality in animais comes from stimulus-response
training rats. The most obvious problem with this experiment is that the two groups
being tested were thirsty to the same degree in the test phase. If behavior is indeed
contingent on thirst then a more obvious way to test changes in thirst would be to have
the two groups thirsty to different degrees. Moreover, this experiment seems to iack a
control or comparison group, in which no variables are manipulated. If a control group
was included, the idea wouid be to not manipulate this group thirst, so that changes in the
test group’s thirst levels couid be compared with this test group.
Heyes and Dickinson’s conclusion of sorts is the following: Their method
suggests that in order to find out whether an animal’s actions are intentional it is
necessary to measure the effects of changes in the environment which bear on the
animal’s mental states. Many behaviors that appear initiaily to be intentional fail to
change under the influence of new enviromitental contingencies. Therefore, naturalistic
observations of behaviors provide no refiable information about the intentionality of
animal action (1990:94).
3. Objections and Evaluation
Heyes and Dickinson treat three potential objections to their theory, but as we will
see, most miss the mark ofwhat is truly problernatic about it. The first possible objection
that they have identified is that their theory has an inherent anthropomorphic bias against
identifying intentionality in animais (1990:94). That is, The method will tend to yield
false negative conclusions because it presupposes that scientists can reliably identify
environmental contingencies and motivational states that will affect the content of the
animal’s intentional states. To this objection they agree that, indeed their account
requires the identification of conditions that bear on the content of mental states, but that
this identification is easier done in the case ofbeliefthan desire. In the difficuit case of
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desire, failure of environmentai contingencies to change the desire state is subject to two
interpretations. Either the behavior is truly flot intentional or the experimental
manipulations have failed to change the desire state. Heyes and Dickenson admit that
there is no principled way of deciding the issue. They are of the opinion that in the
situation where the belief has been manipulated but the desire fails to be, they should eir
on the side of caution and remain agnostic about the intentional status ofthe animal.
It couid be further objected that in the case ofbeliefthe fact that the account
requires ail beliefs to be true or veridical is too stringent a criterion. In other words, it
should be enough that an animai approaches the food bowi at the sight or sound of a
stimulus in order for the animal’s behavior to be deemed intentionai. The act of
approaching a food bowi is presumably indicative ofthe beliefthat approaching the food
bowi wili give the animal access to food. The second part of the experiment, where
stimuius contingencies are reversed or changed, is deemed necessary by Heyes and
Dickinson to prove that changes in environmental contingencies affect an animai’s
mentai states. In their view, changes in enviromuentai contingency shouid produce
changes in beliefs, which are necessary to demonstrate intentionai behavior. In Heyes
and Dickinson’s opinion, it is not enough to show mereiy that the animai has a beiief, for
this would be too difficuit to demonstrate empiricaiiy, since it would be hard to isolate
the belief and show that it is there. It is much easier to demonstrate the existence of a
belief empirically by showing changes in that beiief
As a rejoinder to this objection, it has been shown even in humans that certain
behaviors wiii persist in the face of absent or negative reinforcement. That a human’s
behavior wili persist in the face ofnegative reinforcement does flot mean that the
human’s beliefs are flot intentional. Evidence of false negatives in the anirnai’s behavior
will tend to miss attributing intentionality where it shouid be attributed. Heyes and
Dickinson’s account will thus faii to attribute intentionality where it shouid be attributed,
nameiy in the case of behavior that is intentional and that persists in the face of absent or
negative reinforcement. Their answer to this is to maintain that it is necessary to insist
that au beliefs be veridicai in order to be abie to test intentionality empirically. Mereiy
testing if the animai approaches the food bowi, on an omission schedule at least, wouid
only show that the content ofthe animai’s beiief does not veridicaiiy represent the
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contingencies ofthe world. For Heyes and Dickinson. this is flot enough to warrant an
intentional attribution. The system must additionally be capable of detecting the extent to
which the contents of its mental states match the states of affairs in the world, and also be
able to adjust the content ofthese mental states to bring about eventual conespondence
with the state of affairs in the world (1990:95).
The second objection anticipated by Heyes and Dickinson is that their theory goes
against current research into human perception. It has been found that intentionality is
apparently directly perceivable at least in sorne behavioral situations involving hurnans.
At the beginning oftheir article they daim the contrary, that intentionality is not directly
perceivable in behavior. The reference for direct perception is to a farnous set of
experiments conducted by the psychologist Gunnar Johaimson in 1975 (Goldstein,
1 975:307-8). Previous to the experiment a series of point-light walkers were created by
outfitting several people with a string of Christmas lights attached to their limbs and
filming them as they move about in the dark. The films of these walkers were then
shown to a group ofsubjects. It was found that subjects could guess whether an object
about to be picked up by one ofthe walkers was heavy or light, based on the walker’s
actions. These guesses are taken to indicate that subjects could directly perceive
intentions, therefore intentionality, in the walkers. This is at odds with Heyes and
Dickinson’s daim that intentionality is not directly manifest in behavior. b this
objection they answer that if direct perception is understood in a certain way, then the
experiments on direct perception do not show that intentionality can be directly
perceived. They construe direct perception as meaning that the observer caimot be
rnisled, in other words, that direct perception is error-free perception, not subject to error
on the part of the observer. With this construal of direct perception in mmd, they can
maintain that it is possible for the subject to attribute illusory intentionality to the walker,
if the subject is mistaken about the walker’s actions. Under optimal conditions, when the
subject successfully guesses the walker’s intentions, the intentionality is stili ofa derived
form, since it cornes from the designer ofthe lights.
The terrn ‘direct perception’ has nothing to do with the perception of
intentionality and moreover should not be construed in the sense of errorless, that the
observer cannot be misled. The term originally was coined by the perception researcher
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J.J. Gibson and was taken to mean that no cognitive processing is required on the part of
the observer when observing a scene (Best, 1986:90-7). Ihe phrase ‘direct perception of
intentionality’ if h were to have a meaning, would mean that an observer could directly
perceive intentionality in behavior. If the terrn were to exist it would negate the entire
present discussion. There would be no debate on whether a creature’s behavior was
intentional, since intentionality could presumable be read straight from the behavior.
Moreover, Johannson’s experirnents were flot designed to demonstrate that intentionality
either can or cannot be directly perceived in behavior. The experiments were designed to
demonstrate only that subjects can detect apparent uniform human movement when the
lights on the walker are in motion, whereas the lights are perceived as disparate and
rnotionless when the walker is motionless. In my opinion Heyes and Dickinson are using
the ordinary use connotation of intentionality construed as purpose or intention, to
interpret these experiments. They seem to have taken the subject’s ability to guess
whether the object a walker picks up is heavy or light to mean the same as the ability to
guess the intention ofthe walker. They also equate being able to guess an actor’s
intentions with being able to perceive intentionality directly.
The third objection relates to the debate over the value ofnaturalistic observation
versus experirnental manipulation. The objection to Heyes and Dickinson’s theory,
which is based uniquely on laboratory experimentation, is that one is less likely to find
intentionality in the lab by their methods than in the field through naturalistic
observation. Contrary to their main daim that naturalistic observation is unlikely to
provide evidence of intentionality, some authors argue that it is only through naturalistic
observation that one can find such evidence. As we will see in the next chapter, authors
such as Daniel Dennett argue that the hundreds of training trials that animals undergo in a
typical experiment are hardly worthy of an intentional characterization, but are rather
more representative ofheavily pre-trained stereotypic behavior explicable in terms of
rival conditioning hypotheses (1983:250). Heyes and Dickinson’s rejoinder to this is to
wonder why such authors would believe that the existence of a prolonged training history
is incompatible with the attribution of intentionality. They speculate that perhaps such
authors assume that, unlike S-R habits, beliefs are formed quickly, on the basis of
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minimal experience. While they accept that this rnight be the case in some training
situations, they wonder why over-training should rob an action of its intentional status.
The issue is flot whether stimulus-response over-training is incompatible with
intentionality, for it is compatible. That is, stimulus-response training can produce
intentional behavior in the animal. The issue here is whether repeated attempts to create
or modify a unit of behavior somehow rnask or remove the real spontaneous behavioral
reaction in the animal, which might be found to be intentional. The worry is also not that
over-training an already intentional behavior would rob it of its intentional status,
because this seems an impossible feat, but rather that training would create a new
intentional behavior that is artificial to the animal’s repertoire. An even more
counterproductive feat would be to train a behavior in the animal that is artificial to its
repertoire and not even intentional. One can train an animal to act intentionally, just as
one can train an animal and thereby modify the animal’s original intentional reaction into
one devoid ofintentionality. The creation of so-called false positives, where the
intentional behavior is flot within the animal’s repertoire of behaviors but is rather created
through repeated stimulus response training, is just as bad as false negatives, where the
behavior really is intentional but failed to be labeled as such. The aim is to see if any of
the naturafly occuring behavior in the animal can be considered intentional and it is only
through noninvasive naturalistic observation that such an aim can be carried out.
Heyes and Dickinson’s rejoinder to this objection is to wonder why, even if
intentional status is a product of training history, one would find more evidence of
intentional action in the field than in the tab. The short answer to this is that since no
experimental manipulation is involved in naturalistic observation, the chances of
producing artificially induced intentionality through training history are minimized. This
is precisely why ethologists insist on naturalistic observation: to determine what an
animal’ s natural reactions are in view of certain natural environmental constraints that are
found in their natural habitat. It is one thing to unobtrusively note how the environment
and evolution constrain the animal’s range ofbehavior, be it intentional or not, it is quite
another to artificially constrain the animal’s behavioral reactions through experimental
manipulation and create intentional behavior in the animal. Ethologists are interested in
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discovering whether the naturally occurring behavior of animais is intentional. They are
flot interested in creating or training behavior to be intentional.
Mien and Bekoff, in their critique ofHeyes and Dickinson’s theory (1995, 1997),
correctly sum up the main argument oftheir article into four premises. The point of
Heyes and Dickinson’s argument is that an animal’s approach to a food source does not
warrant an intentional account because the animal fails to modify its behavior given
opposite feeding contingencies. A schematic of argument is as follows:
1) An action A warrants an intentional account only if it is caused by an
(instrumental) belief of the form “Action A causes access to some desired
object O.”
2) If an action A would be acquired or persist under contingencies that do not
support the instrumental beliefthat A causes access to O, then A is flot caused
by that belief.
3) The action of approaching food (A) is acquired (by rats) and persists (in
chicks) under contingencies that do not support the belief that approaching
food (O) causes access to the food.
Hence, the action of approaching food performed by chicks, rats and by other species
does flot warrant an intentional account (Allen & Bekoff, 1997:167).
Allen and Bekoff assess the degree to which each premiss supports the conclusion. The
problem with the first premiss is that it is possible that other intentional states besides the
single instrumental belief and the single desire may be causally implicated in an action.
For instance, an animal may be moved to act by a number of beliefs in addition to the
single instrumental one, that are not necessarily instrumental, as well as numerous other
mental states whose content involves attitudes other than belief or desire. Heyes and
Dickinson’s account is thus overly restrictive and overly rudimentary in the sense that it
covers only simple instrumental acts. It should be recalled that Heyes and Dickinson
have admitted that their account is rudimentary in the sense that it only considers the very
basics of intentionality. They justify this sirnplicity by appeai to the fact that ail
inferential processes including higher cognitive abilities will eventually reduce to simple
instrumental beliefs and desires. It could be argued in reply that this type ofreduction,(J although characteristic in behaviorism, might not apply to intentionai states. Perhaps
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some higher-order intentional beliefs and desires and other propositional attitudes cannot
be reduced to simpler, albeit also intentional, states. In the reduction to basic beliefs and
desires, the issue is not whether intentionaÏity is lost along the way, it is rather that the
content ofthose higher order states may be implicated in the execution ofthe end resuit
behavior, and that their causal implications would disappear in the reduction to simpler
states.
It is possible to dispute the second premiss if the case can be made that the
persistence of an irrational behavior is still compatible with causation of the behavior by
a veridical instrumental belief (Allen &Bekoff, 1995:319). Allen and Bekoff advance the
idea that what may seem irrational from one perspective may seem rational from another.
They daim that belief persistence, despite a change in evidence, at least from an
evolutionary perspective does not necessarily provide evidence of inationality. They cite
Gilbert Harman’s article (1986) on beliefpersistence despite conflicting or negating
evidence as further proof that irrational behavior can still be caused by instrumental
beÏiefs. Reasons abound as to why beliefs persist despite evidence to the contrary, from
the view that beliefs are like old habits, hard to break, to the idea that a link has not been
made between the new evidence as discrediting the old beliefs (Harman, 1986:326-330).
It has been experimentally tested and verified in humans that beliefs do in fact persist in
the face ofdiscrediting evidence. This beliefpersistence should not be equated with
irrationality, nor should beÏiefpersistence be considered non-intentional. It is the view of
Allen and Bekoffthat animals may also evidence this tendency for beliefpersistence,
which would invalidate premiss 2.
To invalidate premiss 3, Allen and Bekoff offer the idea that most prey runs away
from the animal that is trying to catch it. In fact, with the exception of certain
domesticated breeds, the food sources for most carnivorous wild anirnals is another
animal who will try to prevent itself from being captured and eaten. This point would
explain why Heyes and Dickinson got the results they did in the experirnents: the chasing
behavior ofthe animal persists when confronted with a retreating food bowl. And so,
interestingly enough, the resuit obtained in the Heyes and Dickinson experiments,
although contrary to their hypothesis and constitutive of a failure of the animal to exhibit(J intentionality actually exactly matches the behavior of the same animal observed in the
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wiÏd. Given this resuit, the behavior of chasing a retreating food bowi should be
considered intentional. This further underlines the need for naturalistic observation at
least as a preliminary to experimental manipulation.
The idea that in natural conditions most prey runs away from its predator
reinforces the point made earlier about the value ofnaturalistic observation. Here is a
good example of the contrast between naturalistic observation and experimental
manipulation with regard to intentional behavior. It would be found through observation
in a naturalistic setting that most prey runs away from its predator. Through
experimental manipulation, Heyes and Dickinson have attempted to rnodify the original
intentional behavior into some other behavioral response, especialiy when one contrasts it
with what occurs in the animal’s natural habitat. The resuit is intentional behavior
according to them, but it appears to be artificially induced ‘intentional’ behavior in rny
opinion. If Heyes and Dickinson sornehow fail to train the new behavior in the animal,
the proper conclusion to draw is not that the animal fails to behave intentionally, but
rather that the behavior modification attempts have failed. Through out all this, the
animal’s natural intentional reaction to run after prey, which is what cognitive ethologists
are interested in, is masked.
How well does Heyes and Dickinson’s theory fare against the set of guidelines
rnentioned at the beginning ofthe chapter? It would be helpful to examine the guidelines
first in a little more detail in order to see why I have chosen them. The first guideline
results from my discussion of Davidson’s views in chapter one. While I don’t think he
succeeds in making the case that conscious awareness of error and thus knowiedge of true
and false behef is a condition for thought or rationafity, I do think that any theory of
intentionality that will be applied to animals must account for the possibility ofmaking
mistakes, otherwise it is incomplete in a fundamental way. In my opinion, the stipulation
that all beliefs be veridical doesn’t allow for the possibility of false belief or enor, in the
animal. Heyes and Dickinson’s theory cannot account for error, and there are a number
of reasons offered by them as justification. The most important reason likely stems from
their stipulation that ail beliefs in the animal must be veridical. They defend the
stipulation by claiming it necessary for empirical testability. But empirical testability
C) would not necessarily be compromised if the theory were to allow for error on the part of
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the animal. One can stili develop a theory that contains an account of error that is
ernpirically testable on animais. The requirement that ail beliefs be veridical would have
to be gotten rid of however, since it doesn’t allow for error, in and of itself. They justify
the fact that ail belief must be veridical by the daim that there isn’t another way to ensure
that the animai’s beliefs are a true reflection of states of affairs in the world. I think it is
possible to construct an experiment that will better track whether the animal’s beliefs
match the state of the world without having to assume that they are ah true. An example
of such an experiment would be to set up a counterfactual situation, and if the animal
fails to change its behavior, it can be interpreted as having committed an error. At any
rate, their theory, lacking an account of error, fails to be adequate in a fundamental way.
The second guidehine has to do with identification of propositional attitude
content, particularly that ofbeliefs. It is designed to meet the challenge that non-verbal
animais are unabie to be sensitive to fine-grained distinctions in content in the way that
language-speaking humans are. In one of its variations, the challenge takes the form of
the underdetermination argument. It will 5e recalled that Davidson discussed the
example ofMalcolm’s dog chasing a cat into a tree. He daims that the dog cannot have
any beliefs about the cat in the tree since we wouldn’t know what particular behiefto
attribute to the dog, and there are too many to choose from. A good theory of
intentionahity should 5e able to narrow down the content ofbehiefs and desires to a
reasonable degree. Heyes and Dickinson’s theory, while it might atternpt to answer
whether an animal’s behavior is intentional or not, does not go the ftwther step of
narrowing down the content of belief and desire. This lack of an ability to narrow
content stems from, in my opinion, the rudimentary variables they have chosen to
manipulate such as thirst and hunger, and with the simple experimental design, a Skinner
box. Moreover, the requirement that ail beliefs be veridical means that identification of
the content of false behiefs will flot 5e considered. The testing of rudimentary states such
as thirst and hunger ensures a restriction on the complexity and the variability of the
content ofthe supporting behiefs. It may turn out to be the case that thirst and hunger do
not translate into desire states. Thirst and hunger are flot themselves mental states.
‘Thirst’ would have to be translated into ‘desire to drink’ and ‘hunger’ with ‘desire to
eat’. Moreover, the simple experimental design puts umiecessary constraints on the
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variability of the actions of the animal, to the point where ail responses are stereotypic
and mechanical.
As we saw in chapter four, a recuning probiem with data interpretation in
experiments is the failure ofthe experirnent to be abie to decide between competing
hypotheses. There are difficulties in establishing that an anirnaÏ’s actions are intentional,
because the data doesn’t offer a clear-cut victory of intentional explanations over non
intentionai ones. As rnentioned, this is in my opinion the greatest obstacle to estabiishing
any sort of intentionality in animais. Heyes and Dickinson’s theory takes us no further in
this regard. If anything their experirnents have estabiished that it is possible to train
artificially-induced intentional behavior in animais. They admit that their difficuity in
isolating the desire criterion makes it impossible to decide whether the behavior is non
intentional ta product of stimulus-response) or whether the behavior is intentionai and
environrnental contingencies have failed to rnodify the rat’s desire.
The fourth guideline is practical implementability. If a theory of intentionality is
going to advance the issue of animal rnentality it must be applicable to animais and be
ernpirically tractable, considering the fact that animais are ‘other minds’ and we don’t
have the access point of human ianguage. Heyes and Dickinson, in developing
behaviorai criteria for the attribution of intentionality, appear to have practical
considerations in mmd. Given that researchers do flot have the common
communicational path of ianguage with animais, they have chosen the next obvious
indicator of intentionality which is behavior. Notwithstanding the fact that they could
have chosen better experiments, their theory is in principie very applicable to animais and
compensates for the lack of language, thus their theory passes the implementability
guideline.
4. Normative Criteria
An important motivation for Heyes and Dickinson to corne up with behaviorai
criteria for the attribution of intentionality, aside from the idea that it is amenable to a iab
setting, is the fact that the creature under study iacks language. Any creature that lacks
language, the argument goes, also iacks sensitivity to the fine-grained intensional
contexts or states of mmd that human language is a perfect vehicle for, and thus cairnot
be attributed intentionality.
David Beisecker (1999) thinks that this point is significant for the argument that
animais possess sorne sort of prelinguistic primitive form of intentionality, a form
possibly matching an earlier evolved form in ourselves. There is more than one form of
intentionality, on Beisecker’s account. He thinks that what has prevented the idea that
different forms exist from being considered is the popular entrenched view that there is
only one type of intentionaiity known as ‘original’ and ail other forms are ‘derived’ from
the original form. This popular view is ofien associated with evolutionary theories such
as that of Millikan and Dennett. The view is that ail intentionality is of a derived forrn
and cornes from mother nature, the ultimate designer. Beisecker bas been led to consider
the possibility of different forms of intentionality by the implausibility of the daim that
heat-seeking missiles and sunflowers have the same type of intentionaiity that animais
have, and that this in turn is the sarne type of intentionality that thinking humans have.
The challenge is then to find a way to distinguish the special sort of directedness
possessed by bona fide thinkers from the more primitive kinds exhibited by these simpier
systems (Beisecker, 1999:283).
On Beisecker’s view, there exists at least two types ofintentionality, one for
linguistic humans and another type for non-linguistic creatures. I suspect that bis
motivation for creating a type of non-linguistic intentionaiity to apply to animais is the
idea that if animais couÏd talk, we would flot hesitate to attribute intentionality to them.
Just because animais don’t have language, there is no reason to think that they don’t aiso
have intentionaiity of another sort. Otherwise the case could then be made that
intentionality is dependent on language. On the other hand, there is no good reason to
think that animais do have intentionality of another form. I think that Beisecker makes an
assumption in order to get his theory off the ground, one which flot only renders bis
theory somewhat question begging, but aiso causes it to fail one ofthe four guidelines.
The assumption is that there exists this second form of non-linguistic intentionaiity and
that it is associated with mental capacity. Instead of asking whether animais couid be
considered intentional beings, which is what the point of ail the theories discussed is, he(J assumes intentionality in humans as weli as in animais, creates a separate type of non-
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linguistic intentionality and shows how it rnight operate in animais according to a
normative criterion. As we will see, the main component of bis tbeory, that of an
expectation, is already intentional.
Beisecker thinks it makes sense to talk about different varieties of intentionaiity
by focusing on the normativity of intentional phenomena. The hallrnark of intentional
states would 5e their susceptibiiity to evaluation. According to bis account, a system is
credited witb intentionai states only if it can be judged as correct or mistaken with respect
to some standard or purpose. The question he begins the discussion with is: In what
sense could a non-iinguistic animal be said to be mistaken about the way things are?
There are a variety of options. The first option is Millikan’s biologicai account (1984,
1993). Briefly, she offers an account of how creatures ofnatural selection exhibit a
genuine bioiogical sort of intentionaiity, based on what the proper function of the
organism’s organs and internai mechanisms is. Wbether or not a creature exhibits
intentionaiity on this account is a matter of whether its organs and internai mechanisms
are carrying out their proper function, determined according to the evoiutionary history of
the item (Beisecker, 1999:285-6).
Beisecker lists a number ofprobierns witb this account. One problem
corresponds to a failure ofmy third guideiine, having to do with the identification of
content. The probiem with theories based on bioiogical function is that determinations of
proper functions are too ad hoc or too indeterminate to underwrite ascriptions of belief or
other states with propositional content. Beisecker thinks that underwriting ascriptions of
belief is a necessary component of intentionai theories. for instance, the proper function
of most creatures from the point of view of evoiution is said to be propagation of the
species. It would be immensely difficuft to somehow work this function into the content
of a belief in a particular situation, especially if the situation appears to bave no relation
to propagation of the species, for instance, that of two animais playing together. The
uitimate weakness with the account on bis view is that it appeals to the wrong sort of
normativity to be a compeliing account of mental representation. The sort of
intentionaÏity ascribed to these creatures, since it bas to do with natural selection, couid
be deemed as a form derived from the original designer, in this case, Mother Nature.(J Beisecker’s probiem with this is that the norms or standards by which the behavior is
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evaluated are not set by the animais thernselves, but rather by the designer ofthe animal,
in this case, mother nature or evolution. The intentionality ofthese animais is thus ofa
derived form since they are assessed as correct or mistaken relative to the standards set
by natural selection. Beisecker thinks it makes more sense to look for a type of
intentionality that is original, perhaps intrinsic to the animal, and thus flot evaiuated only
by biologicai or proper function.
It should be noted here that Beisecker’s stipulation that theories underwrite
ascriptions of belief with content is a little strong. There is no need to stipulate that belief
contents should refer directiy to proper function, on most biological theories of
intentionality. It would suffice to be able to trace the function back to evolution, even in
an indirect way. Note also that it is not necessary, although it is for Beisecker’s account,
that the norms or standards by which the behavior is evaluated intentionally to be set by
the creatures themselves.
Looking next at Dennett’s theory ofthe Intentionai Stance (1987), Beisecker
notes that Dennett is reluctant to distinguish between varieties of intentionality, for
instance, between the type that humans have and the type that animais have. Deirnett
empioys two different arguments to convince us that there is onÏy one type of
intentionality and that there is no difference between original and derived intentionality.
Intuitively, and as will be seen in the next chapter from an examination ofDennett’s
theory, it is obvious that Dennett will not see the point of distinguishing between varieties
of intentionaiity, since his Stance recommends that one treat ail systems ‘as if they are
intentional. If the question of whether systems actually are intentional or not is un
important, then there is no reason to further distinguish between its different varieties.
The first argument that Deimett advances undermines both ofBeisecker’s daims
above, that the content of the belief must contain the source of intentionality and that the
standards or evaiuation be set by the creature itself. The argument, known as the “lack of
intrinsic content determination” argument, states that belief contents are not completely
determinable by reference to the mmd alone. The usual argument offered to make this
point is the famous ‘twin-earth’ thought experiment, where two otherwise
indistinguishable beings are imagined, one from earth and one from another planet.
Ç These two beings can be shown to nonetheless entertain thoughts with different content,
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due to differences in their respective environrnents. This argument is designed to
demonstrate that propositional attitude contents are flot completely deterrnined by activity
inside a subject’s head (Beisecker, 1999:291). More generally it refers to a recuning
problem with trying to attribute specific intentional states to creatures. The worry is the
lack of a clearïy identifiable and definable content in the creature’s so-called intentional
state, in other words the identification of content problem. Briefly, Dennett offers the
reasoning that if other creatures don’t use the same distinction-making rnethod ofhuman
language to conceive of their circumstances, trying to appÏy this distinction-making
method of language to them is flot going to give up a one to one correlation, hence the
identification of content problem. Beisecker is not in agreement that a slight
indeterminacy of content should siide into a rejection ofthe idea that there exist different
varieties of intentionality. In other words, just because one cannot determine with
complete accuracy the contents ofa dog’s thoughts does not mean that there is only one
type of intentionality, of a biological or artifactual sort. Beisecker is of the opinion that
Dennett is able to daim the above because he mistakenly equates “intrinsic” (in the head)
intentionality with “original” (Searle’s term for non-derived) intentionality. So, claiming
that thought content is determined exclusively inside the head amounts to claiming that
intrinsic (construed as original) intentionality is the only true form of intentionality. In
Beisecker’s opinion, to daim that intentionality is determined in the head does not
include the daim that it is the only type that exists.
The second argument of Dennett’s is based on the idea that we hurnans also have
only a derived intentionality from Mother Nature, just as any other creature, because we
are all products of natural selection. As Dennett humorously maintains, the variety of
intentionality that we possess is ftog intentionality from frogs ail the way up to humans,
“(human) belief and desire are iike froggy belief and desire ah the way up”, (Dennett,
1987:112). Since we humans also share the same form of intentionality as frogs, being
creatures of Mother Nature, there is no reason to make a distinction in types of
intentionality between any ofMother Nature’s creatures. There would be no work for
this other type of intentionality to do (De;mett, 1996:54). Beisecker is flot convinced by
this daim of Deimett’s either, which bous down to the daim that rival accounts of(J intentionality preciude one another in favor ofthat of Mother Nature. As Beisecker
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notes, accepting that we are ail creatures ofnaturai selection and thus have derived
intentionality from Mother Nature doesn’t preclude us from having other types of
intentionality as weli. These other types could aiso ultimateiy derive from Mother
Nature. The content of ail our attitudes cannot all be directly reiated to evoiution and
thus evaiuated according to proper function. Aithough Beisecker does flot deny that
humans and other creatures can be evaluated according to proper function from an
evolutionary perspective and thus partake in a form of derived intentionaiity from Mother
Nature, he is unwiliing to end the story here. He thinks that there exist different varieties
of intentionaiity, and that these varieties exist on a normative dimension.
Beisecker’s own theory begins with the process of identifying rational patterns.
He is looking for severai types of possible rationai pattems corresponding to different
ways in which one might adopt an intentional stance. One ofthese types is educabie
capacity. fis theory, in a nutshell, is basically that the flexibility in behavior of an
educable creature gives rise to a speciai sort of accountabiiity or evaluation. This shouid
expiain how a non-bioiogical form of intentionality couid stili be a product of naturai
selection, as Millikan’s and Dennett’s accounts suggest, but goes one step further.
Miiiikan’s and Dennett’s accounts focuses on how a creature’s educable capacity enables
it to fuifihi its natural purpose in the face of environrnentai contingencies and constraints.
Beisecker’s account goes one step further in that it can account for the intentionaiity an
animal might have above and beyond that related to proper function and naturai seiection.
In other words, he is seeking to demonstrate how animais with the capacity to iearn from
their mistakes couid be intelligible apart from the animai’s biological purposes
(Beisecker, 1994:294).
The phenomenon of educability in animais can be expiained by the abstract
adjustment of certain ofthe animai’s cognitive structures cailed expectations.
“Expectations” is meant here in the everyday sense of predictions based on the outcomes
of previous simiiar situations. Animais revise their responsive dispositions over time by
being sensitive to the consequences oftheir responses in certain situations. In other
words, an animal wiii eventuaiiy revise its expectations if environmental conditions
repeatedly fail to respond accordingly. This educable capacity, or the ability to learn
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from one’s mistakes, is also the basis for Colin Allen’s theory of concept attribution, as
will be seen in chapter seven.
Ail expectation-based theories have the same abstract structure, although they
might differ in the details (1999:297). There are three basic components. The first
component is a condition of activation and de-activation that specifies when the
expectation should be turned on and off. The second component is a consequence
condition that will pick out the expected state of affairs associated with the activation of
the expectation. The third component is the response component, that specifies the
responses expected to bring about the consequence condition. The activation of the
expectation condition can be evaluated as correct or mistaken, depending on whether it
brings about the desired consequence or flot. Expectation based creatures can be defined
as those whose responses are governed in part by the consequence conditions oftheir
cunently activated expectations (1999:297). Beisecker gives no account of how the
activationlde-activation, consequence or response components are manifested physically
in a creature. Although he gives examples oftwo phenomena that are explainable by
expectations, the problem is basically that it is difficuit to identify the three components
in any given example and this becomes a real problem for the theory.
There are two phenomena found in the literature of leaming theory in psychoiogy,
‘blocking’ and ‘latent leaming’, that resist explanation in terms ofclassical stimulis
response learning theory. These two phenomena are easily explained on an expectation
account, according to Beisecker. The first phenomenon of blocking refers to the apparent
failure of a new stimulus to become associated with an already existing stimulus-response
pairing in the animal. for instance, if the S-R pairing between a beli and the delivery of
food has already been established in the animal, it is very difficult if not impossible to
then get the animal to respond if a new stimulus, say a tone, is then paired with the food
delivery. It is as if the first associated stimulus blocks or prevents the second stimulus
from being associated into a new pairing. On a classical conditioning account, the new
stimulus should eventually be paired with the original stimulus, but this is not what
happens, and so the theory is at a loss to explain the phenomenon. This phenomenon of
blocking can be explained by expectations. The explanation is that the animal fails to
generate the new expectation, that it should respond at the sound ofthe tone, because it is
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using the original one, the bell, to predict an outcome of events with reasonable success.
The success at prediction with the original stimulus prevents new pairings from being
made. Although Beisecker does not speli it out, we can infer what the process is: the
success ofthe original response component prevents its de-activation and subsequent
activation of a new response that is associated with the tone, because the original
consequence condition is successful for getting food.
Expectation-based accounts can also better explain the phenomenon known as
latent learning. Classical conditioning theories are also unabte to explain the
phenomenon of latent learning, again because the pattem of explanation fails outside the
power of classical conditioning. Latent learning is leaming which occurs usually in the
absence ofreward or reinforcement, which is why classical conditioning is at a loss to
explain the phenomenon. The leaming is flot manifested in the performance of the
animal until some period afterwards, hence the term ‘latent’. Examples of latent learning
usually occur in pre-training phases of experiments, such as in the case where a rat that is
allowed to explore a maze prior to the experiment is found to be able to navigate it more
quickly in the experimental phase than a rat who has not had such previous exposure.
Classical conditioning caimot explain latent learning because it cannot explain any type
of Ïearning in the absence of rewards or reinforcement. Ail iearning is a resuit of reward
or conditioning on their account, and if there is no reinforcement or reward to point to as
responsibie for soliciting the behavior in the animais, then the animal cannot be said to
have learned anything. Expectation-based accounts can explain latent learning in part
because they are flot constrained by a pure stimulus response structure. In the
experimental situation ofa rat navigating a maze, the rat’s previous exposure to the maze
allows it to form expectations that then allow the rat to exploit this expectation-based
knowledge to the pursuit ofnew goals, such as food rewards.
It is in attempting to generate a concrete example where the three components of
the theory are identified that brings out the main problem with Beisecker’s theory. Let us
take the example of a primate standing at the bottom of a tree that has bananas out of
reach in the higher branches. The primate forms the expectation “Shaking this particular
branch ofthe tree will cause the bananas to fall to the ground”. Presumably the condition
C of activationlde-activation will then be activated. The response component is presumably
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that the primate begin shaking the tree branch. The consequence condition is presumably
that bananas will fali from the tree. The problem here is that it is difficuit to determine in
advance whether or flot the activation condition has been activated, and also it is difficult
to determine if one has correctly identified the other two components.
Although Beisecker’s account is difficuit to implement on a practical level, it does
not, like Millikan’s or Dennett’s, rest on a determination ofthe purposes for which a
creature has been designed or selected. In fact, as Beisecker notes, the goals ofthe
organism may even collide with Mother Nature’s purposes. The bonus is that we can
identify the expectation configurations that are likely to hinder a creature’ s attainrnent of
its goals, and cal! these configurations expectation errors. Errors can be of two forms.
An error of commission occurs when a creature’ s expectation is activated in a situation in
which the expectation’s response would fail to bring about the satisfaction of its
consequence condition. In ordinary terms this would correspond to any situation where a
creature executes a movement or an action to accomplish a goal that does not in fact
accomplish the goal. A mundane example would be a basebail player who swings too
late on a pitch. An enor of omission occurs whenever the response of an expectation that
is not activated would in fact bring about the satisfaction of its consequence condition. In
this situation a creature would fail to execute an action that would bring about the desired
resuit. To take the baseball example again, the player would not swing at a pitch that
tumed out to be well enough placed to be potential home run.
There are two appealing features to the account, as Beisecker points out, both of
which answer challenges raised by Davidson in the first chapter. The first has to do with
Davidson’s daim that only a creature with language can evidence the fined grained
sensitivity to intensiona! contexts associated with the attribution of genuine intentional
states. On Beisecker’s account, a creature need not have language and yet stiil evidence
by its behavior relatively fine-grained distinctions in intentional content. The distinctions
in the content are realized by differences in the creature’s expectations. Distinct
expectations may share the same circumstances of appropriate application, since the
situations in which one expectation would be satisfied may happen to une up with
situations in which another would be satisfied. The same is not true for the content ofthe(J expectations themselves however. The particular means by which the circumstances are
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picked out would differ for each expectation, since the circumstances are each cornprised
of different expectation components. Distinctions in expectations can 5e demonstrated
by changing the conditions ofthe animal’s environrnent. So the fine distinctions in
language that humans are easily able to verbalize are analogous to distinctions in
expectations that an animal activates, depending on the circumstances (1999:299). The
only small problem with this is that environmental conditions are what dictate the fine
grainedness of expectations. The only way to test the theory is with counterfactuals, just
as it was with Chater and Heyes’ theory.
The theory also accounts for the rational responsiveness to error that Davidson
daims is required for any creature to be deemed rational. As we saw in chapter one,
Davidson daims that rational responsiveness to error complete with the element of
surprise is necessary for any attribution ofrationality. On Beisecker’s account, a creature
with educable capacity displayed in the form of expectations bas the capacity to revise
expectations in the event of error, and even to take steps to avoid such errors in the
future, which would indicate a capacity to leam from one’s mistakes. Implicit in the
recognition of error is the element of surprise, the recognition that things did not turn out
as one predicted. Both these elements are present in expectation-based behavior.
5. Evaluation
The motivating factor for Beisecker’s theory is to corne up with different varieties
of intentionality. The intuition is that sunflowers, computers, animals and humans cannot
ail have the same single type of intentionality. Generally speaking, however, I think that
rather than justify the need for different varieties of intentionality, Beisecker has rnerely
assumed different varieties of intentionality evaluated on a normative dimension and
shown how this story might be piayed out in the case of animais. Beisecker’s theory is
certainly an improvement over Heyes and Dickinson’s, although there are a few parallels
that give it the same problems as theirs does in the realm of practical implementability.
With regard to my four guidelines, Beisecker’s theory appears to pass two ofthe
four. It will be recalled that two ofthe guidelines corne from rny discussion of
Davidson’s views in chapter one. A theory must have an account of eiror and should be(J able to narrow down the content of mental states to a reasonable extent. As Beisecker
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points out, an expectation-based theory can account for errors made by the animal. If the
animaÏ’s expectation does not bring about the required response, it can revise that
expectation in order to then bring about the desired response. The theory goes even
further in that it gives an account of how creatures can learn from their errors.
There remain two problems with regard to error on an expectation based account
however. One is the difficulty in identifying errors, and it ultimateÏy stems from a
difficulty in identifying expectations. As mentioned, Beisecker cites two types of errors,
those of commission and those of omission. While errors of commission are easy to
identify; the animal executes an action or movement that does flot resuit in its expectation
being ftulfihled, errors of omission are harder to identify and at the least are revisionist in
the sense that we have to know what the animal’s expectation was in the first place in
order to note if it was fulfihled or flot. The animal’s lack of execution of a movement or
action will obviously flot give any dues. This problem stems ultimately from a failure on
the part ofthe observer to be able to identify expectations in the animal. As with Heyes
and Dickinson’s account, on Beisecker’s account one can identify expectations only by
varying environmental conditions and thus only demonstrate changes in expectations.
My guideline only asks that the theory be able to give an account of error, however, and
50 Beisecker’s theory does pass the error guideline, although it is flot a huge
improvement over Heyes and Dickinson’s theory in this respect.
As for the ability to narrow down the content of mental states to a reasonable
degree, Beisecker points out that expectation based theories can demonstrate a certain
amount of fine-grained distinctions in content. Differences in goals of the animal
correspond directly to differences in the expectations ofthe animal. Distinctions in
content ofthe expectations are realized by distinctions in expectations. However, as
mentioned above, there is no way to identify particular expectations except by
demonstrating changes in them. It is only by varying conditions in either the
environment or the goals of the animal that will provide distinctions in content of the
anirnal’s mental states. Beisecker’s theory thus passes the error guideline, but only
barely.
Looking next at how the theory fares with regard to the third and fourth
guidelines, the ability to discern intentional from non-intentional behavior and practical
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implementability, it is here that problems are found. Regarding the ability to discern
between intentional and non-intentional behavior, a theory is already halfway there if it
can narrow down the content of beliefs and desires, and Beisecker’s tbeory can do this.
That is, if the theory can say something specific about the actual content of the animal’s
beliefs and desires, then it should also be able to show that explanations in terms of
intentional attributions are different from the non-mental alternative explanations.
Unfortunately Beisecker’s theory is concerned with demonstrating that varieties of
intentionality exist. It thus begs the question ofwhether a state is worthy ofbeing
deemed intentional in the first place. This is due mostly to the fact that bis notion of
expectation is itself intenfional. It thus fails the third criterion.
Beisecker’s theory unfortunately also faif s the guideline ofpractical
implementability. He gives no possibilities for experimentation in bis elaboration of the
theory. 11e relegates justification for the lack ofthis feature to a footnote. In it he states
that he is flot trying to show that any particular creatures are expectation mongerers
because that is the work of ethologists, not philosophers. On his view, he has constructed
the phulosophical theory, and ethologists should be able to take this theory and apply it to
animals. Judging from my difficulty in implernenting his theory in a concrete example, it
does not appear to be easily applicable. The problem, also stemming from his lack of
furnishing concrete examples, us the difficulty in identifying and distinguishing between
the three components. Moreover, according to bis account of error and content
identification and the fact that errors of omission and expectations can only be
demonstrated by showing change in them, bis theory would have to be tested with
counterfactual conditions. As we saw with Heyes and Dickinson’s theory, counterfactual
conditions make constraints on the variety ofresponses an animal could display, as well
as masking the possibility of error commission. In the next chapter, I will be looking at
an example of a theory that bas actually been put to the implementability test in the
natural environment of the species, that of The Intentional Stance conceived of by Daniel
Dennett.
Cliapter Six
Intentïonalïty II
1. Introduction
In this chapter I wiii be exarnining two more theories of intentionality that apply
to animais and submitting them to my four guideline evaluation. The first is Daniel
Dennett’s famous Intentional Stance. fis theory is particularly interesting because it has
been adopted by cognitive ethologists and even tested ‘in the field’. It thus represents a
mai or advance in the field of cognitive ethology with regard to investigation into the
mental states of animals. However it does suffer from problems, most stemming from the
idea that the theory has been touted as being pragmatic. It is thus weak on matters such
as predictive power and the issue of whether the mental states of animais can reaily be
deemed intentional. The last theory I will be examining in the chapter, that of Jonathan
Bennett, is an improvement on these two matters and represents the most far-reaching
advance in applicability of theories of intentionality to animais to date, in my opinion.
Bennett’s theory bas the further bonus of solving the methodological problem
encountered in chapter four, that of discerning between intentional and non-intentional
states in the animal.
2. Intentionality à la Daniel Dennett
Daniel Dennett has had a iife-long interest in the notion of intentionality, dating
from his first book on the topic pubiished in 1969 called “Content and Consciousness”.
In that book Dennett was engaged in developing a scientific theory of the mmd. He
ernployed an abridged notion of intentionality to get him out of a well-known
philosophical dilemma regarding scientific theories ofmind, the presumed
incompatibility of mental discourse with scientific theories. The dilemma is briefly to try
to find the point of interaction between physical properties and properties of the mmd,
which are non-physical. If one says the two spheres do interact, one is at a toss to explain
how mental events, being non-physical, can cause changes in the physical world
C (1969:3). In attempting to develop a scientific theory ofthe mi, Deimett treated the
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most important obstacle to this endeavor, the intentionalist thesis. The thesis, originally
conceived ofby Franz Brentano, makes a distinction between mental and physical
phenomena, that mental phenomena exhibit intentionality and physical phenomena do
not, thus the mental mode of discourse is ultimately incompatible with the physical mode,
and no translations, reductions or unifications are logically possible (1969: x). This
distinction is a major obstacle to Dennett’s attempted construction ofa scientific theory
of mmd.
Brentano bonowed the term intentionality ftom medieval philosophy. The
original conception of it is captured by his statement “Every mental phenornena is
characterized by what the scholastics ofthe middle ages called the ‘intentional
inexistence’ of an object, and what we would cail the reference to a content, a direction
upon an object.” (Dennett, 1969:20). The phrase ‘direction upon an object’ means that
one cannot want without wanting something, one cannot hope without hoping something,
and yet the object in ail these cases need flot exist in the sense ofphysical objects
existing. The phrase ‘reference to a content’ refers to the fact that in addition to the
direction upon an object, intentionality can also manifest itself as a relation to a
proposition. Brentano’s intentionality thesis thus divides into two parts: some mental
phenomena are directed upon an object, and other mental phenomena are related to a
content or proposition or meaning (Dennett, 1969:20). Since then, another caveat has
been added to the thesis: no statement or statements about non-intentional phenomena
can have the same truth conditions as any statement about intentional phenomena.
Dennett modifies Brentano’s original conception of intentionality in two ways.
first, the reaim of applicability that the thesis applies to will be enlarged from the more
obvious mental terms to include the entire realm ofpsychological mental terms. This is
because there are a host of terms that are not obviously mental, such as the term ‘hunt’
and ‘search’, but that still appear to warrant intentional characterization. Second,
intentionality will no longer be a construct that divides phenomena from phenomena, but
rather sentences from sentences. Dennett raises the level of discussion from phenomena
to talk about phenomena, that is, to a discussion of how we describe or allude to certain
phenomena in our ordinary language, in other words, sentences. This coincides nicely
C
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with Dennett’s view that there are probably flot aiways actual phenomena for intentional
sentences to be about (Dennett, 1969:22).
3. The Intentional Stance
Dennett bonows this newly reformed conception of Intentionality and
mcorporates it mto his theory of Intentional Systems, out of which arises the famous
Intentional Stance (1971,1978,1 987). Intentional systems are those systems whose
behavior can be explained and predicted by relying on ascriptions of beliefs and desires
to the system. The defining characteristic of intentional systems is that a particular thing
is an intentional system only in relation to the strategies of someone who is trying to
explain and predict its behavior. That is, an object is flot labeled as an intentional system
except in the service ofpredictions and explanations made about it. Any ontological
questions about the true nature ofthe object, for instance, are not answered by taking the
intentional stance.
There are three possible stances to take toward a system: the physical stance, the
design stance and the intentional stance. The physical stance is based on knowledge of
the physical constitution of the object. One can make predictions in the physical stance
by determining the physical constitution ofthe object and the physical nature ofthe
impingements upon it, and use one’s knowledge ofthe laws ofphysics and nature to
predict outcomes of input (Deimett, 1987:16). for instance, taking the physical stance
toward a tree informs us that pruning the lower branches of a tree will stimulate denser
branches and thicker foliage. Information about the malfunction of objects can be gotten
from taking this stance. For instance, one can determine if mechanical breakdowns have
occurred from this level.
The design stance is adopted and works best when one is making predictions
about mechanical systems. One relies on the notion of function as the basis for one’s
predictions. function is understood as a teleological notion, an answer to the question of
what purpose bas the object, under optimal conditions, been designed to carry out
(1978:4). As we saw in the last chapter, evolutionary theories such as Millikan’s ascribe
intentionality on the basis ofthe design stance. Design predictions are made based on the(J assumption that the parts and/or system are functioning properly. Predictions are made
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based on knowledge ofthe object’s ftmctional design, inespective ofthe physical
constitution ofthe object. One can only make predictions ofthese systems based on what
the designed behavior of the system is. One cannot predict what the behavior of a system
will be if one is using it for something other than what it has been designed for. For
instance, one cannot predict how a computer monitor will serve as a fish tank, since it bas
flot been designed for this purpose.
The third possible stance to take toward an object is the intentional stance. An
object viewed from this stance is an intentional system. Predictions and explanations
from the intentional stance are gotten based on the ascription oftwo things to the system:
the possession of certain information and the idea that the system is directed by certain
goals. It is then a short step to cali this possession of information the system’ s beliefs and
the goals its desires. Predictions made in this stance are based on the idea that the agent
will act to further its goals in light of its beliefs (Dennett. 1987:17). Adopting the
intentional stance also carnes with it an assumption of rationality. Rationality for
Dennett’s purposes means optimal design relative to a goal (Deimett, 1971:89).
Dennett daims that our commonsense predictions and explanations ofbehavior in
humans and in animais are intentionai, and we regularly assume rationality in both
humans and animals. In fact, he daims, most experimental psychologists would have
trouble designing experiments were it not for the implicit adoption of the intentional
stance, with its assumption of rationality, toward lab rats and other such creatures, in
order to predict how they would react. He is quick to add, however, that even though we
might view both a computer and an animal as an intentional system, we do not adopt the
same attitude toward the computer as we do toward the animal that is conscious and
rational. The rationality ofthe computer is said to be pinched and artificial relative to the
animal’s rationaiity (1978:8).
The objection could be made here that belief in logical truths is a necessary
component ofrationality, and yet we do not honestly believe that animais share our belief
in logical truths. Dennett does believe that animais share our beliefs in logicai truths, or
at least they can be said to follow the truths of logic. There is quite a difference between
merely following the truths of logic and possessing beliefs in logical truths. If following
Ç the truths of logic is a component of rationality, then the animal can be said to follow the
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truths of logic by fiat. The animal may flot have the further capacity of formulating these
truths into proper beliefs. If truths of logic are a matter of discovery, which implies that
they already exist, then it is flot a far stretch to say that animals foflow them. The animal
does flot need to follow all ofthe logical truths, just as it need flot display perfect
rationality. The justification is the same as it is with regard to rationality: an actual
intentional system is imperfect, i.e., it does flot always follow logical truths, just as it
need flot always display perfect rationality (1978: 10-11).
If the animal does flot necessarily have logical truths in its repertoire ofbeliefs,
what beliefs can the animal be said to have in its repertoire, on Dennett’s account? With
regard to the attribution of beliefs in a more general manner in the intentional stance,
there is a rule of thumb, according to Dennett. It is the following: attribute as beliefs ail
the truths relevant to the system’s interests or desires that the system’s experience to date
has made available. This rule of thumb will of course tend to unrealistically inflate the
repertoire of actual beliefs in a creature. Even humans do not have access to ail possible
true beliefs about a phenomenon at any given moment, given lapses in memory,
imperfectness of cognitive processing and the like. More irnportantly however, this rule
will tend to overlook the possibility ofenor, or false belief occuring in the animal.
Dennett daims that false belief always arises from true belief. As he puts it “the
falsehood lias to start somewhere, and the false beliefs tliat are reaped grow in a culture
medium of true beliefs.” (Dennett, 1987:18). He later states that an implication ofthe
intentional strategy is that true believers mainly believe truths (IBID: 19). As we shall see
iater, Dennett has merely sidestepped the issue of error.
There is one more aspect to add to the above description of the Intentional Stance,
and that is the different levels or scales of ‘embedding’ that are possible within tlie
intentional stance (1927:244-7). The first possibility is zero-grade intentionality, that is,
no intentional states are ascribed to the system. This level is flot included within
Dennett’s scale, since it is not intentional in nature. It conesponds to the level of
description refened to in the terminoiogy ofthe behaviorists. The first actual grade in the
intentional stance is first-order intentionality, where the system lias beliefs and desires,
but no beliefs about beliefs. Norman Malcolm’s distinction between mere beiiefs and(J beliefs about beliefs is an example of first and second-order intentionality respectively.
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There is no embedding of belief in the first-order intentional belief, and there is one level
of embedding in the second-order. A second-order intentiona! system, in addition to this
level of embedding, can entertain beliefs about its own beliefs as well as beliefs about the
beliefs of others. Third-order intentional systems have two levels of embedding and are
ofthe nature of ‘Jack hoped that Jili didn’t know that he Iiked her’. Fourth and fiflh
order intentional systems are theoretically possible, but difficuit to follow even for
humans.
Dennett entertains a possible objection here. If the system being described as
intentionai is an inanimate object such as a computer, the question arises as to whether
the computer reaÏÏy possesses beliefs and desires (1978:7). Dennett’s answer is that this
question is beside the point, it doesn’t matter whether the computer really has beliefs and
desires or not, we ascribe beliefs and desires only in order to predict and explain the
behavior of the computer. One ascribes beliefs and desires to a system only in so far as
this allows one to predict the behavior ofthe system or explain the behavior ofthe
system. The intentional stance does not treat of the question whether the system really
possesses beliefs and desires, and so Dennett’s view is ofien referred to as ‘as-if
intentionality’. Thus the decision to adopt the intentional stance is a pragmatic one.
Another possible objection couid be raised here, that the tactic ofimposing the
human categories of belief desire, rationality and the like on other species in order to
then predict their behavior is anthropomorphizing (1978:9). Dennett’s answer to this is to
agree that it is indeed anthropomorphizing, but that it is conceptually innocent
anthropomorphizing. Ail that is being transported into the other species’ world are the
three categories of rationality, perception and action. While it rnight be anthropornorphic
to attribute hopes, fears, attitudes or outlooks to an animal, the same cannot be said for
action or perception since the animal already has these capacities. Moreover, these
capacities are flot uniquely human and these capacities are flot propositional in nature.
Dennett adds that we are not assuming that the other species shares any of what might be
later discovered to be peculiarly human attributes, such as particular beliefs and desires
etc (Dennett, 1971:93). Moreover, as noted in chapter two, it has not yet been established
that there are any attributes that are peculiar to humans, except perhaps the capacity for
C human language.
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Dennett anticipates yet another potential objection when he gets to the question of
what systems can be properly described as intentional and which cannot (1987:23). In
other words, are there any exclusions to the reaim ofthe intentional? One would be
reluctant to attribute intentionality to a lectern, for instance. What disqualifies an object
from being intentional? The deciding factor, according to Dennett, is if we get no more
predictive or explanatory power from taking the intentional stance than we antecedently
had for the object when we took the design or physical stances. In such cases where no
gain in explanatory power is achieved, it would be better to instead step down a level or
two and take either the physical or the design stance toward the object. Deciding whether
or flot to move up to the level oftaking the intentional stance has to do with behavioral
complexity. If the behavior ofthe system under scrutiny is sufficiently complex as to flot
be adequately captured or exhaustively explained by either the design or the physical
stances, one moves up to the level ofthe intentional. Dennett is making reference here to
the same type of phenomena that occurred in chapter tbree having to do with explanatory
range of a theory. The theory of mmd explanation for an experimental outcome was
ofien different from the non-mental explanation in that it had a further reaching
explanatory range. This is presumably due to the fact that the animal’s behavior in the
experirnental results is sufficiently complex as to require explanation by attribution of
mental states rather than by mechanistic explanations.
Now that the above description ofthe intentional stance is complete, let’s see how
it fares when applied to the project of cognitive ethology. Here is how Dennett sees the
cunent situation in cognitive ethology. He believes that the new generation of cognitive
ethologists is looking for a new theoretical vocabulary in which to carry out and describe
their research and findings, the current behaviorist one being too confining (1987:237).
Dennett is not, however, opting that researchers create a new mid-level language as
Davidson envisions. The situation is analogous in philosophy concerning the status and
role of folk psychological terms (intentional or mental state terms). Although the
common folk use folk psychology to great success in interpreting behavior, it is the
opinion of some that folk psychology will be repiaced with more exact methods once ail
is discovered about humans from a neurological point of view. The question for
cognitive ethology is: could the everyday language terms of be1ief desire, understanding
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etc. also serve as the suitably rigorous abstract language in which to describe the
cognitive competencies of animais? We have seen the dangers implicit in taking two
possible paths as a resuit of a positive answer to this question. In answering yes’ and
applying these everyday human language terms to describe the competencies of animais,
ethoiogists first risk being labeled anthropocentric in their application of inappropriate
terms to the animal because these terms are for humans only and humans are a separate
category from animals. Secondly, ethologists are lefi with the objection that these terrns
unnecessariiy inflate the competencies of animais because the terms themselves carry
meanings and connotations that just aren’t within the capabilities of animais. If they
choose flot to use everyday language terminology, ethologists are lefi to invent a new
terminology to better describe the competencies of animais that wouid fail midway
between the mind-fuil and rnind-less classification levels. As we saw in chapter two,
why should ethologists move straight to creating a new vocabulary when the current ones
have not yet been eliminated as possibilities?
Dennett believes that the answer to the question of whether we should risk using
ordinary language terminology to apply to animais is a quaiified ‘yes’, provided we are
carefril and understand the assumptions and implications ofthe strategy we must adopt
(namely the Intentional Stance) when we use these words. The most obvious implication
is that nothing is stated from an ontological point of view about whether the animal really
is an intentional system. One only attributes beliefs and desires in order to be able to
predict or explain the system’s behavior.
To illustrate the application ofthe intentional stance to a system, Dennett takes
the example ofa vervet monkey giving an alarrn caIl (1987:242-9). Vervet monkeys are
a species ofmonkey found primarily in Kenya and the topic ofresearch oftwo eminent
cognitive ethologists, Dorothy Cheney and Robert Seyfarth. Theoretically, the vervet’s
behavior in a particular situation could be described either by ascribing zero-order
intentionality or by first or even second order intentionality. The language of zero-order
intentionaiity, used by behaviorists and often occuning in journal articles in animal
behaviorjournals, ascribes no beliefs, desires or any type of mental states whatsoever. In
this case a zero-order explanation would state that the monkey is subject to three flavors
of anxiety: snake-anxiety, Ïeopard-anxiety and eagle-anxiety. When one of these three
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predators enters the fieïd of vision ofthe monkey. the monkey associates the predator
with danger and has the reaction of uttering a loud vocalization of one of the three
flavors. This vocalization has one ofthree possible triggering effects: sending fellow
monkeys into the trees if it’s a leopard, out of the trees if it’s a hawk, or fleeing on foot if
it’s a snake. The above scenario could also be described in terms ofstimulus-response
chains. The stimulus of either a snake, leopard or eagle in the monkey’ s field of vision
elicits the response of an alarm cail in the monkey, and the alarm cal! of the monkey acts
as a stimulus to his conspecifics, whose response is to fun up into the trees.
A first-order intentional explanation would be that the rnonkey gives the alarrn
cali to wam other monkeys that a predator is near, or that the rnonkey wants his friends to
act accordingly in order to escape the predator. Morgan’s canon, according to Dennett,
dictates that we should choose the least sophisticated ofthe explanations. The original
expression ofthe canon by Loyd Morgan is the following: In no case may we interpret an
action as the outcome of the exercise of a higher psychical faculty, if it can be interpreted
as the outcome of the exercise of one which stands lower on the psychical scale
(Budiansky, 1998:xxx). The problem with the canon is that the terms higher and lower
have flot been defined, nor have criteria been given for judging one explanation as lower
or higher than the other, except in relation to each other. The most glaring problem is
thus to determine which oftwo competing interpretations is the higher and which is the
lower, so that a choice can then be made. Deimett thinks that following the canon is the
wrong approach, and has in fact prevented the case that higher order explanations are at
work from being made for many years (Dennett, 1987:246). This has perhaps
contributed to the present situation where cognitive ethologists are looking around for
another vocabulary, the present behaviorist one is too confining. Additionally, it should
be noticed that perhaps the behaviorist and intentional interpretations correspond to two
different levels of explanation that are possible for the sarne piece of behavior. Hurnan
behavior can also ofien be described in terms of zero-order intentionality, but we do not
engage in that practice because the explanations would be severely complex and long
winded. It is nonetheless possible to explain a good portion of human behavior in either
intentional or behaviorist terms. Why should we bother with the complexity and
lengthiness of behaviorist explanations when a convenient shorthand intentional terrn is
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availabie? Dennett seems to think that the fact that animal behavior can always be
explained in terms of a lower-order theory is no longer interesting to ethologists. He
speculates that they would rather find out what gains in predictive and expianatory power
wouid accrue if they were to venture into intentional characterizations ofbehavior
(Dennett, 1987:247)
In addition to the fact that current explanations are too confining, Dennett
suggests that the popular laboratory experimental rnethod ruies out everything but the
stereotypic behavior of a species that most ofien shows no evidence of intelligence at ail.
It shows no intelligence precisely because behavioral responses are heavily pre-trained,
stereotypic, and flot spontaneous in the least. As an example ofthis situation, Dennett
notes the difficulty Premack and Woodruff have had in establishing that primates have a
theory ofmind. Alternative reasons given by antagonists (such as Heyes) for the
experimental results ofien refer to extensive pre-training in the primate (1987:250).
Dennett also notes that anecdotes have a less than stellar reputation in the
scientific community. Anecdotes are flot an accepted form of evidence, prirnarily
because they consist in a single unobtrusive observation trial in the natural habitat of the
species. Because no experimental intervention is involved, they lack the appropriate
controls and therefore rigor. However, Whyten and Byrne, in an effort to tighten up the
status ofthe anecdote, have developed two criteria that serve this purpose. The first is to
compile a series of anecdotes, taking care to ensure that each anecdote provides evidence
for the same proposed phenomenon, and the second is that the anecdotes must corne from
independent observers (Heyes, 1998:110). Providing a number of anecdotes that ah refer
to the same piece ofbehavior or phenomenon should get around the objection that a
single instance does not arnount to evidence. The fact that each anecdote cornes from a
different observer should give some rigor to anecdotes. For instance, one cannot appeal
to the fact that since ail the evidence cornes from a single observer that the observer must
be biased or prirned to find that sort of evidence.
Taking note of the above considerations on the strengths and weaknesses of
anecdotes and experirnents, Deimett has corne up with a research method that is a hybrid
ofthe two methods of investigation (1987:250-3). Known as the Sherlock Holrnes
C method, it is an intentionality hitmus test in that it is an engine for generating or designing
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anecdotal circumstances and predicting the outcornes ofthese situations. The method is
anecdotal in nature since it only contains one trial and is usually conducted in the
animal’s natural habitat. However, it is an improvement on anecdotes in that controlled
manipulation of variables is carried out. Additionally, a prediction is made as to how the
resuits will turn out, which is a classic characteristic of experimentation. In addition to
the characteristic ofhypothesis testing, Dennett’s method also is conducted under
controlled or artificial circumstances, and some aspect ofthe target subject’s behavior is
manipulated, just as with laboratory experimentation. The main advantage this hybrid
method has over pure experimentation is the fact that the animal’s performance cannot be
attributed to intense training, since only a single trial is conducted. Most importantly, the
animal’s performance is not restricted and artificial, since the test trial is conducted in the
animal’s natural habitat as opposed to an artificial laboratory environment.
The Sherlock Holmes method entails setting up a one-shot experiment that will
predict a particular and peculiar outcome, due to the variables that are manipulated in the
experiment, based on what the intentional stance predicts the system under observation
will do. The method gets its name from the fictional stories in which the crime-solving
detective Sherlock Holmes sets up artificial circumstances in order to find out who
committed the crime he is attempting to solve. A popular example involves attempting to
catch a thief who bas hidden the items he or she has stolen in various other rooms of the
house. In this situation Mr. Holmes would gather ail the suspected guests in the house
into the same room and have his assistant yell ‘FIRE!’. He would then watch very
careftulÏy to see which ofthe suspects attempted to move the items, thereby leading him
to the perpetrator oftbe crime.
There is a theoretical downside to tbis particular method however, stemming from
the fact that animais, just like humans, are not perfect intentional beings. Deimett
predicts that animals will fail some rather baseline tests and yet pass other rather
sophisticated ones (1927:255). The fact that the experiments can only be performed once
is a further problem. If the animal fails the test one cannot attribute it to chance or
rnisunderstanding and then just perform the experiment again. The urge to demote the
species on the basis of it having failed a rather easy test shouid be suppressed, however.
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Q 4. Intentionality in the FïeldThe interesting thing about Dennett’s theory is that it did flot remain entirely ‘in
the armchair’, within the reaÏrn ofthe theoretical, he has had a chance to test it ‘in the
field’ with two researchers that study Vervet Monkeys in Kenya. Dorothy Cheney and
Robert Seyfarth, familiar with Dennett’s work, approached him, thinking that his theory
provided a good theoretical framework in which to describe their investigations. They
thought that perhaps some ofhis suggestions could even be irnplemented in the field.
His proposai to Cheney and $eyfarth was to carry out the $herlock Holmes
Method. The first task is to make a tentative catalogue ofthe vervets’ needs. These
needs include those having to do with survival, such as getting food and shelter, as well
as informational needs, such as knowing where young family members and possible
predators are located. The next step is to adopt the intentional stance complete with the
assumption of rationality, acting as if the vervets are rational beings with beliefs and
desires, based on this compiled catalogue ofneeds. The idea is to translate this list of
needs into a set ofbeliefs and desires. This would entail transiating the vervet’s need for
food, for instance, into the desire to obtain bernes from a tree, or translating the
informational need for the location ofpredators into the beliefthat there is an eagle
circling overhead. The next step is to frame some hypotheses, based on how the vervets
ought to behave given the beliefs and desires ascribed to them. A possible hypothesis
based on beliefs about predators would be that the vervet should warn bis family
members and cohort that the eagle is nearby. The last task is to test the hypothesis and
sec if the outcome matches the predictions that were made based on ascribing
intentionality to the vervets. That is, do the vervets behave as they ought to have behaved
under the circumstances?
Applying this method to research in cognitive ethology has produced some rather
ingenious experiments. The most popular one developed by the researchers involves a
direct adaptation ofthe SherÏock Holmes ‘fire’ situation. It involves setting up a stimulus
from an artificial source, in this case playing back pre-recorded alarm cails from speakers
hidden in the bush nearby. The hope is that the monkeys will respond to the fake
warning call in the same way they would if it came from a live conspecific instead of a
speaker, otherwise the experiment is invalidated.
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The downside to the method, according to Dennett, flot immediateiy apparent in
the armchair building of the theory, is that the information that needs to be imparted to
the subjects in the ‘set-up’ portion ofa typical experiment is ofien imparted verbaliy
(1998:303). The mindset that Sheriock Holmes must cajole his suspect into in order to
bring out the guiity response is ofien accompiished verbaliy. When non-verbal animais
are the subjects of study it is impossible to set up the ‘trap’ properly when your subjects
do not have language. This point is well taken, but I do not think that it is quite the
downside that Dennett makes it out to be. Researchers of non-verbal animais are weli
aware ofthis fact and reguiarly take it into consideration in designing their experirnents.
Certainly many ofthe experiments performed on animais do not entail trying to discover
intentionai states; many ofthe experiments are designed rather to discover the presence
of other cognitive capacities. On the other hand, if intentionality is somehow manifest or
detectable in behavior, then the fact that more ingenuity is required in designing these
experiments should not be taken for the impossibility of designing experiments that will
capture intentionality.
A second problem, much more difficuit to mitigate, is shielding the vervets from
certain information in the setting up of circumstances in a fake situation (1998:303). For
instance, when Cheney and Seyfarth set up fake aiarm calis that come from a speaker
instead of a fellow vervet, what could potentialiy ruin the experiment is if the vervets
catch on to the fact that the calis are not coming from a feiiow vervet, but from a speaker.
The following is a typical scenario. Cheney and Seyfarth set up the experiment by hiding
the speaker in a bush and cueing the tape to the exact cali they wish to play by a target
vervet. They then have to wait untii the target vervet moves out of sight before piaying
the cail. What ofien happens is that the target vervet re-emerges into view before they
have a chance to play the cali for the other vervets, and so they have to stop the
experiment and wait for another opportunity. If the other vervets figure out that the eau
is coming from a speaker and not from the fellow target vervet, the cunent experiment as
well as future experiments will be invalidated.
Cheney and Seyfarth have a series of ‘out the door’ experiments that they wouid
perform if the political situation in Kenya ever got SO dangerous as to force them to leave(J (1998:306). They are called ‘out the door’ experiments because they wouid
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furthcr experiments of a like nature to be conducted. for the reason given above: some
aspect oftheir conduction would give away the source ofthe trickery, and future
experiments would be invalidated. Note that it does flot matter that the vervets’ ‘catching
on hehavior could also he considered intentional. thus giving weight to the hypothesis
that the behavior is intentional. The fact that experirnentai protocol bas not been upheld
takes precedence over any interesting resuits that may have been obtained. If the vervets
catch onto the trick ail future behaviorai resuits obtained are potentially tainted by this
knowledge in that the hehavior ofthe vervets may become altered. These experiments are
interesting in that the illustrate the possibility that some aspect ofcontrol is possible
even in naturalistic observation. First. there is the ideajust mentioned that the vervets
must neyer know that the alarm cails corne from speakers and flot fellow vervets. The
Fact that the vervets have been exposed to the source ofthe trickery wilI more than likely
alter their future behavior. The fact that the vervets believe’ that the vocalization cornes
from a fèllow vervet is thus a controlled variable. Second. there is the idea that the
vervets must neyer notice’ Cheney, Seyfarth and Dennett: the three observers must neyer
be construed as a source of potential payoff for paying attention to them. For this reason,
manv weeks are spent in the presence ofthe rnonkeys without any attempt at
cxperimentation so that the monkeys can habituate to the observers. It is hoped that once
the ohservers begin experimentation. they will continue to be ignored by the monkeys. If
one ot the observers somehow informs the monkeys of some unknown as yet danger,
then future experimentation is potentially confounded.
5. Evaluation
Dennett’s intentional stance is not without its critics. Most ofthe criticism bas to
do with the idea that it is a pragmatic stance: one takes the intentional stance toward an
oreanism if it shows relative compiexity in its bebavior, and it remains an open question
as to \vhether or not the animai really is an intentional being. One could argue that
Dennett’s intentionai stance does not advance the issue, for tbe question we really want
thc answer to is left unanswered.
Let us sec how bis theory does with regard to rny four guidelines. First of ail,
does it have an accocint oferror? As we saw. Dennett daims that most creatures are true
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believers, they believe mainly truths, and false belief must ultimately arise from a large
set of true beliefs. This is more an account ofthe source of false beliefthan how it might
occur in the animal given his theory. Perhaps an account of error could be distilled from
the experiments themselves, in other words if an animal fails one of the Sherlock Holmes
method experiments, perhaps the source could be due to an error on the part of the
animal. This will not work, however, because these tests are designed to predict whether
an animal’ s behavior is intentional or not, in other words, whether the animal will behave
according to predictions made based on the attribution of a list of beliefs and desires and
a modicum ofrationality to the animal. The content ofthe beliefs and desires cannot be
whittled down sufficiently to be determined as true or false except through further testing
following a particular response in the animal. If beliefs and desires caimot be sufficiently
identified, the content of enoneous beliefs will also not be identifiable. Notwithstanding
Dennett’s daim that truc believers belicvc mainly truths, which is probably accuratc, his
thcory does not have an account oferror, and so it fails the guideline.
The second guideline is that a theory of intentionality must be able to narrow
down the content ofbeliefs and desires to a reasonable degree. I say reasonable here
because I think we should heed Millikan’s suggestion that the content of animal states
will probably not translate exactly into sentences of English. Dennett’ s theory is helpful
in this way, at least in theory. His Sherlock Holmes method applied to vervet
communication systems means that Cheney and Seyfarth can narrow down the
possibilities in content to a reasonable degree for any one ofthe alarm calis. If an initial
experiment stili remains subject to multiple interpretations, content can be nanowed
down even further by performing a family of related experiments, depending on the
vervet’s response to the initial one.
The fact that vervet monkeys in particular are the subjects ofDennett’s applied
theory is an even bigger bonus, for according to Dorothy Cheney, vervets are a species
with laser beam intelligence. This means that they have brilliant narrowly specialized
cognitive talents, with almost no carry-over of skill to other topics (Deimett, 1998:298).
One might think that since they have nanowly specified cognitive talents that the content
oftheir beliefs should be relatively easy to narrow down, either because the beliefs are
less sophisticated or less numerous. Either the hypothesis about laser beam intelligence
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is wrong, or there is something about Dennett’ s method that prevents the narrowing down
of the content of the beliefs of the vervet. Either way, the content of the beliefs of the
vervets cal-mot be identified without multiple additional experiments being performed.
The list ofpotential beliefs and desires for a single communicative cal! remains too large
for Dennett’s theory to pass the narrowing of content guideline. Moreover, Dennett heips
to sink bis own ship in the case ofthis guideline. According to him, ail intentionality is
‘as-if intentionality. One attributes a set of ‘as-if beliefs and desires to the vervet and
one determines whether the vervet behaves in an intentional mariner in the experiment.
Even if one were able to narrow the content of these beliefs and desires enough to
actually identify them, they wou!d stili be deemed ‘as-if beliefs and desires. If ail beiiefs
and desires are of an ‘as-if nature, they will give us no usable information as to their
content.
Concerning the third guideline ofpractical implementability, Dennett’s theory
passes with flying colors. Dennett’s is one ofthe only examples, to rny knowledge, ofa
philosopher’s so-caÏÏed ‘armchair’ theory that has been applied rather successfully in the
field to a particular species of animal. Dennet’s attitude seems to be one of ambivalence
with regard to this success, lie mentions two big problems with his theory when applied
to the field, both having to do with a lack of language in the species under scrutiny. As
we saw, one problem is that the set-up portion ofthe Sherlock Holmes method is usually
done verbally. The other problem is the need to shield the vervets from certain
information that, if known, would invalidate the experiment. Notwithstanding De;mett’ s
own pessirnistic evaluation of bis theory, it stiil passes the guideline in my opinion.
The last guideline is whether or not the theory can discriminate between
intentionai and non-intentionai behavior. This guideline is important in order for the
theory of intentionality to avoid begging the question, in other words, the theory must not
assume that which it is trying to demonstrate in the animal, namely that the animal has
intentional mental states. Dennett’s theory automatically fails this guideline due to the
fact that it is a pragmatic theory. He insists that he is not interested in answering the
question of whether the animal’s behavior is really intentional or not. If we look past his
insistence that there is no ‘really’ question beyond as-if intentiona!ity, we see that his
Stance is at !east able to distinguish between zero-level or the absence of intentiona!ity
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and first order intentionality. The categories of zero-order intentionality versus first
order intentionality are both mentioned in the Stance, but is the theory actually able to
distinguisli between intention-less or non-mental beliavior and intentional behavior?
Dennett’s own opinion on this question does not inspire much confidence. As
noted above, once an experiment bas been performed on an animal, the resuits are ofien
stili subject to multiple interpretations, as was the case in chapter four. In order to
eventually get a yes or no answer to the question of whether the anirnal’s behavior is
intentional, one must perform large families ofrelated experirnents on the animal to
‘narrow down the field’ as he puts it (1998:298). Thus, while bis theory can distinguish
between the various levels of intentionality, it cannot tell us more than that the behavior
is ultirnately as-if intentional. It thus fails the fourth guideline.
6. Bennett’s Guiding Rule
Jonathan Bennett is motivated by precisely this lack in Deimett’s Intentional
Stance. In Bennett’s opinion, Deirnett’s theory lacks an account of what it is for a given
hypothesis to explain a range ofbehavioral data. Following from this, it lacks a
principled way of deciding between intentional and non-intentional behavior. Bennett
makes the hurnorous daim that were we to rely on Dennett’s theory, when an ethologist
cornes up with a mentalistic hypothesis that lie fails to find any rivais to, he merely sits
trembling, hoping that no more ingenious and mean-minded colleague would be able to
come up with a rival (Beimett, 1990:45). The primary motivation for Bennett’s theory is
thus to develop a set of generalizations that will explain a range of behaviors. His theory
will show how to bring a class of behavioral episodes that make reference to mental
states under a single explanation. His theory bears a striking resemblance to Heyes and
Dickinson’s in some respects except with improvements in problem areas.
According to Bennett, what is needed for a theory of intentionality that will be
applicable to non-verbal beings is a set of fairly reliable generalizations relating beliefs
and desires to behavior. These generalizations will provide an explanation of behavior in
terms of belief and desire, although the explanation will not necessarily be causal in
nature. It will be remembered that Heyes and Dickinson immediately couched their(J’ account in terrns of causality, demonstrable in terms of counterfactuals and
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contingencies. Their justification for this move is that experimentai manipulation is
made easier. One major problem with this move is the impossibility of accounting for
error on this type of causally based account. Bennett thinks that causal explanations must
aiways ultimately be couched in neurological terms, and that mentalistic explanations can
be explanatory without being causal (1990:39). In fact, and this will become the defining
difference between mentalistic and non-mentalistic explanations, mentalistic explanations
involve patterns that would be missed altogether by neurophysiologicai explanations.
It couM be asked why Beniiett doesn’t irnmediately go the ‘causal’ route, as many
of the other theories examined thus far have done. Afier ail, causal explanation is the
most popular variety of explanation. In addition to the reason that causal accounts of
intentionality tend to exciude the possibility of error on the part of the animal, there is
another more general reason to avoid causal accounts ofexplanation, on Bennett’s view.
According to one construal of causal expianation, one can only attribute thoughts to
others if their behavior could flot have been caused purely by the physical states oftheir
bodies. If one subscribes to this type of explanation, one would probably end up
concluding that the physicai causes of animal behavior suffice to explain it ail, leaving no
gaps to be filled from outside the physical realm (Beimett, 1990:3 8). One would then end
up giving up research in cognitive ethology because there wouid be no point to it.
Ethologists don’t want to give up the search for mental states in animais until it can be
soundly proven that there is no likelihood that animais have them.
I suspect that Bennett’s reference to this defining feature between mentalistic and
neurophysiologicai explanations, i.e. the notion ofpatterns, originates from a sentence in
Dennett’s article titled True Believers: “It is the pattems in human behavior that are
describable from the intentional stance, and only from that stance.” (Dennett, 1987:25).
Dennett perhaps fails to exploit the notion of patterns since ail intentionality, according to
him, is ultimately all of an ‘as-if nature. 11e is thus flot interested in differentiating
between true intentional behavior and non-intentional behavior. This is unfortunate, for
the notion of patterns is, in my opinion, the defining feature of intentional explanations
that helps get a theory of intentionality off the ground, and circumvents the objection of
begging the question. As we will see, Bennett’s theory is the most comprehensive ofthe(J four being examined because he is able to offer a defining feature, based on patterns, that
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will serve to set intentionaÏ explanations apart from other non-intentional or non
mentalist alternatives.
The core of Bennett’s theory of Intentionality is a belief-desire-behavior triangle.
Ibis triangle should be seen as a mathematical equation, containing the three variables or
components of belief, desire and behavior. Some of these three variables are either given
or need to be solved for. There is a caveat to the solving of the unknown variables in the
triangle. The caveat is that if both the belief and desire variables are unknown, solving
these two variables must be tackled at the sarne time. This is because behavior is only
indicative of an animal’s beliefs if its wants are assumed, and only indicative of its wants
if its beliefs are assumed. There is no possibility of determining one of the elements first
and then going on to study the other (Bermett, 1990:41). Thus beliefs and desires must be
studied and solved for simultaneously. This might appear an impossible situation, how
does one solve the two variables at once if there is seemingly no handle on knowing
either variable? One must make a single temporary assumption, and that is that the
animal’s desires do not change much over time.
The triangle at this stage very much resembles Heyes and Dickinson’s beliefand
desire criteria. It thus suffers from the same problem as their criteria in that it is too
libertine. That is, one caimot identify belief or desire content, or even narrow it down to
a reasonable extent. Any content can be made to fit in the belief-desire pairs. There are
so many possible contents that will fit the pattem ofbehavior that almost any one will
work. Two implications follow from the triangle as it stands: one is that it has no
predictive power and the second is that it cannot account for error. It has no predictive
power because the procedure cannot connect what the animal thinks or wants at one time
with what it thinks or wants at another (Bennett, 1990:41). The procedure also cairnot
account for the possibility of error in the animal because in order to do so, it must be able
to identify the content of the belief as an erroneous one. Amidst the myriad of true and
false beliefs, how wouÏd one go about choosing one and then justifying this choice over
all the other possibilities? As il stands, the triangle also resembles the theory of Dennett,
in that his theory also cannot account for error. The triangle thus needs to be grounded in
some manner to allow for the identification of a particular belief-desire content.
Ç Grounding the triangle will give it predictive power and account for error in that it should
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allow some way of identifying the content of belief. What form should this act of
grounding take?
Bennett thus adds a fourth variable, that of sensory-input, to the triangle, making
it into a square. The square now bas as its four components: sensory input, beYief, desire
and behavioral output. The new relation forged between the animal’s sensory apparatus
and beliefs serves to ground the square. With regard to the identification of content, the
addition of a sensory input component doesn’t seem at first glance to bring us any doser
to the identification ofparticular belief or desire contents. However, with the temporary
assumption that the anirnal’s desires don’t change very much over time, we can
hypothesize what those relatively static desires might be, and then determine what the
animal’s beliefs truly are relative to the desires and as a function ofthe various
environments that the animal finds itself in.
According to Bennett’s theory then, two variables need to be identified, and each
bas its own constraint. The beliefs of the animal must relate systematically to the
environment, desires remain relatively static over time. All that is needed to get the
theory off the ground is to assume that desires don’t change rnuch and identify a single
desire. from that identification as well as the animal’s subsequent behavior one can
hypothesize what beliefs the animal might have given the assumed desire relative to a
particular environment. We can then notice if the desires of the animal do change over
time, because they will be reflected in the changes in behavioral response ofthe animal.
Having determined what the animal’s beliefs are, we can then go back, drop the static
desire assumption, and identify the animal’s real desires.
The theoretical sequence put into the context of a concrete example is thus the
following:
1. Assume that desires don’t change much over time and identify a single desire
in the animal, to get food, for instance, obtain bananas in a tree.
2. Fix a belief according to that desire, for instance that shaking a particular
branch on the tree will make the bananas fail.
3. If the primate shakes that branch, replace the assumed desire with an actual
C one. In this case the assumed desire turned out to be accurate.
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4. If the primate instead approaches a female primate and starts to groom her, the
assumed initial desire will prove to be inaccurate, and replaced with the new
desire that the primate’s desire is to engage in grooming behavior.
Now that it is possible to identify particular belief and desire content, we see that
the square has predictive power. Having identified the environments in which an animal
bas a particular belief-desire content, the square can now predict how the animal will
behave under a particular environmental contingency. That is, future behavior can be
predicted on the basis of the known variables of belief and desire as well as environment
and past behavior, and the idea that desires can be solved for as a function of beliefs
given changes tracked in the environment. There will remain some level of
indeterminacy of content, but this is to be expected.
Bermett feels that although Demett’s theory is quite good overali, the one
problem it suffers from is the inability to rule out rival explanations. That is, it fails one
of my most important guidelines, the ability to distinguish between intentional and non
intentional behavior. In addition to begging the question, explanations generated from
the theory are thus forever vulnerable to being equafly well explained by alternatives
such as those ofthe behaviorist. This problem is similar to that occurring throughout my
discussion in chapter four on methodology, although flot exactly. There are two possible
scenarios involving rival hypotheses that I believe are used interchangeably. The first is
a situation of rival hypotheses where the two rivais represents different camps, such as
mentalist versus non-mentalist. Ail of the experiments seen in chapter four concerned
rival explanations belonging to different camps. In cases like this it is a matter of
eliminating the non-mentalist hypothesis, and in doing so an answer to the question of
whether the behavior is intentional or not is also obtained. The other possible situation is
of rival hypotheses where both are mentalist hypotheses, and the difference is one of
degree, say of a 1St order hypothesis versus a 3rd order hypothesis. In this case, both
hypotheses are within the intentional reaim. Bennett cails this second situation a case of
‘empirically equivalent’ hypotheses. Dennett’s theory does weÏi regarding the situation
of empirically equivalent hypotheses, since his Stance can discem differences of degree
within levels of intentionality. Ris theory does suffer from the first problem mentioned
above, however. Ris theory is unable to mie out non-intentional or stimulus-response
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(S-R) explanations in favor of intentional ones.
When faced with either ofthe situations above, Deimeft’s prescription is to appeal
to some sort of economy rule, either the principle of parsimony or Lioyd Morgan’ s
canon. Rules ofthis type advise one not to attribute cognitive states to an animal whose
behavior can be explained without them. Within levels of intentional explanation, the
rule also prescribes that cognitive attributions do flot go higlier than wliat is needed to
explain the behavior (Bennett, 1991:98). As will be seen, with Bennett’s theory it is
uimecessary to appeal to this type ofrule in trying to etiminate rival hypotheses, since the
different pattems of behavior given the two types of explanations suffice to determine a
victor.
At this juncture I believe it is necessary to make a distinction between the notion
of hypotheses (or experimental predictions as they are sometimes caÏÏed), and the notion
of explanations, in order to clear up any confusion based on conflation of the two terms.
On a purely physical level, there is a distinction to be made between hypotheses and
explanations, namely that hypotheses are made before an experiment is conducted.
Hypotheses constitute a prediction of the experimental resuits, that is, they venture a
guess as to how the animal will perform in the experiment. Hypotheses cannot be offered
or made afier an experiment has been conducted. Explanations, on the other hand, are
usually offered alter the experirnent has been conducted and pertain to the actual
experimental resuits obtained. The issue is usually that two rival explanations are ofien
on offer, one representing the non-mentalist or non-intentional or behaviorist camp, and
the other representing the mentalist or the intentionalist camp. Given an experimental
resuit, it is aiways possible to explain it after the fact by either rival explanation. In rny
opinion, it is in large part the sanctioning of the practice of advancing ad hoc
explanations that allows for either explanation to account for the results of an experiment.
As I claimed in chapter four, the fact that Heyes could account for the experimental
resuits in every case by a non-mental explanation is precisely because lier explanations
are explanations rather tlian hypotheses, and also that tliey are afier the fact. Deimett also
daims that any behavior, human or animal, is subject to explanation in terms of
behaviorist terminology, and that this fact is now uninteresting to us because it does
nothing to advance the issue (1987:247).
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Given that rival explanations can always explain the experimental results equally
well, we should flot look to explanations as giving us any tie breaker victories, unless
they are translated into hypotheses. The notion that rival hypotheses will rarely make the
same predictions of experimental resuits should interest us however, because it is at the
level of prediction that a tie-breaker to the stand-off will be found. Rival hypotheses,
such as non-mentalist versus mentalist, will flot make the sarne predictions of the resuits
because they contain different patterns of explanation. So a non-mentalist hypothesis
will flot make the same prediction of a set of experimental resuits that a mentalist
hypothesis will make, because it seeks to explain behavior at a different level than the
mentalist hypothesis. I gave an example ofthis type of situation that was originally
conceived of by Dennett at the end of chapter three. If we put a rat in a $kiimer box and
train it to take exactly four steps forward to press a bar to get a food reward, when we
retract the bar so that it now takes five steps to get the food, the Skhmerian is forced to
hypothesize that the rat will stiil take the same four steps and end up jabbing the air with
its nose (Dennett, 1978:14). Putting the issue in terrns ofpatterns ofbehavior, the pattern
referred to by the non-mentalist is a different pattern than that ofthe rnentalist. This
point is further reinforced by the daim that mechanistic explanations, i.e., those ofthe
non-mentaHst. behaviorist or stimulus response variety have no predictive power in the
absense of eliciting stimuli, that is, one cannot make behavior predictions on these
varieties unless there is a stimulus to point to.
According to Bennett’s guiding rule, there is a way to decide between two rival
explanations. This is because there is a difference between the two types of explanations.
having to do with the explanatory ground that each type of explanation covers. We are
here interested first in the difference between mentalistic or intentional explanations on
the one hand and behavioristic or mechanistic or stirnulus-response explanations on the
other. The crux ofthe guiding rule is that mentalistic explanations have a different
pattern of explanation from which an extra ingredient emerges. Building on this notion
of a pattern, Beimett daims that mentalistic and behavioristic explanations contain
elaborations of different pattems of behavior. Stimulus response behavior can be
explained by the principle ‘Given a certain kind of stimulus-input, the animal produces a
certain kind of motor output.’ Mentalistic explanations can be covered by the following
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principle: ‘The class of behaviors to be generalized over involves inputs whose only
unifying description is that in each ofthem the environment is such that there is
something the animal can do that wiii, for instance, bring it food’. The class ofbehaviors
invo ives outputs that are united only in that in each of them the animal moves in such a
way that resuits in it getting food. The common factor to ail mentalistic explanations is
that the behavior they explain can be unified by one generalization. The fact that several
pieces of different behavior can be grouped under one unifying idea and generalization
means that intentionalistic expianations have the extra ingredient of a larger based
explanatory power.
Frank Dreckmann has captured the difference between the mechanisms
underlying the two kinds of explanations in a comprehensible manner (1 999:96-8).
Mentalistic behaviors, according to him, abstract from particular tokens of behavior.
They leave out various details that an S-R explanation would include, but possess more
explanatory range because they group together various differently executed behaviors
under a common unified idea. S-R explanations might include mechanistic movernents
that can be described in a kind of token manner, and that are fully exhausted by a
stimulus response type of explanation. Moreover, S-R explanations cannot group a series
of slightly different behaviors together under one common idea.
This distinction can then be used to develop the tie-breaker guiding ruie for ruling
out one oftwo rival explanations. Let’s say we are given a set of disparate behaviors
performed by a group of vervet monkeys following an alarm cail uttered by a member of
the group. One monkey climbs into a tree, another runs along the ground, a third freezes
in its tracks and remains motionless like a statue and a fourth fails to the ground and
appears dead. These behaviors cai-mot be explained in an exhaustive manner by the S-R
explanation, since there is no pattern common to ail ofthe behaviors ofthe type “given a
certain stimulus input S, the animal produces a motor output R”. The stimulus is the
sarne for ail scenarios: an alarm cal!. The response is not the same; each monkey
produces a different behavioral output to the alarrn cal!. Since the disparate behaviors
can be unified under one common notion or idea, that of ‘getting to safety’ for instance.
this series of disparate behaviors can be successftiily explained by a single mentalistic
C explanation, for instance, the belief that the monkeys wants its friends to safe!y
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the predator. The mie of thumb as to whether or flot content can be attributed is whether
or flot one can justify the need for the notion of that particular content in characterizing
the ciass ofenvironments in which the behavior occurs. If there were a single stimulus
type that couid capture and thereby expiain ail ofthe animais’ behavior, content based on
beliefs and desires won’t be justified. In this case, however, there is no single stimulus
that would cover the series of disparate behaviors in the monkeys.
If a theory can discriminate between S-R explanations and mentalistic ones, then
that theory has the ability to ruie out S-R expianations. This translates into being abie to
determine whether beliefs and desires warrant being attributed to an animai or not. In
addition to being able to state whether beliefs and desires can be attributed to an animal
or flot, Bennett’s account can aiso specify what content to attribute to these beliefs and
desires. In terms ofthe question of what content to specifica!ly attribute, it should be
possible to read it straight from the unifying idea. Belief content is thus gotten through
what is perceived as common to ail the environments in which the behavior occurs.
Beimett’ s theory has the ability to ru!e out S-R explanations with the he!p of his
guiding ruie. What about the second situation mentioned above, that of ernpirically
equivalent hypotheses, where both hypotheses are from the mentalist camp? Does his
theory ai!ow us to be able to choose one level of attitude attribution over another within
the reaim of intentionai attributions? 11e daims that the theory can help to decide
between hypotheses that are empirically equivalent. Let us first pin down the issue at
stake in this case. One is trying to decide between two hypotheses, both of which fali
into the intentional reaim except that one might make reference to a 1st order embedding
while the second might make reference to either a 2’ order or even a 3’ order embedding
of belief or desire. Taking up the predator exampie mentioned earlier, a feliow rnonkey
utters an aÏarm cati, and ail other members ofthe group are observed to flee in different
maimers. Interpreting the situation with reference to a 1st order embedding would be: a
vervet gives an aiarm cal! because it believes there is a predator nearby and desires that
its friends should act according!y to get to safety. An example ofa 2’ order embedding
is the foïlowing: the vervet gives the alarm cali because it believes there is a predator
nearby and desires that its friends should believe the same thing. Under the 1st orderC interpretation the a!arrn cail itself so!icits the different fleeing behaviors of the other
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vervets. Under the 2’ order interpretation, the alarm cail solicits the bellef in the vervets
(that there is a predator nearby) that then solicits their own fleeing behavior.
Morgan’s canon in this case wouid suggest that, within mental state attributions,
we should flot go higher on the scale than is needed to explain the behavior. This
translates into picking the less extravagant ofthe two hypotheses unless ajustification
can be found for the need for an extra level of embedding. In this case. foliowing
Morgan’s canon we would have to choose the interpretation with a 1st order level of
attribution. In terms of Bennett’ s theory, to justify the extra level of belief or desire
found in the 2’ order interpretation, the vervets must have a variety of uses for the belief
that there is a predator nearby that came from the aÏarm caller vervet. If we go with the
first interpretation, we find that in trying to inciude ail of the various reactions of each of
the fellow vervets we end up attributing a single thought to the alarm caller of
“implausible complexity”, according to Bennett (1991:105). The thought wouid have to
include the fact that the alarm cail solicits rnonkey X to fun along the ground, monkey Y
to climb a tree, and so on. On Bennett’s theory, we wouid rather group ail ofthe vervets’
various reactions to the eau, and find that we couid simplify the interpretation into a
unitary thought ‘behave appropriately to the beliefthat there is a predator nearby’. The
clause ‘that there is a predator nearby’ within the attribution constitutes a 2 order level
of ernbedding. Having justified the need for the 2’ order embedding, we then have a
method to distinguish between empirically equivaient hypotheses on Bennett’s theory,
and a reason to choose the 2’ order interpretation, because it is the simpler of the two.
Be;mett’ s theory, as it stands, stiil lacks an account of en-or. None of the
examples discussed so far make mention ofthe possibility of error in the animal. It is the
input and output principles (elaborated on above) that must be amended to account for
error, because they are what dictate how the animal wiii react. The original input
principle was the foilowing: “The class of behaviors to be generalized over involves
inputs whose only unified description is that in each of them the enviromnent is such that
there is something the animal can do that will aiiow it to achieve X”. This is an error free
principle, for it assumes that the environment will aiways be such that the animal can act
to achieve its goals. The new input principle, amended to include the possibility of error,
would thus read: “Each ofthe relevant environments, given the animal’s perceptual
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apparatus and space, is signfficantly similar to the ones in which there is something the
animal can do to allow it to achieve X.” A comparison set of environments is created to
allow for comparison between what the animal does. and what really needs to occur in
order for the goal to be achieved. Thus if the animal misperforms in some way or fails to
execute a movement, the error will be recognized as such by the difference in the way the
animal has behaved and the way it ought to have behaved to achieve the goal. This
difference will be reftected in the comparison ofthe two environments, i.e., between the
comparison and the actual. The output principle is also amended to include this
comparison set of environments. The original principle was “The class of behaviors to be
generalized over involves outputs that are united only in that in each of them the animal
moves in some way that resuits in it achieving X”. The new principle wouÏd be “On each
occasion, the animal moves in a way that would allow it to achieve X if the environnient
were a member ofthe comparison set”. Stated in this way, the principle allows for error
the possibility that the environment is not a member ofthe comparison set.
It should be apparent to the reader already that Bennett’ s theory of intentionality
is a strong theory. With regard to the four guidelines I have developed, he devetoped his
theory with two ofthe guidelines already in mmd. That is to say, he became interested in
developing a theory that would not only state when it is reasonable to attribute beliefs and
desires to an animal, but also what the content ofthose beliefs and desires might be. His
theory thus passes two of the guidelines, the theory is able to rule out rival hypotheses
and thus discem when an animal is acting intentionally from when it is not, and the
theory is also able to narrow down the content of those beliefs and desires to a reasonable
degree. He is explicitly concerned to include an account of error in his theory, and thus
creates a set of comparison environnients that should point out when the animal lias
erred. The last guideline is empirical tractability. Bennett’s theory automatically passes
this guideline due to his interest in ameliorating the lacunae in Dennett’s theory. As
rnentioned, Deimeft’s theory lefi out a way to mle out rival hypotheses, a phenomenon
originally manifest in the discussion ofexperiments in chapter four. Bennett’s theory
offers a way to rule out rival hypotheses using the experiments themselves in their
supposed ambiguous state.
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7. Conclusion: Empirica]ly Equivalent Explanations Solved
The lefiover problem from chapter four, it will be remembered, was the inability
of the mentalist or theory of mmd theory to declare a victory over the non-mentalist
explanations. With Bennett’s theory it is possible for mentalist explanations to eliminate
the non-rnentalist camp. Generally speaking, because each explanation manifests a
different pattern in the behavior, the mechanistic explanation is unable to account for a
variety of different behaviors in the way that the intentional theory can. As it turns out,
the situation in chapter four was flot the more difficult case of empirically equivalent
hypotheses, where rival hypotheses are made that both pertain within the realm of the
intentional, but rather a simple case of determining whether the behavior in question is
intentional or flot, which was one ofmy four guidelines. As mentioned, the fact that
Heyes regularly neglected to mention hypotheses for any of the experiments is one source
of the problem. The situation was also exacerbated by the experimental design
characteristic to theory of mmd experiments and the fact that her competence and validity
criteria were ill-suited to this design. In theory of mmd experiments and unlike ordinary
experiments in psychology for instance, the presence or absence of the behavior in the
experiment is flot the deciding factor. If Premack and Woodruff had been able to point to
the mere presence of a particular behavior as demonstrative of a theory of mmd in
primates, the situation would be quite simple and Heyes would not be able to tack on her
ad hoc explanations as equally accountable for the resuits. It is precisely because of the
fact that the behavioral result is a given, and the issue is whether or not an intervening
variable of a mental state is justified, that allows Heyes to try and account for the results
according to a non-mentalist explanation.
Cognitive ethology cannot seem to get out from under the weight ofthe
objections ofbehaviorism. I think I have been successful in advancing the case for the
search for mental states in animals in at least one important respect in these two chapters,
and that is by finding a theory of intentionality that does flot beg the question. In being
able to show whether a bit of behavior is intentional or not, Bennett’s theory lias the
further bonus of quieting the most damaging behaviorist objection to a certain extent.
This notion ofpatterns, first discovered by Demett but that he failed to exploit I suspect
because of bis insistence on the unimportance ofthe ‘really’ question, was picked up on
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Q by Beimeil and constitutes, in my opinion, another much needed ‘shut-down’ argumentagainst behaviorism and the idea that animais cannot have mental states for their behavior
is explainable without recourse to mental states.
G
Chapter Seven
Concept Attribution
1. Introduction Three Empirical Questions
One ofDavidson’s daims in the first chapter makes a link between the three
notions of concepts, propositional attitudes and language. It is the following:
1. In order to have a belief, one must have the concept of a belief.
2. In order to have the concept of a belief, one must have language.
This daim has two issues implicit to it. One that I will flot be concerned with in this
chapter is ‘Can one have propositional attitudes, such as beliefs and desires, witliout
having the concept ofthese propositional attitudes?’ The other issue ofwhich I wili be
examining one aspect in this chapter is ‘Must one have language in order to be said to
have concepts?’
Theories of concepts can be loosely distinguished in at least three different ways,
according to what question investigations are designed to answer. Some theories wiil
attempt to provide answers to more than one question, and ail three questions are
interreiated. One type of theory is primariiy interested in the question ‘what is a
concept?’ Many ofthe psychological theories of concepts are interested in answering
this question. The first theories examined in this chapter, those of Definitionai,
Prototype, and Exemplar, could be classified as attempting to answer this first question.
A second type oftheory is interested in answering the question ‘what is it to possess a
concept?’ Many such theories wiil postuiate a set of necessary and/or sufficient
conditions that must be met in order for a creature to be considered to possess a concept.
The Definitionai theory mentioned above would aiso fail into the category of theories
interested in this second question for it postulates a set of necessary and sufficient
conditions for possession of a concept. Christopher Peacocke aiso is interested in this
question in his book “A Study of Concepts” (1984). A third possible question is ‘When
is it reasonable to consider that a creature has or is operating with a concept?’ This third
question motivates theories that are concerned with the issue of concept attribution. Ruth
Millikan views concepts as abilities, and so lier theory based on evolutionary adaptability
is a good example of a theory interested in this third question (Millikan, 2000). For the
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purposes ofthis chapter I wiii be particulariy interested in theories concerned with this
third question in its applicability to animais, for these theories take performance in the
animal, i.e., behavioral evidence, sornetimes aiso in the form of conditions, as prirnarily
indicative ofwhen concepts might be attributabie to the animai. Using behaviorai criteria
as opposed to verbal response as indicators means that these types oftheories will be iess
dependent on language and more easily applicable to animais.
There are flot many theories of concept attribution in the literature that have been
specifically appiied to animais. While there are numerous theories in both the
psychological and philosophicai iiterature that been offered for humans, a theory by
Colin Ailen (1999) is the only other existing theory apart from Millikan’s, to my
knowledge, that has been designed specifically for animais. One reason bas been offered:
most human theories of concepts cannot apply to animais because they hinge too rnuch
on possession ofa natural language. Nick Chater and Cecilia Heyes (1994) base their
views on this reason. As we saw in chapter five, Heyes aiong with Anthony Dickinson
bave deveÏoped a theory of intentionality, listing two behaviorai criteria that have to be
met in order for an animal’s action to be considered intentionai. In this chapter, I will be
discussing Heyes and Nick Chater’s search for a theory of concepts that wouid appiy to
animais. The theory must contain a construal of ‘concept’ that meets three criteria in
order to be considered as potentially appiying to animais. The caveat, according to
Chater and Heyes, is that uniess there is some way of understanding concepts that is
independent of their connection with naturai language, non-linguistic animais cannot
have concepts. I wiii also discuss Alien and Hauser’s (1998) reply to their article, as weil
as their subsequent development of a minimal constraint on concept ascription that is
based on evolutionary theory. The point of the minimal constraint is to isolate and
identify abstract concepts by the fact that they contain characteristics that are not
perceptually available. This minimal constraint, albeit difficuit to impiement
experimentally, nonetheiess represents a positive step forward in the eventual
deveiopment of a theory, since it goes beyond the usuai contentious constraint of stimulus
generaiization. I will end the chapter with Colin Alien’s (1999) theory of concept
attribution. In my opinion it is the best exampie of a theory of concepts that can appiied(J to animais because it provides a behavioral demonstration of concept-mediated behavior.
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The detection, recognition and modification of errors made by the animal are the crux of
the criteria.
2. The Search for a Theory of Concepts
The main daim in Chater and Heyes’ aptly titled article “Animal Concepts:
Content and Discontent” is that unless there is some way of understanding concepts that
is independent of their coimection with natural language, non-linguistic animais cairnot
have concepts (1994:209). I am ofthe opinion that it seems a bit defeatist to discuss
whether human theories of concepts that are linguistic in manifestation would apply to
non-linguistic animals in the first place. If it has been established that language is so
intimately tied to these theories, and that animais do flot have a reasonably humanlike
language, then what is the use in examining whether these theories apply to animais?
Nonetheless, one way to get around Chater and Heyes’ daim is to demonstrate that there
exist theories of concepts that are flot dependent on language.
Given that Chater and Heyes’ aim is to search for a particular sense of ‘concept’
that meets three criteria, it could be said that they are interested in the ‘What is a
concept?’ question. Rather than developing a set of criteria that wouid have to be met for
possession ofa concept they instead ask ‘Is the nature of concepts such that they are
intimateiy tied to language?’
Chater and Heyes examine the various theories of concepts on offer in the
literature. They are specificaily searching for a sense of concept that satisfies three
desiderata.
1) Applies to hurnans, and assigns to them concepts corresponding to terms of
natural language.
2) Can be applied to non-linguistic creatures.
3) Allows for empiricai investigation of animal concepts (1994:210).
These can be summarized for ease of discussion as the human applicability criterion, the
animal applicability criterion, and the empirical tractability criterion. As we saw from
the discussion in the two previous chapters on intentionality, crucial to any theory
applicable to animais is that it is able to generate testable hypotheses on animais, and SO(J criterion three is absoiuteiy necessary to a search for a theory that would appÏy
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animais. Criterion two is aiso necessary, it is the main motivation behind a search for a
theory that wouid appiy to animais. Criterion one. however, is only present for
comparative purposes. It is there to aiiow comparisons to be made between animais and
humans, otherwise, it is argued, we wouid be at pains to cail whatever items we find in
animais ‘concepts’. However, it couid be argued that criteria one and two when taken
together, raise a problem similar to my point made above. How can one search for a
theory that appiies to humans and assigns them concepts that correspond to terrns in
naturai ianguage that wiii also appiy to non-linguistic animais? There wiÏi only 5e very
few theories to choose from that wiii be abie to satisfy this iinguistic condition of being
abie to correspond to items in natural language and also apply to non-linguistic animais.
Chater and Heyes discuss the implications that wouid arise if some but not ail of
their criteria are met for any given theory of concepts. In the first such scenario, where
the first or second criteria have flot both been met, then we cannot ask whether animais,
like humans, have concepts (1994:210). They seem to be referring to my point made
above but offering a counter justification to it: that without a theory that appiies both to
humans as weii as animais, there is no basis for comparing the two species. I think that
this criterion is a iittie stringent for the foiiowing reason. Chater and Heyes’ overali
daim is that uniess a theory can be found that understands concepts independent from
ianguage, there is no way in which theories of concepts can be applicable to animais. If
such a theory was indeed found that applies to animais and did not depend on language, it
risks faiiing the first criterion, appiicability to humans. This is in fact the counterintuitive
conclusion anived at by Chater and Heyes with regard to perceptual theories, as wiii 5e
seen.
In the second scenario entertained, if the empiricai tractabiiity criterion is not met,
then aithough we might have found a theory that is in principie applicable to animais, we
cannot test whether it does in fact appiy to animais (1994:2 10). This speculation is again
a iittie defeatist, reiying on a lack of ingenuity on the part of designers of experirnents. It
assumes that even if we were to find an apparentiy applicable theory, it wouid not 5e
testable because ethoiogists wouid be unabie to come up with an experimental design that
circumvents the iack of ianguage probiem in animais.
C
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Chater and Heyes don’t specffically discuss the implication if only criteria two
and three are met. What could be wrong with having a theory that applies to animais, is
empirically tractable, but doesn’t apply to humans? In some sense then, failure ofthe
first criterion resuits in an automatic failure of ail three criteria, or at least removal of the
theory from consideration, since it doesn’t apply to humans. This seerns to run counter to
the endeavor of finding a theory of concepts that applies to animais. I think that the first
criterion should be removed from the list for two reasons. The first is that keeping the
first criterion ensures that the sense of concept being sought must correspond to natural
language items and this unnecessarily restricts the range oftheories being looked at.
Second, hurnan applicability is not necessary for a theory of concepts that will be applied
to animals. Human applicability forms a useftil base for comparison and could comprise
one thread of research into the area of comparative cognitive ethology. But as ve have
seen, when it’s the only aim, it might prematurely close the door on animal abilities that
are flot humanlike. The counter argument to the idea of removing the human
applicability criterion from the list is usually that we would flot be able to caIl the theory
a theory of concepts. I think the only real conclusion to be drawn in such a case is that
the theory cannot be deemed a theory of concepts that applies to humans. The aim with
regard to investigating concepts in animais, i.e., comparative versus non-comparative,
must be gotten straight ftom the beginning. The non-comparative aim of investigating
animal concepts, that these theories should stand on their own, appeai-s to be missing
from Chater and Heyes’ examination. This point becomes obvious in their two
interpretations considered next.
There are two interpretations of the relation between human and animal concepts
that underlie Chater and Heyes’ search for a theory. The first interpretation is that the
animal’s categorization behavior is mediated by mental structures ofthe same sort that
are postulated in human theories of concepts, such as definitions, sets of exemplars or
prototypes. The second interpretation is that animais may be judged to have concepts
because they can learn discriminations that correspond to hurnan categories. The first
interpretation is the stronger ofthe two, for it assumes strong similarity of mental
processes between the two species. This strong interpretation is unlikely to be met given
the lack of as yet identification of a lexical system of communication in animais. It also
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prematurely nanows the range of possible theories to be exarnined, in that they must
relate to natural language. The second weaker interpretation shows more promise at
being met by animals. However, if animais were found to make discriminations that
don’t correspond to human categories, they could flot be fit into either interpretation
above. Although the second weaker interpretation seems to move away from the aim of
comparison a littie, it is flot entirely divorced from it. Thus neither interpretation on
Chater and Heyes’ view is completely devoid ofcomparison aims and this is a problem,
because they don’t allow for examination of a theory that fails criterion one, i.e.,that
doesn’t also apply to humans.
Chater and Heyes evaluate three types oftheories under the strong interpretation,
those of Definitionai, Exemplar and Prototype. The first criterion, applicability to
humans, is automatically passed for ail three theories since the theories under scrutiny are
theories of human concepts. The only possibilities for failure are thus criteria two and
three, animal applicability and empirical tractability.
According to the definitionai view of concepts, to possess a lexical concept is to
know a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for category membership. For instance
the concept ‘chair’ would have as one ofits necessary conditions ‘four ieggedness’.
Lexical items of natural language are represented in terms of complex definitions in a
system of internal representation, a so-called language of thought (1994:213). Since this
theory concerns the relationship between lexical concepts and a proposed language of
thought, and animais do not have natural languages, it cannot be applicable to animals. It
thus fails criterion two, applicability to animais. Even if, on Chater and Heyes’ view, one
were to assume a language of thouglit in animais, there are experimental difficulties that
would then make the definitional view violate criterion three. It would be impossible to
translate experiments done on humans that demonstrate the definitional view, which
include reasoning and comprehension tasks, to animais (1994:2 14). Both these tasks
involve questions with lexical items and verbal answers on the part ofthe tested subject.
It could be objected that Chater and Heyes’ description ofthe definitional view is
too restricted, that flot ah concepts on the definitional view must necessarily correspond
to lexical items. Rising to the objection that there is not a definition for every concept, it(J is claimed on some versions of the theory that some concepts correspond to complex
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lexical items or representations that break down uitimateiy to sensory primitives which
are themseives undefined (Laurence and Margolis, 1999:9). It couid be argued that
animais possess these sensory primitives. At any rate, the view has been unabie to rneet
other objections made by opponents, in particular concerning a failure to agree on a
particular definition for many concepts, and so the definitionai theory of concepts is
probably flot the rnechanism underlying human concept possession either.
On the Exemplar Theory, a concept consists in a set of representations of
particular instances ofthat concept. For instance, to have a particular concept such as
that of ‘chair’ is to have a set or list of stored representations of chairs that have been
encountered in the past (1994:215). The Exempiar view is different from the definitional
view in that the membership set of a concept is a list of representations rather than a
lexical item from a presumed language ofthought. In other words, one does not need to
have a language of thought for this theory to apply. One must, however, demonstrate
how an item belongs to a particular concept, and this is made much more difficuit by the
fact that the item is not in the form of a word, but in the form of a set of representations.
In the human case, stored exemplars of concepts are assigned internai labels
corresponding to the naturai language labels iiterally assigned to the stimuli they
represent. This mechanism cannot reasonably be translated to non-linguistic animais.
There is a trade-off of sorts. The theory shows promise in its appiicability to animais
since no language is assumed. However, it loses on empirical tractability since it is
difficuit to empiricaily demonstrate that particular representations are concepts without
appeai to the mechanism of naturai ianguage. Without such a theory of what makes one
representation rather than another a concept, the theory caimot be appiied to animais.
The theory thus fails criterion two as weli as criterion three.
One would think that the Exemplar theory is indeed ernpiricaiiy tractable
especiaiiy since it is easily demonstrable experimentaily by stimulus generaiization. In a
typicai experiment, animals are rewarded for choosing one item from a set of two that
falis under the target concept. For instance, a pigeon would be rewarded for choosing a
barstool over a loveseat if the target concept was ‘chair’. However, on Chater and
Heyes’ account, stimulus generaiization is not a proper experimentai coroliary of
C concept-mediated behavior. Stimulus generaiization ofien is presented as a forced choice
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situation where the subject must choose one of onlv two items. and the objection camiot
he ruied ont that the suhject is mereiv responding to paired associations as opposed to
choosing an item because it is an instance ofa particular concept. Moreover, potentiai
amhitiuitv resuits from the fact that concept mediated accotmts. however they rnight be
mauitèst behavioraiiv. cannot be sufficientiy distinguished from the act of stimulus
gencralization in the testing situation. That is. it is impossible to determine with certainty
that animais are not in fact responding to paired associations ta case of stimulus
generalization) instead of picking out an instance of a particular concept (true concept—
mcd iated behavior). In order for the animal’s behavior to be truly deemed concept
niccliated. instances that correspond to concepts would have to be recognized by the
animal as having feutures in common. On a foiced choice paradigm sucli as in stimulus
gencralization experiments. this aspect is not necessarily demonstrated. Additionally,
crus-reièrencing between concepts that have overlapping features is impossible to
demonstrate expenmentallv. for instance, stimulus generalization may be able to explain
the abihtv to distinguish dogs from non—dogs, and furry from non—furry. but flot both
features at once (1994:216). Briefly. the view cannot be apphed to testing procedures
‘‘ ithout an adequate account ofhow exemplars are linked to concepts.
If there is no account of how exempiars are bound to concepts. how then is the
vic’w applicable to humans? The theory thus fails criterion one as well. The theory thus
fails ail three criteria. on Chater and Heyes’ view. I happen to think that the view, with
its experimental corollary of stimulus generalization. is most prornising as a potential
theotv of concepts in the animal. The fact that on this view concepts are not necessarily
lexical items but rather representations. and that demonstrations of concept possession
eau tic donc non—verballv in an experimentally tractable manner points to the fact that this
t\ pe ut theorv should be further explored for its potential applicability in animais.
On the third theory that Chater and Heyes examine, the prototype view, concepts
arc complex representations whose structure encodes a statistical analysis ofthe
pmperties their members tend te have (Laurence & Margolis, 1999:27). An item is
catcgorized as falling under a concept if it is sufficiently similar to the central tendency or
pmtotype ofthe concept. This view differs from tue definitional view in that the
pmncrties in question are net necessarv for possession ofthe concept. and it is flot
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Q necessary to satisfy ail of the relevant features in order for the item to fail under theconcept. This is again a non-linguistic theory and so could in principle be applicable to
animals. It suffers from the same problem as the theory on Chater and Heyes’ view,
liowever: the process of categorization, however it might be manifested behaviorally, is
flot sufficiently distinguishable from the behavior of stimulus generalization in the testing
situation, so it fails criterion three.
The prototype view, like the Exemplar theory, may even fail criterion one, on
Chater and Heyes’ view. The idea is that category or concept discrimination is probably
flot based on feature analysis because the visual world is too complex for the brain to be
able to compute features from the visual array. The variability and complexity of natural
stimuli and even of artificial OflCS such as geometrical shapes makes the approach
improbable in the human case. It should be clear at this point that Chater and Heyes’
criteria are too stringent and are preventing theories that are not so intimately tied to
language that would ideally be applicable to anirnals from being considered, often
because they fail criterion one, applicability to humans.
On the basis ofthe above albeit very brief discussion ofthe three types ofhuman
theories of concepts that fali under the first interpretation, Chater and Heyes conclude
that the categorization behavior of animais cannot be mediated by the same type of
mental structure that is thought to underlie human theories of concepts. They then daim
that the argument could be advanced that it is obscurantist to daim that anirnals possess
concepts on the basis of any empirical data, since it is flot cÏear what is being postulated
(1994:22 1). The possibility is lefi open however, that what it is to possess a concept is
flot a matter ofpossessing a particular internal structure. They next examine theories of
concepts based on the weaker interpretation ofthe mechanism underlying concept
possession. That is, that animals may be judged to have concepts because they can learn
discriminations that correspond to human categories. One would think that examining
theories where language is not a pre-requisite would be the Ïogical starting point for
Chater and Heyes, since animais don’t have language. Perceptual theories wiÏl have a
much better chance at passing criteria two and three, being more applicable and
empirically tractable in animals, than theories that require a language.
O
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Chater and Heyes survey the literature on perceptual theories of concepts next,
starting with the correlational view. The correlational view on concept possession states
that possessing a concept consists in the subject’s ability to discriminate instances from
non-instances of that concept. Perceptual theories differ from the more ‘lexical’ theories
described above in that a concept is described as simpiy an internai representation with
no commitment as to what the structure ofthe representation is. This type oftheory, as
will be seen, is very similar to Allen’s theory of concept attribution. The phenomenon of
stimulus generalization rnentioned earlier wouid also be a good experimental
demonstration ofthis category oftheory. The correlational view is inapplicable to
humans, on Chater and Heyes’s account, and so fails criterion one. The problem with the
human version of the theory is that it is unable to account for enor in categorization.
That is, one object may be mistaken for another, or an object may be failed to be taken as
such. A possible reason for human enor has been cited as failure to categorize correctly
because of sub-optimal perceptual conditions. Proposals put forth to account for error
include the division ofperceptual conditions into those that are optimal and those that are
sub-optimal. Categorization errors only occur in sub-optimal perceptual conditions, such
as when light is insufficient, or the subject is too far away from the object. If a principled
way of distinguishing the two types of conditions could be found, the problem would
apparently be avoided. According to Chater and Heyes, it is difficuit to see how to define
the distinction between the two conditions in a non-circular way. furthermore, even if
researchers were to work on the theory to make it applicable to humans, empirical
tractability in animals would then be compromised, and so it would then fail criterion
three.
There are two problems with Chater and Heyes’ reasoning above. First, it is
unlikely that humans do flot categorize or recognize concepts on a perceptual basis at
least occasionally. Second, it is unjustified to fail the theory on applicability to humans
just because it lacks a completely worked-out account ofenor. Accounting for error
hasn’t been raised as an issue thus far with regard to other theories of concepts. Third, it
is difficult to see how, if researchers could improve the theory to make it applicable to
humans, it would therefore become less applicable to animals. If we accept Chater and(J Heyes’ conclusion here, what does that say about their classification scheme? I think it
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makes it abundantly clear that criterion one should be removed from the scheme. If the
theory is applicable to humans on their reasoning, empiricai tractabiiity in animais is
automaticaily compromised. This reasoning renders the whoie exercise of finding a
theory of concepts that appiies to animais as well as humans counterproductive.
At this juncture Chater and Heyes entertain a potentiai objection to their overali
daim. The daim is that unless a way is found to separate language from concepts, non
linguistic animais cannot be said to have concepts. It couid be objected that since such a
close connection is posited between concepts and language, an implicit division is
thereby irnposed between iinguistic and non-linguistic animais. It couid then be argued
that the above daim does not appiy to linguistic animais, if such a category of animais
exists. Certain animais could possess concepts if they also possessed a language, and it is
up to someone eise to find out whether animais have a language or not (1994:228).
Chater and Heyes do not believe that research into this category of so-called iinguistic
animais should be pursued. They state two caveats that shouid dissuade anyone from
thinking that research into the linguistic capacities of animais is a viable research path to
take. The first is that very few species of animais, if any, possess the linguistic abilities
to be properly described as concept possessors. Sucli animais wouid have to use
predicate expressions, which have a particular syntactid/semantic roie in the animal’s
language. This presupposes that the animal’s ianguage has a syntax and a semantics, and
most ianguages of animais do flot have both these attributes, according to them. There
are thus only a few species of animais to which concepts couid, even in principle, be
applied.
The second caveat is that, on a practicai ievel, it would be rnuch more difficuit to
identify which concepts an animai has than in the human case. We have seen this
problem as it was outlined by Davidson in chapter one, and aiso with regard to theories of
intentionaiity and the difficuity of identifying or at least of narrowing down the content of
mental states. The concept of number has ofien been cited as a relativeiy easy concept to
identify in the animal, and many have ciaimed that certain species of animais can count.
The rejoinder to this is to daim that a number concept can only be applied to creatures
that can perform additional feats such as the arithmetic operations of multiplication and(J division. Here again, the strategy is to ‘up the ante’, i.e., additional coroilary capacities
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are smuggied into the class ofthings that wouid imply concept manipulation and
possession. Why wouid a creature possessing the number concepts, one, two, three, and
four have to be able to perform the range of human arithmetic operations on these
numbers in order to be said to be using these concepts?
The problem with both these caveats is the same. With language as well as
numbers, a much too enriched definition of language and numbers is being used. With
such an enriched notion of language, a holistic view of language acquisition must also be
held; il must be assumed in the case of a chuld that the chiid either knows language, or
not. It is the same with numbers, the child either knows how to count and perform
arithmetic operations on numbers, or not. If one does flot wish to espouse this extreme
‘ail or nothing’ view of concept and language acquisition, in particular because it
contradicts the way that both these capacities are acquired in the child, the alternative is
to think that there are leveis or degrees of ‘sophistication’ to language and concepts. In
this case then, the chiid need flot have ail that human possession ofa number concept
entails and yet stili be operating with the concept of ‘four’ in some minimal sense. In
terms of language, as the case of chiidren shows one could be operating with a much
impoverished syntax and sernantics and stili be attributed concepts.
Chater and Heyes next anticipate an objection that takes the form of one of the
main issues of discussion in cognitive ethoiogy, that of experirnental versus naturalistic
observation. In view ofthe fact that naturalistic observation is the main observatory tool
ofthe ethologists, they next look at attempts to test concept possession in a naturalistic
setting as opposed to the iaboratory situation, and on animais that communicate in an
apparently linguistic manner.
Chater and Heyes admit that so far, they have been discussing experiments in a
laboratory setting where control is achieved by examining the behavior of socially
isolated members of a limited range of species, in a standard apparatus, and in relation to
objects that are not designed to resemble those that the animais might encounter in their
natural environments (1994:232). This is a most succinct expression ofthe contrast
between naturalistic observation and experimental manipulation. They note in their
article that Deimett daims that in the situation of laboratory experimentation rigor of
method is exchanged for relevance ofresuits. Dennett’s flippant remark is an
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understatement ofthe general idea that while greater control over variables is achieved in
the environment of a laboratory, the lack of the animal’ s natural habitat brings up
questions as to how representative the animal’s reactions are. This dense daim made by
Chater and Heyes must be unpacked to elucidate the issues involved. First there is the
setting. The issue is how much the animal’s environment constrains its behavior. If it
turns out that the animal’s natural environment plays a large role in shaping the behavior
of the animal, then the argument could be made that a laboratory setting is artificial and
so constrains the animaÏ’s behavior as to restrict it to unitary stereotypic movements. The
practice of using only socially isolated members of a species could also have a negative
impact on the generalizability ofresults, especially if notions like ‘social intelligence’
continue to gain viability at least in those cases where the species lives in a community
environment. Isolated members ofa species don’t have the prior and maybe crucial
experience of interacting with the other members. The issue of using only a Ïimited range
of species to study will certainly impact issues of generalizability to other species, and
maintains a bias toward only studying certain species of animals that is not characteristic
of the field of cognitive ethology. The employrnent of an artificially conceived of
standard apparatus to train all species with might mask or contradict the true natural
abilities of each species, abilities which might differ from species to species. Last is the
issue ofusing objects not found in the animal’s natural environment. It will be more
difficuit to assess the animal’s degree oftool-use for instance, if one is only employing
novel tools flot found in the environment ofthe species under study. Given the above, I
am of the opinion that Chater and Heyes should have started their search for a theory of
animal concepts with data from naturalistic observation in the wild as opposed to from
the laboratory.
Chater and Heyes begin their survey of the wild by asking: can the problem with
animal concepts be remedied by relocating the animal back to its natural environrnent?
They have chosen to discuss Cheney and $eyfarth’s research on vervet monkeys, one of
the rnost thorough naturalistic studies to date, in their opinion. Cheney and Seyfarth have
identified four separate alarm cails given by vervets in danger situations. One ofthese
calis they have identified as the leopard call, and its function is to defend against
predation by leopards. Chater and Heyes daim that in order to get around the
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indeterminacy of content objection, i.e., how can we be sure that the content ofthe cali
contains the concept ‘leopard’, the researchers appeal to evolutionary explanation.
Evolutionary explanations explain concept possession by appeal to the proper or adaptive
ftinction of the behavior. If the leopard cail is an adaptation for defense against leopards,
then the vervets could reasonably be described as possessing the concept ‘leopard’.
Chater and Heyes find a problem with this, however. An attribute is an adaptation with
respect to a particular function only if it was the fulfihiment of that function which
resulted in the retention of the attribute through natural selection. There is a question,
according to them, as to whether the current flinction of an attribute is a reliable indicator
of its adaptive significance. The point is that reliance on history to teli us whether an
attribute has been retained through natural selection does flot ofien pan out because the
information about past conditions and events is lost in the mists oftime (1994:234). Ail
this to say that evolutionary theories fail on criterion three, they would not support an
empirical investigation into animal concepts.
I think it is ironic that Chater and Heyes would fail the theory on this particular
criterion, since Cheney and Seyfarth’s work represents one ofthe first examples of
successful experimental manipulation within the confines of a naturalistic environment.
Cheney and $eyfarth were able to mitigate the indeterminacy of content problem
precisely with experimental manipulation. Certainly the theory is empirically tractable;
in fact, this is how the researchers were able to narrow down the possibilities for the
content of the alarm cails. The way that they went about narrowing the content through
experimental manipulation brings out the necessity in using a combination ofthe two
types of investigation, rather than choosing laboratory experimentation over naturalistic
observation. The manipulation employed was to play previously recorded alarrn calis in
certain circumstances yet stili within the confines ofthe anirnal’s natural environment.
Moreover, Chater and Heyes seem to ignore the rnost important aspect of evolutionary
theory, that survivai is indicative of an adaptive trait. If the atarm eau was not adaptive,
ail ofthe members including the caller would perish. finally, I think it is also ironic that
Chater and Heyes would choose Cheney and Seyfarth’s work with vervet monkeys in
particular to discuss. Let us try to imagine for a moment how we would go about setting(J up this experiment in a laboratory situation. It hinges on discovering the nature ofalarrn
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calis in monkeys. Imagine the difficulties involved just in capturing a leopard to use for
the experiment, and then providing ail the apparatus necessary for the monkeys’ escape
routes, such as trees or bushes. What validity can the lab experiment possibÏy possess if
it doesn’t alÏow the subjects to escape in the manner they would normally when in the
presence of a predator, i.e., by climbing trees?
The problems with Cheney and Seyfarth’s research cited above are used to argue
for a completeÏy contrary daim by Chater and Heyes: good reason for a return to the
more unnatural methods of laboratory investigations. Their argument is as follows. If
the adaptive function of an attribute depends on the history of natural selection, then the
content of a concept depends on its history of selection through learning, and it is in the
Ïab, rather than the field, that we have the best opportunity to record this history
(1994:235). In light ofthe considerations discussed above concerning experimental
manipulation versus naturalistic observation, this argument, with its emphasis on
learning, is not very convincing. The first thing to note is that on rnost accounts, a history
of selection through learning caimot be considered as evolutionary in the strict sense of
the term. On evolufionary accounts, it is evolution or natural selection and flot learning
that shapes the animal’s behavior. Moreover, while the case could be made that
experimental manipulation brings out the sought out capacity in a much more rapid
marmer than waiting and observing through the process ofnaturalistic observation for it
to occur, the importance ofregistering the anirnaÏ’s reaction in its natural environment is
equally important to an evolutionary explanation, in order to ensure that it is the animal’s
natural reaction that is being recorded, and not some artificial stereotypic movement.
The appeal to rapidity is not justified in this case, especially when we consider what is
iost in the process.
Chater and Heyes entertain a possible objection to their general daim before
making their final conclusion. It will be remernbered that their general daim is that
unless a sense of ‘concept’ can be found that is independent from natural language, there
is no plausible sense in which non-linguistic animals can be said to possess concepts.
Their conclusion is that since they have not been able to find such a sense, that the terrn
‘concept’ cannot be used in the same way in discussions pertaining to humans and
C animais. The general objection entertained is that Chater and Heyes are mistaking the
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true aim of investigation into animal concepts, which is twofoid. First, investigations aim
to determine whether animais can discriminate stimulus categories based on human
concepts, and if so, the second aim is to determine whether the concepts used are in any
way like human concepts. Note that the comparison aim is secondary, contrary to Chater
and Heyes’ two interpretations mentioned above where it appears as the first
interpretation. This objection also makes the more general point that Chater and Heyes
are mistaking the failure to assimilate animal concepts with human concepts for a total
failure to find concepts in animais. The situation is not quite this dreary. Ah they can
conciude is that certain human theories of concepts, particuiarly those that reiy on
ianguage possession, probably do flot appiy to animais. Claiming that animais do flot
possess human concepts does not mean that animais possess no concepts at ail. Just as
we saw in chapter one, claiming that animais do flot possess a human ianguage does not
thereby mean that they possess no ianguage at ail. The main point of investigations into
animai mentality is not to vindicate the existence of human attributes in animais, aithough
this may be a corollary aim.
There is a point of comparison to be made between the twofold aim of cognitive
ethology with regard to concept investigation and the strong and weak interpretations of
the iink between human and animai concepts in Chater and Heyes’ discussion. The first
aim of cognitive ethology corresponds to the weak interpretation. That is, ethoiogists are
primariiy interested in whether animais can discriminate stimuius categories. The fact
that the categories are based on human concepts is because there are no other types of
concepts known to humans that couid serve as a comparison basis at this early stage of
investigation. The mention of comparison to human concepts in the second aim
constitutes a branch of comparative cognitive ethoiogy, where studies are made of
animais with the underlying aim of eiucidating human capacities.
This issue of confusion in aims in cognitive ethology has been discussed in an
article by Coiin Aiien (1999). In this article, Allen suggests that Chater and Heyes’
strategy is a rather anthropocentric investigation of concepts in animais, because it
focuses too much on assimiiating animais to humans. He then goes on to expiain that his
1991 article, where he and Marc Hauser eiucidate a minimai constraint on concept
ascription, could have been misconstrued by authors such as Chater and Heyes. The
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reason is that a comparative aim is explicitly stated by Ailen and Hauser: that they are
attempting to render plausible the daim that animais can be shown to be operating with
internai representations that function rather like human concepts. They also employ two
thought experiments on human reactions to death with the idea that these experirnents
would aliow for comparison between human and animai reactions to death. In Aiien’s
later work, particularly in his working out of three criteria for the attribution of a concept,
he is trying to move away from what lie views as the anthropocentric angle that a
comparative approach offers, i.e., justifying the attribution of concepts to animais by
using human behavior in similar circumstances as the benchmark. The ultimate aim in
his later investigations is that research into animai concepts should be able to stand on its
own (1999:34).
The issue here, in my opinion, is what specific purpose the comparative approach
is being used to accomplisli. There are two possibilities. The comparative approach is
either being used to advance and elucidate theories ofhuman capacities, or it is being
used to justify the existence of animal capacities. The first purpose is beneficial, when
explicitly stated as such, for advancing our knowledge ofhuman beings. Ibis second
purpose is where trouble arises, for it is where the challenges discussed in the first four
chapters are allowed to enter in.
3. A Minimal Constraint
Colin Allen, as a precursor to his iater work on a theory of animal concepts, and
in conjunction with Marc Hauser, has developed a minimal constraint on concept
ascription. The basis ofAllen and Hauser’s researcli is a theory-theory approach within
an evolutionary framework. Generally speaking on a theory-theory construal, a concept’s
identity is determined by its role within a theory (1991:49). In answer to the question of
what theoreticai role mental ascriptions might play, Allen and Hauser believe that
mentalistic terminology allows a mode of description that enables explanation within an
evolutionary framework. This type of framework is being adopted by more and more
cognitive ethologists. If the project of cognitive ethology is viewed as the study of
behavior within an evolutionary framework, then an animal’s behavior is examined in
C light of its function and evolution. Mentalistic terms provide a level of description that is
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appropriate to the functional level of description that is the concern of evoÏutionary
hypotheses. A mental state relates organisms to their environrnents through its content.
A mental state will be adaptive insofar as its content makes links between the
environment and the organism’s behavior. Mentalistic terms thus provide a natural
vocabulary for ethologists to frame their hypotheses. If one were to apply non
mentalistic terms, or pureiy behavioristic terms to this framework, one would flot get the
same resuit.
Allen and Hauser make two preliminary distinctions that are central to the
elucidation of a minimal constraint on concept ascription. The first is to posit a
difference between a concept and an internai representation (1991:50). One can attribute
an internai representation without attributing a concept. They make use of an example in
the literature to illustrate the difference. Herrnstein’s (1976) work on alieged concept-
possession in pigeons has been widely cited both for and against the idea of anirnals
possessing concepts. In a typical experiment, pigeons were shown numerous pictures
corresponding to the categories oftrees, water and persons, along with other pictures that
were considered ‘near misses’, i.e., not in the category. The pigeons were able to pick
out pictures corresponding to their respective categories. Herrnstein concÏuded that
pigeons possess concepts corresponding to certain natural categories. Allen and Hauser
do not believe that concept possession is warranted in the case ofthe pigeons. While
they allow that the pigeons could indeed recognize features of certain categories that
were present in the pictures and then use these properties to recognize a general class or
category, they do not believe that the pigeons were operating with a concept. They
believe that this experiment illustrates the difference between category discrimination and
concept-rnediated behavior, a difference that hinges on the act of recognition.
The second point they make is thus to distinguish between two forms of
recognition, between the ability ofrecognizing an X and the ability ofrecognizing
sornething as an X (1991:51). The abiÏity to recognize an X can be thought of as an
extension of a discrimination ability, and corresponds to the behavior of the pigeons in
the experiment. That is, the individual may have the ability to classify things into two
categories or classes, that of X and non-X, but this ability can also arise as a result of(J accidentai co-extension. The second ability. recognizing something as an X, requires an
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internai representation that abstracts away from the perceptuai features that enable one to
identify X. This distinction basically functions to discriminate between stimulus
generalization and actual concept possession. The act of stimulus generalization is
recognizing an X and the act of recognizing something as an X is an instance of concept
mediated behavior.
This distinction in senses ofthe term ‘recognition’ is interesting and one can see
how it might advance the issue. We can now sec how the act of recognition might be
pivotai in distinguishing mere discrimination from concept possession. What the
distinction lacks however, in my opinion, is a description of the behaviorai manifestation
of concept possession. Category discrimination is clearly behaviorally manifested. To
recognize an X is to pick it out from an anay ofobjects. The notion ofclioice, or picking
the object out as opposed to another or other objects, is crucial to the act of
discrimination. What would be the behavioral analogue to concept-possession?
Recognizing something as an X is flot easily behaviorally rnanifested other than verbally,
i.e., by naming the concept it corresponds to. This is probabiy why most experiments
that test for concept possession in animais are discrimination tests; we lack a test that
would evidence concept-rnediated behavior in non-verbal animais. As we shah see
below, Allen and Hauser have corne up with two thought experiments that they think
should demonstrate concept-mediated behavior.
Aiien and Hauser make a third distinction, having to do with types of concepts,
although they do flot explicitiy state it as such. They make a distinction between
concepts that are perceptually direct but that might stiii invoive some abstraction of
features, and what they cali abstract or higher order concepts, where presumably few or
no perceptual features are present. “Square” is considered a perceptually available
concept, since many of the features necessary to its identification are perceptually
available such as four sidedness etc. The concept of “deatli”, the topic of investigation in
the two thought experiments, is considered a higher order concept, since few or none of
its identificationai properties are visually available. There is no actual criterion that must
be passed in order for a concept to be considered abstract per se, rather the rule ofthumb
is that if the concept lias more features that are not perceptuaiiy given than features that
are given, then it is an abstract higher-order concept. On this distinction, many concepts
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find themselves as falling midway on the scale, because many concepts have a
combination of both types of features. A potential problem with this type of
classification scheme is that any concept that lias only perceptually available features and
that is successfully discriminated will aiways be susceptible to explanations based on
category discrimination rather than concept mediation.
Regardless ofwhether this distinction carves concepts into the right types or not,
if Allen and Hauser are going to make this distinction, they need to allow for the
possibility that concepts with perceptually available features are going to be evidenced by
the act of discrimination, and that the discrimination ability in those cases is nonetheless
a case of concept mediated behavior. One can see that in distinguishing abstract concepts
they are trying to rule out the possibility of accidentai co-extension, which is coincidentai
in nature. However, there must be a way to demonstrate the possession of abstract
concepts experimentally without completely disqualifying discrimination behavior.
Based on the above distinctions, Allen and Hauser have come up with a constraint
on cognitive representations for them to count as concepts. It is the following:
An abstract concept could reasonably be attributed to an organism if there
is evidence supporting the presence of a mental representation that is
independent of solely perceptual information (1991:54-5).
One can see what Allen and Hauser are getting at here: they are trying to rule out acts of
discrimination based on perceptually available cues. However, given the distinction
between types of concepts outlined above, one has to conclude that this constraint applies
to higher-order concepts more so than the lower-order perceptually avaitable type.
Moreover, the situation remains the same for perceptually available concepts. There is
no way to demonstrate them since stimulus generalization has been ruled out as a
possibility.
Allen and Hauser have developed two thought experiments that put this constraint
into effect, and thus should help formulate the beginnings of an empirical program into
concept attribution. They first suggest two features of behavior that would evidence the
constraint, that is, they’lI outiine two possible ways in which concept mediated behavior
could be manifested. One is that an organism whose internai representations are concept
like should be able to generalize information obtained from a variety ofperceptual inputs
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and use that information in a range of behavioral situations. Second, organisms that can
be said to possess a concept should be able to alter what they take to be evidence for an
instance of that concept (1991 :55).
The two experiments have been designed to be conducted in the species’ natural
habitat, and although they could be modified for the lab setting, it would be better to run
the experiments in the environment where natural selection has shaped the animal’s
behavior. The first experiment, performed on Vervet monkeys, would test mothers’
responses to distress calls made from a loudspeaker that have been previously recorded of
their own offspring. The offspring belonging to the mothers being tested have recently
died. This experiment should test whether mothers are able to generalize the information
of seeing the death oftheir offspring to the situation ofhearing a distress cail from the
offspring. There are three possible reactions to the cail, on Allen and Hauser’s account.
1. They might respond as they did when the infant was alive (i.e., look towards
the speaker).
2. They might respond in a more agitated fashion (i.e., initiation of searching
behavior).
3. They might flot respond at all, continuing the activity they were engaged in
prior to the playback (1991:56).
If the mothers reacted in the first way, then it seems reasonable to conclude that these
Vervets do not have the concept ofdeath, because they react as if the infant is stiil alive.
(There is the possibility that the initial reaction is one of shock. A human might react the
same way upon hearing the voice ofhis or her recently deceased conspecific. The delay
in reaction would be crucial in deciding the issue and should thus be recorded in this
experiment.) The second reaction has two interpretations: either the mother believes the
infant is stili alive, or the cail lias elicited some kind of surprise reaction. Whether or not
the mother has witnessed the actual death of ber infant is relevant to lier reaction in this
case. Reaction 3 is more decisive as evidence for the possession of a concept, according
to Allen and Hauser, in that the ability to ‘turn off a response seems to indicate that the
animal lias recognized the finality of the disappearance of the infant. There are other
interpretations to this reaction, or lack of a reaction, however. Possibilities include that
C the mother did flot hear the cali, that she heard the call but did flot associate it as
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belonging to her infant, that she believes the cail cannot have corne from her infant
because her infant is dead, etc.
What constitutes the ‘right’ response in this experiment? Theoretically, if the
mothers were operating with the concept of death, they would realize the finality of death
and either fail to respond when the fake distress cail was played, or react with surprise.
Since two responses are equaily acceptable, this experiment suffers sornewhat from
arnbiguity. Moreover, the case can 5e rnade that sorne species of animais operate with
the concept of death, for instance, sorne animais feign death in the presence of predators.
There is no ailowance in this type of experiment for the fact that feigning death is an
adaptive response to predation, and that perhaps animais are operating with the concept
of death in cases where they pretend to be dead. Instead reactions to artifical situations
regarding death are investigated here. Shouid we take the reaction ofthe animal when
her dead offspring ‘cornes back from the dead’ as centrai to the concept of death, rather
than the behavioral adaptive success of it?
The second thought experiment investigates the second testable feature of
behavior mentioned above, the creature’s ability to alter what they take as evidence for an
instance of a concept, in this case death. This experiment invoives administering a drug
that makes an animai seem dead to ail appearances, piacing the ‘dead’ animai in a cage
with its conspecifics, and recording their behavior once the drug wears off and the animal
begins to revive itself. The second trial involves a repeat ofthe first, and the third trial
involves choosing another individuai animal as a target and putting it in turn through the
same two trial procedure. The point is to see if a change in response in the conspecifics’
behavior occurs, and then whether this change in response is generalized to subsequent
‘dead’ individuais. There are two possibie reactions on the part ofthe animais, one is that
they faii to modify their behavior, and the other is that they rnodify their behavior the
second time the same animai is drugged and the first time the new animal is drugged.
The first reaction does not seern to warrant the expianation that the animais are displaying
concept mediated behavior, since they wouid be reacting as if the animais were really
dead, thus failing to alter what they take to be evidence for it. However, the second
reaction does suggest that they are operating with the concept of death and that they are
C able to aiter what they take to 5e evidence for it (1991:58).
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In this second experiment, the theoretically ideai response is if the other animais
alter what they take to be symptoms constitutive of death and do flot remove the
conspecific. The right response in this experiment, flot taking evidence of death to be
final because of certain evidence to the contrary, is opposite to the right response in the
first experiment, taking evidence of death to be final, regardless of evidence to the
contrary. From an adaptive point of view, I don’t think that either of these experiments
are compatible with what really goes on in nature. Consider what havoc would be
wreaked on the animal kingdom if animais truIy were observed to second-guess their
judgements made about death. Certainly Burghardt’s snakes would no longer be able to
use feigning death as an escape route from predators, since the predator would be prone
to checking if the snake was really dead or not.
These two experiments are only thought experiments. Is there any way to turn
them into real performable experiments? Ethical considerations rnost likely would
prevent these experiments from being canied out. Even setting ethicai considerations
aside in the animal case, ethical considerations in the human case would prevent the
human analogue from being carried out, and we would thus have no comparative ability.
In the case of testing for an abstract concept such as death, it would be helpful to have the
hurnan resuÏts already established in order to have a point of comparison. Afler ah, the
human benchmark is already in place in imagining the tiwee possible reactions of the
animals.
In my opinion, this minimal constraint on concepts, while it might 5e very
interesting on a theoretical level, raises problems in its practicai application. hi principle.
Allen and Bekoff can be seen as advancing the issue on concept attribution by coming up
with a constraint that taps into possession conditions for abstract concepts, concepts that
don’t have perceptually distinguishable properties. In practice there are a few problems
with this idea. One is that concepts with uniquely perceptible properties get disqualffied.
Many concepts are actually a mix ofperceptuahÏy available properties and abstract
properties. Moreover, identification of the abstract properties is rendered more difficult
on a practical levei by the fact that they are perceptually unavailable. As an example,
consider what might 5e the abstract properties of death. Allen and Hauser offer no dues(J as to what properties they have in mmd. The second problem is the lack of a behavioral
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analogue for concept possession. How is it possible to demonstrate that one possesses or
is operating with a concept independent ofperceptual information? The method of
forced choice is ruled out since it conflates with discrimination and discrimination is flot
sufficient to be characteristic of concept mediated behavior. I think that the source of the
problem is that Ailen and Bekoff have carved concept types at the wrong joints. There is
something to the idea that some concepts have abstract or perceptually unavailabie
features, but I don’t think that this is the most central feature of concepts in general and
thus the wrong aspect to focus on with regard to concept attribution in animais.
4. Behavioral Criteria
In Colin Allen’s later work, he actually develops and advances three criteria for
the attribution of a concept to an animal. He offers a reason why none of the cunent
theories apply to animais, that constitutes a difference outlined in the beginning of the
chapter, that between what it is to have a concept and when it is reasonable to attribute a
concept. Most ofthe current theories offer a philosophical analysis of what it is to
possess a concept. His three criteria will rather stipuiate when it is reasonable to attribute
a concept to an animal. These three criteria were mentioned in chapter one as being a
theory that goes some way to showing how it couid be demonstrated that a non-linguistic
animal could be attributed concepts.
Alien first makes a distinction between two notions of ‘concept’, that is, between
the social and the individual notion (1999:35). Allen notes that there is a tension within
the notion of a social concept, marked by the phrase ‘the concept of X’ that remains
unanalyzed in the psychological literature. Use of the definite article ‘the’ implies that
there is such a thing as a single construal of X that ail individuals share. from the
perspective ofthe individual, marked by the phrase ‘Fred’s concept of X’, it seems
unlikely that there is a single such construal of X, but rather that there exist several
different but overlapping strands ofthe concept X. This is an interesting observation to
make, and the influence of Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘family resemblance’ is clear. The
idea is that there is no essence to a particular concept, that is, concepts do flot have a
given set of properties that can be identified, rather the set of ofien overlapping properties( constitutes a family resemblance type of classification.
200
Social and individual notions of ‘concept’ play different roles in a theory of
concepts. Social concepts play a role in explaining cooperation and communication
arnong individuals. Individual concepts are implicated in the structure of individual
behavior and differences between the behavior of individuals. Allen daims that
philosophical discussions are plagued by failure to heed the distinction between the social
and the individual construal of concept. For instance, in the views of Davidson examined
in Chapter one there is a failure to heed the difference. It will be recalled that one of
Davidson’s reasons for flot wanting to attribute the beliefto Malcolm’s dog that the cat
went up the tree is that the dog lacks the constituent concepts of ‘cat’ and ‘tree’. Allen
takes it that by including the article ‘the’, that Davidson must be referring to the human
and social construal of the concept. Mien daims that there is no reason to think that the
dog must have that particular human social construal ofthe concepts cat and tree, since it
might flot exist even at the level of humans, and further that the dog must have no
concepts whatsoever if it lacks that particular canonicai construal of the concept.
The underlying basis for Allen’s three criteria for concept attribution is this notion
of individual concept and its relationship to perception. From bis work with Hauser on
developing a minimal constraint in concept attribution, it is possible to demonstrate, with
the evolution of bis work, a possible connection from perception to concept formation in
animais. The issue that Ailen is confronting in the evolution ofhis work is the foilowing.
A person with a concept is able to discrirninate between an array of items.
Discrimination thus constitutes one of the various abilities of a concept holder. However,
a person who can discriminate is flot necessarily operating with a concept. The issue is
thus to establish when it is reasonable to attribute a concept to an individual above and
beyond the mere ability to discriminate, since discrimination is flot a decisive indicator.
Recalling his establishment of a minimal constraint on representations, it can be seen
from that work that he was stating a condition necessary in the organism to distinguish
the act ofmere stimulus generalization from concept using. That is, somehow the animal
must be able to abstract features from the perceptuai situation that wiil flot 5e present in
every perceptual situation. This constitutes an additional step up from stimulus
generaÏization, where the animal merely uses the features perceptually available to it to
discriminate between two items. Allen thus believes that some animais can construct
201
category schemes that transcend particular perceptual stimuli. Concepts are the nodes of
such category schemes.
Thus an organism may be reasonably attributed a concept X whenever
1. The organism systematically discriminates sorne X’s from non-X’s.
2. The organism is capable of detecting some of its own discrimination errors
between X’s and non-X’s.
3. The organism is capable ofleaming to better discriminate X’s from non-X’s
as a consequence of its acquisition of capacity 2 above (1999:37).
Central to this set of conditions are the detection and recognition of error, and the
subsequent modification of behavior as a result of this recognition. Allen notes that the
above three capacities are empirically tractable in languageless animais. This is a
particularly interesting bonus, for it provides a solution to the issue of how concept
mediated behavior could be evidenced aside from through verbal response. On this set of
criteria, concept-use is directly behaviorally evidenced.
According to Allen, capacity 1 lias already been extensively investigated. As we
saw earlier, experiments on pigeons have shown that they are able to choose items out of
an aiiay based on their belonging to a particular category. Over and above this category
selection capability, Allen notes that capacity 1 is also systematic, that is, not based on
rote mernorization of stimulus response training trials by the animal. Evidence for this is
shown by the fact that the trial stimuli in the experiment were different from the training
stimuli. For instance, if the pigeons had to choose faces from an array that included other
body parts, the test trials contained faces not seen in the training trials. Capacity 1 is also
seen as n-iore complex than forced choice discrimination (choice between two items
only), in that forced choice discrimination requires only the ability of stimulus
generalization. However, capacity 1 demands lcss than what is required by the minimal
constraint, that is to choose items as belonging to the same concept category despite the
items flot, from a visual point of view, appearing to belong to the saine category. This
last ability of abstraction is really what is characteristic to concept possession. for this
reason, Allen has included the other two conditions. The other two conditions together
should allow investigators to settie questions about the content of the representations,
although they have flot been empirically tested as ofyet.
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Condition 2 concerns the detection of enor. I mentioned in chapter 5 and 6 that
an account of error is important for a theory of intentionality. Error is also important in a
theory of concept attribution. Allen means to take the notion of enor to a more complex
level by making the detection ofone’s own errors a condition of concept attribution. He
gives an example of an experimental phenomenon that could be interpreted as personal
error detection and recognition. In the experiment, a group ofpigs were tested for
making same/different choices on pictures of faces and other body parts. In a particular
trial for instance, the pigs would be presented with either oftwo situations, one would be
two pictures that are both of the same body part or both of a face, the other possible
situation would involve two pictures of different body parts or a body part and a face.
The subjects wouÏd have to choose either the ‘same’ or the ‘different’ answer choice,
depending on if the photos represented sameness or difference in the two photos. The
pigs performed at about 90 % accuracy. Most interestingly however, during the
commission of errors, it was noted that the pigs physically backed away from their
incorrect choices 22 of 23 tirnes, demonstrating to Allen that the pigs were aware that
they had made an error.
Condition 3, according to Allen, is the hardest to articulate and defend. He thinks
the difficulty is not so rnuch a matter of empirically demonstrating condition 3, but rather
that satisfaction of condition 3 provides a link between the first two conditions. The
reasoning is the following. If detection of ones own errors, condition 2, bears on the
capacity to make discriminations, condition 1, then this demonstrates that the animal may
be comparing the stimuli to an abstract representation or a concept. These abstract
representations are worthy ofthe label ‘concept’ because they are independent ofthe
perceptual representations.
Concerning the pessirnistic conclusion by Chater and Heyes, that there seems to
be an unbreakable link between concepts and language, Allen thinks that many have been
seduced into this conclusion by the fact that languages provide a structure that has a vast
number of degrees of freedorn with respect to immediate perception. Linguistic
representation is the most fine-grained system of conceptual representation that we know.
But it would be premature to conclude that it is the only one (1 999:39). Not only do I
C agree wholeheartedly with this remark, but also I think it sums up perfectly the problem
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with searching for a theory of concepts that appiies to animais as well as the search for
intentional mental states in animais. The fact that humans have language has many
benefits: thoughts and concepts are easily demonstrated in the human through the avenue
of language. However, this ease of demonstrability also masks other potential avenues
for these items to be demonstrated, and it is in the search for these items in animais that
this difficulty is encountered and must 5e circumvented.
Conclusion
As mentioned in the beghming of the chapter, there are at Ïeast three questions that
researchers might 5e interested in with regard to concepts and their applicabiiity to
animais:
1. What is a concept?
2. What is it to possess a concept?
3. When is it reasonable to attribute a concept?
A theory attempting to answer question one is concerned with what the nature of a
concept itself is. The other two questions are interested in concept possession or
attribution. Not onïy is there much overiap between the three questions, particularly
between the second and third questions, but also many researchers end up interested in
more than one question, hence the three questions are interrelated. Colin Allen, it will be
remembered, offers this distinction (between nature and possession) and the fact that
many theories offer a philosophical analysis ofwhat it is to possess a concept rather than
offering criteria for when it might be reasonable to attribute a concept as a possible
reason why many ofthe current theories cannot be appiied to animais.
Chater and Heyes, as discussed in the chapter, are looking for a sense of concept
that meets tbree criteria and daim that uniess a sense of concept can be found that is
independent ofnaturai ianguage, animais cannot be said to possess concepts. Usuaiiy, a
creature is said to possess or be operating with a concept if they pass some criteria that
demonstrates rnastery or possession, criteria that could be behaviorai or verbal or both in
nature. The criteria that Chater and Heyes list apply to the term ‘concept’ itselfrather
than the creature’s meeting certain conditions. The case can 5e made that Chater and
C Heyes are really investigating two questions, the first having to do with the nature of the
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term ‘concept’ and the second with appiicabiiity of certain theories to animais. In this
case, their first criterion, or at least the second part of it, is unnecessary. Their first
criterion, it will be remembered, is that the sense of concept must apply to humans and
assign them concepts conesponding to terms ofnatural language. The stipulation that the
sense of concepts must assign terms corresponding to terms in natural language is
unnecessary, because any theory that does flot meet this stipulation will fail to be
considered, and this is ironic considering that any theory whose members correspond to
natural language items is unlikely to apply to animais in the first place. With the
elimination ofthis second part ofthe criterion, many theories, especially those flot based
on lexical items or a language ofthought, might otherwise be prornising places to search
from the point of view of research.
In my opinion the constraint conceived of by Allen and Hauser, although
theoretically interesting, is flot empirically tractable. The aim in a search for a theory of
concepts, as with a theory of intentionality, is that above ail it should be empirically
tractable. Colin Allen’s three criteria for attribution ofa concept meet this condition as
well as not depending on language, and thus constitute a good starting point for research
into animal concepts.
c Conclusion
In the interim summary at the end ofthe first haif ofthe thesis, I noted four so-cailed
grains oftruth’ that could be retained from each ofthe chapters. These grains oftruth
can be expanded upon to generate possible future research paths that could be taken by
cognitive ethoiogists.
From chapter one and the discussion ofthe ‘no thought without language’
argument I iooked at a second strategy that couid be taken to circumvent Davidson’s
arguments that wouid require construing the term ‘language’ in a larger sense to mean a
system of communication. Taken in this wider sense, the anirnal’s system of
communication could be considered a language. One possible research path would entail
discovering the nature of the system of communication of various species of animais, as
well as it’s various fimctions and uses. Within the reaim of function, the ‘intention’ of
certain vocalizations could be studied in much the same way as Cheney and Seyfarth
have donc with vervet monkeys, except with a wider range of species.
from the discussion on anthropomorphism in chapter two I concluded that the
practice of anthropomorphism, when used for heuristic purposes, was weii suited to test
possible hypotheses concerning mental states in animais. As noted at the end of chapter
three, it forms the basis for the development of a new fifth aim in ethoÏogy, concerned
with studying the private experience of animais. Since the private experience of another
creature can oniy be known at best through indirect means, as the discussion on Nagei
made clear, one promising way to tap into this experience is to generate hypotheses about
how the animal might react in a given situation by asking ourseives how we might react
given the same situation. Getting over the obstinate opinion that the private experience
of another creature is an area forever ciosed to scientific investigation, I think this area
shouid be studied, even if only to find out that perhaps Deimett is right, that animais do
not have anything that might be deemed subjective experience because they Ïack an inner
eye or an overseer ofthis experience. Certainly advances soon to be made in the area of
cognitive neuroscience wiii heip to determine if animais have any kind ofexperience, if
indeed they do, and also what the content ofthat experience might be.
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As mentioned in chapter four, experimentation is central to the discipline of
cognitive ethoiogy. However, the objection that experirnental investigation into animais
is nearly impossible and made even more difficuit by their lack of human language is, in
my opinion, a naïve perspective that is the resuit of an inability to adapt to the special
nature ofthe object being investigated. Certainiy waveiengths are not investigated in the
same empiricai manner as chemicai reactions. Extending the anaiogy, it wouid be naive
to assume that animais should be studied by the same experirnental means as humans.
Add to this the fact that more ofien than flot in human experiments, because humans are
so capricious and have the common communicational abiiity of language, the true aim of
the experience has to be cloaked or masked by some other only slightly reiated aim in
order flot to contaminate the resuits. Looking at the situation in this way, it turns out that
experimentation on animais is made easier by the fact that subject-deception is, or has so
far been found to be, unnecessary with animais. However, as was made abundantiy clear
in chapter four’ s discussion and especially with regard to higher-order mental state
investigation such as a theory of mmd, there is stili a long way to go with regard to
refining this type of investigation. This is in large part due to the nature ofthe topic
under investigation, narnely mental states, and their unobservability. The fact that mental
states must be infened makes experimental resuits open to interpretation. This situation
is what aliows other types of expianation such as those behaviorist or mechanistic in
nature equally able to account for resuits, a seemingly hopeless situation from the point
of view of those attempting to demonstrate that animais may have some type of theory of
mmd that mediates their behavior.
It is exactiy this frustrating situation or ‘stand-off between types ofexplanation
that initiaily led me to investigate, in the second haif of the thesis, theories of
intentionality and concept-attribution. The case could be made, although it was flot my
initial intention, that both topics in the second half are also rnotivated by two objections.
The objection that the chapters on intentionality respond to is that even if animais have
mental states, we have no way of finding this out because there is no theory out that can
teli us how to look for them or when we have found them. The theories of intentionality
that I examined are concerned with investigating whether animais possess mental states(J that are intentionai. and because at least one theory can discern intentional from non-
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intentional behavior, an answer to the objection is obtained. As for theories of concepts,
the objection could be made (and is investigated by Chater and Heyes) that since
language is so intimately bound up with concepts, then animais cannot possess concepts
because they lack human language. Believing that concepts needed to be divorced from
language before any other worthwhile investigation can be embarked upon, I decided to
treat this objection in the chapter.
from the standpoint that I anived at as a resuit ofmy investigations in this thesis
as well as the many issues that I did flot examine, many potential research paths present
themselves. With regard to theories of intentionality, the case could 5e made that
although Bennett’s Guiding Rule breaks the stand-off situation with regard to
explanations, how empirically tractable his theory is constitutes an entirely different
issue. Since Bennett mentions himself that Dennett’s theory provided the starting point
for lis own reflections and subsequent development of lis Guiding Rule, it might be a
viable endeavor to combine the two theories, given that Dennett’s theory is very
ernpiricaÏly tractable, and Bennett’ s has the bonus of mitigating the lacunae found in
Dennett’s theory.
I did flot treat the topic of consciousness in any great depth except for a mention
in dhapter three of Aiken’s and Dennett’s views on the matter. Aside from the relation
between self-awareness and consciousness, a vast topic of which an entire separate thesis
could 5e constructed, there are many other facets of this phenomenon that could be
treated. More input from phulosophers and psychologists on the task of dividing
consciousness up into levels and or types would be welcome as a starting point (Ristau,
1992). Part ofthe reason that I chose not to examine consciousness directly is the sheer
vastness and variability ofthe literature on the topic. Another issue related to
consciousness is the question ofhigher order mental states and whether animals possess
them, in other words theory of mmd research. In my brief examination of this issue I
have concentrated mainly on defending this branch ofresearch against objections and
criticisms. There is stiil much to 5e discovered in this area, such as other possible
indicators of a theory of mi, particuiarly within the realm of the recent creation of the
notion of ‘social intelligence’. Also ofparticular interest is the discovery and subsequent
daim by Marc Hauser that certain species of animais, in particular dogs, have been
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observed to engage in play behavior. This daim is interesting because play is not
considered to have much, if any, evoiutionary function. The discovery of the possibiiity
ofpiay behavior in certain species of animais runs very slightly contrary to the presentiy
dominant view that ail behavior in animais bas evolutionary significance.
As for theories of concept attribution, it will be remernbered that I cited the major
flaw in Chater and Heyes’ search for a theory as being the second part of criterion one,
which stipulates that the sense of concept that they are searching for must correspond to
humans and assign them concepts corresponding to terms of natural language. If this
second part was dropped, a good comparative search of the literature could then be
conducted with the remaining two and a haif criteria: that the theory be applicable to
humans, to animais, and be empiricaily tractable in animais. Moreover, if the relation to
naturai ianguage were dropped, many of the theories of concepts surveyed by Chater and
Heyes would have been good candidates for animais, especially the perceptual theories.
If it was found that none of the theories applying to humans were also applicable to
animais, then the comparative aim couid be dropped altogether, the first criterion
removed, and the search performed again. I don’t think that this wouid even be necessary
however, because there must be some overlap between humans and animais, at ieast
within the reaim of perceptuai concepts.
Conceming research into concept possession in animais, there is a lot that is
already being done, such as Hernstein’s work with pigeons, and Allen’s work. On a
philosophical theoreticai levei, a new and interesting une of research is presentiy being
examined. Since theories of concepts applying to humans are not so easiiy applicable to
animais, in part because of the lack of ianguage in animais, some authors have recentiy
wondered if perhaps the notion ofnon-conceptuai content couid be appiied to animais.
Representational content that is non-conceptual means that the possessor ofthe content
need not possess the concepts for the properties, objects and relations that are inciuded in
the representational content. This is an attractive proposai in its applicabiiity to animais
for two reasons. The first is that the propositional content ofmentai states is difficuit to
pinpoint in the animai, especialiy given the iack of language in animais. Perhaps the
situation is even as dreary as Millikan prophesizes, that the content of animai states
caimot be translated into sentences of a human ianguage. The second reason that non-
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conceptual content is an attractive proposai in that it circurnvents the objection that one
cannot attribute mental states to animals without the caveat that they must possess the
requisite concepts. If the content ofthe animals’ states is non-conceptuai, there is no
need to demonstrate that the animal possesses the concepts named in the content.
Central to this proposai are three issues: the first is to establish the existence of
non-conceptual content. The second issue is to determine what the relation is between
non-conceptuai content and conceptual content, if there is one. A third issue concerns
what type of expÏanatory or causal role, if any, the non-conceptual content plays in the
content of experience. b argue for the existence of non-conceptual content, the most
popular argument usually appealed to is the fine-grained nature of experience argument
which is briefly that perceptual experience outstrips the conceptual resources ofthe
perceiver so that it becomes almost necessary to posit the notion of non-conceptual
content to pick up the slack. Another argument that bas been used is the idea that
experience is independent of belief. The phenomenon of perceptual illusions is ofien
used to provide a rationale for this idea, i.e., the perceiver sees a waterfall image on a
sheet ofpaper and the water appears to be moving even though he or she lmows that the
waterfall is flot actually in motion.
As for the relation between non-conceptual and conceptual content, the issue is
whether there a relation between the two types of content or is non-conceptual content
autonomous, as some authors have argued. Christopher Peacocke has advanced the
Autonomy Thesis, stating that it is possible for a creature to be in states with non
conceptual content even though the creature possesses no concepts at all. Some authors,
althougb they accept the notion of non-conceptual content, deny that it can be
autonomous (Bermudez and Macpherson, 1998).
Concerning the explanatory role that non-conceptual content plays, it is obvious
that this will be difficuit to establish, given the so-far indirect arguments employed to
establish its existence, i.e., picking up the slack created by outstripped conceptual
resources. That is, if there is no way to demonstrate the existence of non-conceptual
content except by derivation, demonstrating the explanatory or causal role it plays will be
that much more difficult.
C
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The above potential research path is a good example ofthe main principle ofthis(
thesis, which is that cognitive ethoiogy can benefit from phiiosophical input. As is the
generai opinion of many researchers in cognitive ethoiogy, phiiosophical input provides
the necessary theories, and cognitive ethology ideaiiy should pursue an empiricai
investigation of these theories. One thing is certain: topic areas such as investigation into
mental states and concepts in animais can oniy proceed in so far as they are theoreticaiiy
well-developed ftom a phiiosophical point ofview.
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